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ABSTRACT 
Unlike other major financial markets, Mainland China is home 
to many mixed conglomerates that control a range of large financial 
and non-financial firms.  This Article examines the Leninist origins 
of these financial-commercial conglomerates (“FCCs”), and how 
legal and policy changes in the 1980s and 1990s enabled FCC growth 
during the 2000s.  An underexplored topic of research, Mainland 
China’s FCCs are mostly not subject to group-wide regulation and 
this Article finds that due to complex ownership structures brought 
about, in part, by legal ambiguity, potential risks these entities pose 
to financial markets can be unclear to regulators—in 2019, issues at 
one FCC-controlled bank ultimately sparked market-wide distress.  
Using a dataset built by the authors, this Article estimates that by 
2017, FCC-controlled companies accounted for thirteen to nineteen 
percent of Mainland China’s commercial banking assets, over one-
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third of its life insurance policies written, and about thirty percent 
of assets held by its trust and investment companies (a type of 
institutional investment vehicle).  Given ongoing efforts by the 
People’s Bank of China to implement holding company regulations 
that may apply to some FCCs, this Article also contrasts the 
structure and regulation of Chinese FCCs with state-owned and 
private companies in the EU, Japan, and the United States.  In doing 
so, it examines the extent to which state-owned FCCs in the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”) are unparalleled in structure, as well as 
how laws in other jurisdictions either prevent companies organized 
like the PRC’s FCCs from forming or require more restrictive 
oversight of similarly-structured entities.  This Article also finds that 
unlike financial groups in the EU, Japan, and the United States, 
many large Chinese FCCs formed using cross-shareholding and 
pyramid structures.  It concludes by summarizing challenges that 
complex FCC structures in Mainland China may pose to regulators 
moving forward.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mainland China’s 1  financial system, arguably the world’s 
second largest, 2  is uniquely characterized by the prevalence of 
massive “mixed conglomerates” that control multiple large financial 
and non-financial businesses.3  This Article classifies these business 
organizations as a type of financial-commercial conglomerate 
(“FCC”)—a multi-layered corporate group, usually led by a non-
financial4 entity, that:  (1) operates sizable non-financial business 
lines; and (2) controls two or more types of financial institutions that 
 
 1 For the purposes of this Article, the term “Mainland China” refers to areas 
of the PRC where the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission have 
direct jurisdiction to regulate and supervise financial institutions. 
 2 At the end of 2016, the PRC’s banking system became the world’s largest, 
surpassing the Eurozone’s in size by assets.  Gabriel Wildau, China Overtakes 
Eurozone as World’s Biggest Bank System, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/14f929de-ffc5-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 
[https://perma.cc/V8VZ-KA6D].  At year-end of 2017, Mainland China’s banking 
assets ($38.8 trillion) doubled those of the United States ($16.2 trillion).  See Alfred 
Liu & Benjamin Robertson, China’s $35 Trillion Problem: Managing Financial Assets Is 
Hard, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-26/china-warns-of-
financial-asset-mismanagement-after-initial-tally [https://perma.cc/X9MJ-MYJM] 
(citing regulator data).  Mainland China accounts for the third highest share ($9.6 
trillion) of 2017 assets belonging to “financial institutions that are not central banks, 
banks, insurance corporations, pension funds, public financial institutions, or 
financial auxiliaries,” behind the Eurozone ($32.2 trillion) and the U.S. ($27.1 
trillion).  FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2017, at 
2, 15-17 (2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050318-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YHX-QE9H] (defining “other financial intermediaries” and 
providing data).  Mainland China is also the world’s third largest insurance market 
($575 billion of life and nonlife premiums in 2018), behind the United States’ and 
Europe’s advanced economies.  See DANIEL STAIB, MAHESH H. PUTTAIAH, & OLGA 
TSCHEKASSIN, WORLD INSURANCE: THE GREAT PIVOT EAST CONTINUES 9 (2019), 
https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:b8010432-3697-4a97-ad8b-6cb6c0aece33/sig
ma3_2019_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZGP-38GM].  Japan’s is the fourth largest.  
See id.   
 3 Global banking regulators define “mixed conglomerates” as “groups which 
are predominantly industrially or commercially oriented but contain at least one 
regulated financial entity.”  TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, SEC. & INS. REGULS., THE 
SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 8 (1995), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7AE-N9PW]. 
 4 For purposes of this Article, “non-financial” describes activities, businesses, 
and entities that are commercial or industrial in nature, and thus do not primarily 
relate to business activities involving financial intermediation, such as banking, 
insurance, investing, or trading financial products. 
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conduct a substantial level of financial intermediation. 5   These 
groups can be state-owned (“SFCCs”) or privately-owned 
(“PFCCs”), although some PFCCs may have state-owned 
noncontrolling shareholders.  Mainland China’s FCCs operate major 
non-financial businesses in a range of sectors including 
construction, e-commerce, energy, healthcare, mining, and 
transportation.6  They also control multi-billion-dollar banks, large 
funds, and major payment systems.7   
The existence of large corporate groups made up of sizable 
commercial, financial, and industrial businesses is not necessarily 
 
 5 For purposes of this Article, “substantial level of financial intermediation” 
generally means that an FCC’s total 2017 financial assets exceeded over $10 billion 
U.S. dollars (“USD”) or that the FCC began facilitating over $1 trillion USD annual 
payments in volume.  This Article’s definition of FCC is based on the People’s Bank 
of China’s (中国人民银行 , “PBOC”) definition of “de-facto financial holding 
companies” (“de-facto FHCs”), which it classifies as “non-financial companies 
[that] have acquired majority shareholding in two or more types of financial 
institutions.”  PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, CHINA FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2018, at 
168 (2018), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130736/3729741/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM].  To align with the PBOC’s analysis, this Article 
considers the following types of financial institutions when identifying FCCs:  
banks, funds, securities companies, insurers, futures companies, trust and 
investment companies (“TICs”), and internal financial companies.  See infra note  
272 and accompanying text (listing types of financial institutions owned by “de-
facto financial holding companies”); infra notes 66-6967 and accompanying text 
(explaining internal financial companies); infra note 215 and accompanying text 
(explaining modern-day TICs).  Consistent with the PBOC’s approach, for the 
purposes of identifying FCCs, this Article also treats the following as a “type of 
financial institution” if it is controlled by one of three e-commerce/internet 
conglomerates classified by the PBOC as a “de-facto FHC” (Suning Commerce 
Group, Tencent, and Alibaba):  1) a company with a national third-party payments 
license that processes over $1 trillion USD in payments volume; and 2) a company 
that, through one or more non-bank lending businesses, conducts a high level of 
financial intermediation.  See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 168-69.  Given 
this Article’s focus on non-financial and financial businesses existing within one 
corporate group, its FCC definition does not include investment institutions that 
control several financial firms, which do meet the PBOC’s definition of “de-facto 
FHCs.”  See id. at 169 (classifying state-owned asset managers that control various 
financial institutions as one type of “de-facto FHCs”).  When identifying FCCs, this 
Article considers arrangements constituting an FCC’s control over a financial 
company besides direct ownership of a majority of shares in the company.  See infra 
notes 217-230 and accompanying text.  For a list of conglomerates that meet this 
Article’s definition of an FCC, see Appendix A.  All FCCs analyzed in this Article 
are led by non-financial entities except for two insurance companies—Anbang 
Insurance Group Co., Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, 
Ltd.—that by mid-2017 also controlled large non-financial business lines, and are 
thus treated as FCCs.  See infra notes 157, 169 and accompanying text.  Throughout 
this Article, the term “FCC” generally refers to entities based in Mainland China. 
 6 See infra Appendix A. 
 7 See infra notes 197-215 and accompanying text. 
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problematic.8  Yet as the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) warned 
in its 2018 Financial Stability Report, the rapid growth of 
inadequately regulated FCCs over the last few years may pose a 
threat to the Chinese economy. 9   As this Article explains, the 
complex structures of Mainland China’s FCCs can impede private 
and public sector risk monitoring by obfuscating financial 
relationships within FCCs and between these groups and other 
entities.  This in turn may reduce the likelihood that Mainland 
China’s FCCs have sufficient resources to withstand negative 
idiosyncratic events or broader economic shocks.  Notably, the 
prevalence of FCCs in Mainland China distinguishes it from the 
world’s three other largest financial markets—the European Union 
(“EU”), Japan, and the United States—where similarly structured 
groups are rare or non-existent due to different regulatory 
frameworks and policy approaches.10 
The PBOC is actively pursuing regulatory responses to the 
comparatively significant role that FCCs play across the PRC’s 
financial system relative to other jurisdictions including the EU, 
Japan, and the United States.11  One particularly important issue 
flagged in the PBOC’s Financial Stability Report and explored in this 
Article is the prevalence of intra-group transactions between 
 
 8  See FIN. STABILITY BD., BIG TECH IN FINANCE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND 
POTENTIAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 23 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P091219-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H9U-Q7WT] (finding that by 
allowing technology companies to offer financial services, Chinese firms were able 
to drastically expand financial inclusion); Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of 
the Currency, Remarks at the Clearing House Annual Conference 10 (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-134.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UFX5-X5K3] (observing that “mixing banking and commerce 
can generate efficiencies that deliver more value to customers and can improve 
bank and commercial company performance with little additional risk”). 
 9  PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164 (observing that “[w]ithout 
adequate regulation and supervision,” the rapid growth of non-financial corporate 
groups that control financial entities and engage in high levels of intra-group 
transactions “may pose threats to [the PRC’s] economic and social stability”). 
 10 See infra notes 288-406 and accompanying text. 
 11 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164-68 (observing that non-
financial conglomerates in Mainland China that control financial companies have 
grown in recent years, but are mostly not subjected to group-wide supervision, and 
contrasting this regulatory approach with financial holding company regulatory 
regimes in other jurisdictions, including the United States, EU, and Japan); id. at 
169-71 (stating that the “savage growth” of non-financial conglomerates that 
control financial companies through risky means “must be treated as an acute 
disease”); see also infra notes 249, 266-282 and accompanying text (describing recent 
policy actions proposed and taken by the PBOC and other agencies that would 
increase regulation over or augment the structure of certain FCCs). 
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Mainland China’s FCC-controlled financial firms and their non-
financial affiliates.  In 2018, PRC regulators seized the assets of a 
massive, opaquely-structured FCC that controlled numerous 
financial companies and reportedly relied upon false financial 
transactions between these entities and affiliates to fuel growth.12  
Shortly thereafter, the PBOC and the PRC’s top banking regulator 
both warned that other FCCs were using financial firm affiliates to 
fund company expansion through inappropriate intra-group 
transactions.13   
These warnings came to a head in mid-2019 when Baoshang 
Bank, controlled by a massive FCC called Tomorrow Group, was 
taken over by the PBOC and the China Banking and Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”) in response to “severe credit 
risks”—Mainland China’s first bank takeover in twenty years—and 
shortly thereafter, the deposit insurance fund incorporated by the 
PBOC took over 150 interbank negotiable certificates of deposit 
issued by Baoshang Bank. 14   Indeed, much of Baoshang Bank’s 
lending volume was reportedly to other Tomorrow Group 
companies.15   Over forty percent of its liabilities were interbank 
 
 12 See Guo Tingbing, In Depth: A Maze of Capital Leads to Anbang’s Aggressive 
Expansion, CAIXIN (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-04-30/a-
maze-of-capital-leads-to-anbangs-aggressive-expansion-101084940.html 
[https://perma.cc/RT4T-HPXB]. 
 13  See China Official Says Crackdown on Murky Conglomerates Isn’t Over, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-
17/china-official-says-crackdown-on-murky-conglomerates-isn-t-over 
[https://perma.cc/7C9X-P36R] (reporting that Shuqing Guo, chairman of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, stated that some conglomerates structured 
through complex ownership structures used affiliate banks as “ATM machines”); 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170 (finding that “some non-financial 
enterprises obtain credit funds, manipulate profits, and transfer or hide assets 
through loans and guarantees from financial institutions they own . . . [which] are 
used as cash machines”). 
 14 See Cheng Leng, China’s State Insurance Fund to Take over Baoshang NCDs from 
July 8—Sources, REUTERS (July 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-
banks-baoshang/chinas-state-insurance-fund-to-take-over-baoshang-ncds-from-
july-8-sources-idUSL4N24516F [https://perma.cc/B6JL-U2L5] (citing regulators); 
see also IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2019 Article IV Consultation, 8, Country Report 




 15 See Xia Guobei & Leng Cheng, Troubled Tomorrow Group Selling Control of 
Baoshang Bank, CAIXIN (June 7, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-06-
07/troubled-tomorrow-group-selling-control-of-baoshang-bank-101266629.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GNF-5T97] (discussing the close relationship between 
Baoshang Bank and Tomorrow Group). 
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debts16—its distress increased funding costs for banks and non-
financial institutions heavily reliant on interbank markets by 
sparking market-wide fears.17  The PBOC responded by injecting 
over 400 billion yuan (over $60 billion U.S. dollars (“USD”)) into 
interbank markets.18   
Then in early 2020, long-standing financial difficulties at another 
FCC—HNA Group, headquartered in Hainan province—triggered 
local government involvement.  Regulators had already intervened 
to support the heavily-indebted conglomerate’s ability to raise funds 
in 2018,19 but after the coronavirus pandemic’s severe impact on 
 
 16 See Wu Hongyuran, Timmy Shen & Teng Jing Xuan, Exclusive: Baoshang 
Bank’s Creditors Get Added Backstop on Deposits, Debts Worth Over 50 Million Yuan, 
CAIXIN (May 27, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-05-27/exclusive-
baoshang-banks-creditors-get-added-backstop-on-deposits-debts-worth-over-50-
million-yuan-101420491.html [https://perma.cc/62LW-HKNL]. 
 17 See Andrew Galbraith & Cheng Leng, China’s Baoshang Bank Takeover Raises 
Contagion Fears, REUTERS (May 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-banks-regulator-ncd/chinas-baoshang-bank-takeover-raises-contagion-
fears-idUSKCN1SX0QT [https://perma.cc/YM5Q-KJ8A] (reporting that “[t]he 
seizing of Baoshang fanned concerns about indebted small banks across the 
country, pushing up yields on some negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD) issued 
by regional banks by more than 10 basis points”); Gabriel Wildau & Yizhen Jia, 
Regional Lenders: China’s Most Dangerous Banks, FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/24e2a368-7b4b-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d 
[https://perma.cc/8P8A-E6UJ] (reporting that many of Mainland China’s regional 
banks rely heavily on interbank markets for funding).  Mainland China’s bank-
sponsored wealth management products, which are mostly issued by small and 
medium joint-stock banks but operated off-balance sheet by non-bank affiliates, 
channel both bank and non-bank funds into a range of assets, including money 
market instruments, bonds, and equity assets.  Torsten Ehlers, Steven Kong & Feng 
Zhu, Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure and Dynamics, 14-15 (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 701, 2018), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/work701.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93N-23MH]. 
 18 See Anjani Trivedi & Shuli Ren, China’s Lehman Moment Is Drawing Closer, 
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-
06-19/china-s-lehman-moment-is-drawing-closer [https://perma.cc/DN62-
5A8B].  Throughout this Article, the 2017 conversion rate of 6.759 yuan to $1 USD 
reported by the OECD is used to convert yuan volumes into approximate USD.  
Exchange Rates, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EN97-WXXY].  In instances where the yuan and Japanese yen 
are converted, a 16.585 yen to 1 yuan conversion rate is used, according to the 
OECD report of 112.166 yen to $1 USD conversion rate for 2017.  Id.  In instances 
where the yuan and Euro are converted, a 7.637 yuan to 1 euro conversion rate is 
used, as the OECD reports a 0.885 euro to $1 USD conversion rate for 2017.  Id. 
 19 See China Prepares State Support for HNA Fundraising, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/china-is-said-to-
FNprepare-state-support-for-hna-fundraising [https://perma.cc/TF3Z-SVZG] 
(reporting that, in June 2018, a “senior official at the People’s Bank of China led a 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
808 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
HNA Group in 2020, the Hainan provincial government established 
a working group made up of local authorities to help the FCC 
restructure its sizable debts to a number of large banks.20   Most 
recently, the FCC Alibaba and its affiliate Ant Financial have been 
subject to a range of high-profile regulatory actions, discussed in 
depth below. 
In order to improve understanding of the complex, multi-sector 
conglomerates at the center of these recent events, this Article 
analyzes the economic, legal, and policy origins of Mainland China’s 
FCCs, as well as what differentiates their structure and regulation 
from financial groups and mixed conglomerates in the EU, Japan, 
and the United States.  Unlike older research that contrasts financial 
conglomerate regulation in the EU, Mainland China, and the United 
States,21 this Article focuses on conglomerates that both control two 
or more types of large financial companies and also conduct 
substantial non-financial business activities.  This Article also fills 
research gaps stemming from the fact that most Chinese FCCs 
emerged relatively recently and operate across financial sector 
verticals (for example, banking and insurance), so their significance 
 
meeting with three regulators, the Hainan provincial government, HNA Co-
Chairman Chen Feng and the group’s biggest creditor, instructing attendees to 
support HNA’s future bond issues”). 
 20 Haihang Jituan (海航集团) [HNA Group], Hainansheng Haihang Jituan Lianhe 
Gongzuozu Jiang Quanmian Xiezhu Quanli Tuijin Benji Tuanfeng Xian Huajie Gongzuo 
(海南省海航集团联合工作组将全面协助全力推进本集团风险化解工作) [Hainan 
Province’s HNA Group Joint Working Group Will Fully Assist the Group’s Risk 
Resolution Work], XUEQIU ( 雪 球 ) (Feb. 29, 2020), 
https://xueqiu.com/2701143866/142553597 [https://perma.cc/N2UB-8KHY] 
(reporting that the working group was established in late February 2020).  In mid-
March 2020, HNA Group announced that the working group was helping HNA 
Group address governance and debt problems facing the conglomerate, and that, 
with the support of policymakers, it was in the process of restructuring debts with 
a number of large banks.  Haihang Jituan (海航集团) [HNA Group], Haihang Jituan 
Yu Bufen Zhaiquan Yinhang Daibiao Juxing Zuotanhui (海航集团与部分债权银行代表
举行座谈会) [HNA Group Held a Symposium with Representatives of Some Creditor 
Banks], WEIXIN ( 微 信 ) [WECHAT] (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/el8WWmYEViWMnZh3UHMjmQ 
[https://perma.cc/DC28-N97R].  According to one report quoting inside sources, 
by mid-March 2020, the working group was, “play[ing] a dual role of rescue and 
supervision . . . allowing the government to channel necessary funding and asset 
merger services to HNA.”  Dave Makichuk, ‘No Bailout’ for Troubled HNA Group, 
ASIA TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/03/no-bailout-for-
troubled-hna-group/ [https://perma.cc/8R28-G5T2]. 
 21 See Kuan-Chun Chang, From Zero to Something: The Necessity of Establishing 
a Regulatory System of Financial Conglomerates in China, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 
69-93 (2009). 
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is accordingly not emphasized in earlier, sectoral-focused studies on 
Mainland China’s financial system structure.22 
Part II examines the Leninist origins of the PRC’s first SFCCs, 
which emerged in the 1980s, and how legal and regulatory changes 
of the 1980s and 1990s facilitated FCC growth during the 2000s.  Part 
III estimates the role FCCs play in Mainland China’s modern 
financial system, while also identifying regulatory reasons for and 
organizational drivers of complex FCC structures that may pose 
potential financial market risks, as well as recent regulatory steps 
taken in response by the PBOC.  Part IV contrasts structures of 
Mainland China’s FCCs with those of state-owned entities and 
corporate groups in the EU, Japan, and the United States, examining 
how these jurisdictions’ policy frameworks prevent organizations 
similar to Mainland China’s large FCCs from emerging.  Part V 
concludes, summarizing challenges that FCCs will pose to 
regulators moving forward. 
II. HOW DECADES OF LEGAL AND POLICY CHANGES SPURRED THE 
FORMATION OF CHINA’S FIRST FCCS 
Mainland China’s first FCCs formed in the late 1980s.  Their 
origins can be traced to the PRC’s 1950s to 1970s embrace of a Lenin-
inspired, centrally-planned economic system, through which almost 
all financial and commercial activities were coordinated by the state, 
as well as 1980s policy shifts guided by an embrace of cross-sector 
horizontal integration aimed at achieving a “socialist commodity 
economy.”23  Against this backdrop, most large FCCs emerged in the 
 
 22 See generally DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT & KAI YAN, THE CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (2013) (analyzing the Mainland China financial 
system primarily along categories that reflect financial industry sub-sectors); 
Franklin Allen & Jun “QJ” Qian, China’s Financial System and the Law, 47 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 499 (2014) (examining the Mainland China financial system across 
banking, stock markets, bond markets, investment industry, asset managers, and 
the shadow financial sector); Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian & Xian Gu, An Overview 
of China’s Financial System, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 191 (2017) (analyzing the PRC 
financial system across: the banking and intermediation sector; financial markets; 
the shadow financial sector; and foreign sectors). 
 23  The founding of the PRC’s political and economic system was highly 
influenced by the Soviet Union’s.  See Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏), Zhongguo Jingji Gaige 
Sanshi Nian Licheng de Zhidu Sikao (中国经济改革三十年历程的制度思考 ) 
[Thoughts on the Reform of China’s 30-Year Economic System], Keji yu Jingji 
Huaba (科技与经济画报) [ECON. SCI.], no.5, 2008, at 285.  Indeed, the PRC’s embrace 
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2000s, thanks to 1990s legal and policy shifts formalizing company 
structures and securities markets, as well as efforts throughout the 
2000s to channel more private capital into the financial sector.  This 
Part profiles legal reforms, policy actions, and economic events that 
enabled PRC corporate groups to gain control of two or more of nine 
types of financial companies24 and thus become FCCs.  In particular, 
this Part focuses on the origins of Mainland China’s ten largest FCCs 
as of 2017,25 and on how these major FCCs gained control of banks, 
insurers, and “trust and investment companies,” 26  which have 
served as financing vehicles for numerous FCCs’ commercial and 
industrial business lines. 
a. Born from Lenin’s “State Syndicate”:  Origins of FCCs 
Shortly after the PRC’s founding, its policymakers embraced 
Vladimir Lenin’s vision for a “State Syndicate,”27  through which 
“[a]ll citizens become employees and workers of a single 
countrywide state ‘syndicate.’”28  By 1956, the PRC had adopted 
Leninist socialism “with drums beating and gongs clanging,” as 
economist Wu Jinglian writes, and all urban nonagricultural 
 
of Lenin’s “State Syndicate” resulted in the mid-1950s establishment of a “centrally-
planned economic system.”  See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING 
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 9, 12 (2015).  Later, the PRC’s central government 
implemented a series of policies between 1958 and 1978 that decentralized 
administrative power from the central government to subcentral authorities, 
forming a decentralized planned economic system.  These developments, however, 
did not change the nature of the PRC’s planned economy.  See id. at 43, 54-55. 
 24 According to this Article’s definition, FCCs control two or more types of the 
following financial firms: banks, certain large non-bank lending companies, certain 
large non-bank payments companies, fund companies, futures companies, insurers, 
internal financial companies, securities companies, and “trust and investment 
companies.”  See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 25 Based on data used in this Article’s analysis and its definition of an FCC, 
Mainland China’s ten largest FCCs as of 2017 were Alibaba, Anbang Group, CITIC 
Group, China Huaneng Group, China Resources, China Merchants Group, 
Evergrande Real Estate, Ping An Group, Tomorrow Group, and Funde Group.  For 
information on the sources and methodology used to identify these FCCs, see infra 
note 196 and accompanying text. 
 26  For an overview of the functions of modern-day trust and investment 
companies, see MCKINSEY & CO., infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 27 See JINGLIAN WU, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY 83-84 
(2005). 
 28 VLADIMIR LENIN, The State and Revolution, in 25 V. I. LENIN COLLECTED WORKS  
381, 473 (Stepan Apresyan & Jim Riordan eds., 1964). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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industries were transformed into a single, giant enterprise—the 
“state syndicate.”29  Indeed, Wu explains that each of the thousands 
of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) that emerged was not 
considered a stand-alone entity, but rather, a “grassroots production 
unit for cost accounting” within a “highly integrated system of the 
party, the state, and the economy” that spanned many sectors.30  
From 1959 to 1978, SOEs accounted for over eighty-six percent of the 
PRC’s total industrial output.31  Policymakers encouraged SOEs to 
expand operations across various industries,32 resembling the cross-
sector expansion FCCs would embrace decades later. 
The PRC’s 1950s embrace of a Leninist “state syndicate” also 
resulted in the establishment of a “mono-bank” system through 
which the PBOC was the PRC’s only bank, 33  serving both 
commercial bank and central bank functions.34  This aligned with 
Lenin’s vision for “a single giant State Bank, with branches in every 
rural district, in every factory.” 35   By the 1960s, the PBOC was 
essentially the only source of industrial and commercial credit in the 
PRC.36  Similar to operational and commercial activities of SOEs, its 
 
 29 UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 
23, at 83-84. 
 30 Id. at 84. 
 31  See BECKY CHIU & MERVYN K. LEWIS, REFORMING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES AND BANKS 189 (2006). 
 32  See, e.g., MAO TSE-TUNG, Instructions (June-September 1958), in SELECTED 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG: VOLUME VIII (1990). 
 33 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 188-89. 
 34 See Franklin Allen, Xian Gu & Jun “QJ” Qian, People’s Bank of China: History, 
Current Operations and Future Outlook 5-6 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3018506 
[https://perma.cc/T2GA-ZK7U] (noting that under this law and regulation, the 
PBOC was made responsible for “[i]ssuing currency, managing the treasury, 
administering financial activities, maintaining financial stability and restoring the 
economy and rebuilding the country” and also for “(1) printing and issuing 
banknotes and bonds and adjusting currency circulation; (2) allocating wealth and 
providing short-term and long-term loans and investment; (3) analyzing and 
monitoring the financial management of government offices, state-owned 
enterprises and cooperatives by managing cash and transferring money; (4) 
managing foreign currency, noble metals, and the balance of payments and 
settlements; (5) taking charge of financial administration and supervising private 
institutions, public-private institutions and foreign organizations involving the 
financial industry; (6) managing treasury and cash outflow of the fiscal budget; (7) 
issuing treasury bonds; (8) leading specialized banks and state-owned insurance 
companies; (9) other relevant financial issues”). 
 35 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 189 (quoting A.W. SAMANSKY, CHINA’S 
BANKING SYSTEM: ITS MODERN HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (1981)). 
 36 See id. 
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lending and monetary policy decisions were ultimately decided by 
the State Council,37 “the highest organ of state administration” in the 
PRC.38  By the late 1970s, the PRC had transformed into a large, 
cross-sector “state syndicate” that inherently mixed commercial and 
financial activities.39 
b. The 1980s:  The First FCC Emerges from Financial System Shifts 
and SOE Reforms 
Starting in 1978, the PRC began a decade of sweeping economic 
policy changes resulting in dramatic transformations to its financial 
system and SOEs.  The economic model that came about—
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”—aimed to achieve 
economic modernization through pragmatic reforms, although it 
remained explicitly guided by Leninism.40  This decade would give 
rise to SFCCs, whose business activities, like that of the PRC’s “state 
syndicate,” spanned multiple sectors and aligned with national 
policy objectives. 
Between 1979 and 1984, the PRC’s mono-banking system was 
split-up, and major pillars of financial intermediation were handed 
over to newly-created, state-controlled entities.  Four major state-
owned banks (“SOBs”) were formed.41  Previously-established rural 
credit cooperatives (“RCCs”) morphed into SOB “grassroots” 
 
 37 See Allen, Gu & Qian, supra note 34, at 6-7. 
 38  SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43303, 
CHINA’S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERS IN CHARTS 2 (Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting 
XIANFA art. 57, §1 (1982) (China)), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HK25-BAFX]. 
 39 See Yingyi Qian & Jinglian Wu, China’s Transition to a Market Economy: How 
Far across the River? 4-5 (Stan. Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No. 69, 2000), 
https://kingcenter.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/69wp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JHC-M8AR] (observing that “the essential point of Lenin’s 
[State Syndicate] remained valid for both pre-reform and post-reform China”). 
 40  Marxism-Leninism was a component of one of the “Four Cardinal 
Principles,” introduced by Deng Xiaoping in a 1979 speech that guided “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.”  See William A. Joseph, Ideology and Chinese Politics, 
in POLITICS IN CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION 129, 156 (William A. Joseph ed., 2010). 
 41 The large SOBs established during this time are the Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China.  See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 191-92. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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units,42 state-influenced urban credit cooperatives (“UCCs”) were 
launched,43 and the PBOC’s role as a central bank was reaffirmed by 
the State Council. 44   The People’s Insurance Company of China 
(“PICC”) was founded as the PRC’s only insurance company and 
would remain as such until the late 1980s.45 
Although securities markets were undeveloped,46 policymakers 
increasingly allowed small businesses to form. 47   Private sector 
growth accelerated after 1983 under Deng Xiaoping’s policy of 
“don’t argue; try bold experiments and blaze new trails” and related 
national-level guidelines, which enabled medium- to large-scale 
private enterprises to grow,48 even though the private sector would 
 
 42 RCCs are another form of loan-making depository institution that date back 
to the 1950s, when their ownership structure at that time was unclear; although by 
the 1960s and 1970s, RCCs were managed by “people’s communes.”  See KUMIKO 
OKAZAKI, RAND, NAT’L SEC. RSCH. DIV., BANKING SYSTEM REFORM IN CHINA: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MOVING TOWARD A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY 10 (2007), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAN
D_OP194.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5A3-EVCG].  Starting in the late 1970s, RCCs 
“were transformed into the ‘grass-roots unit’ of the [Agricultural Bank of China],” 
an SOB.  Id. 
 43 UCCs are depositories that emerged to primarily serve privately-owned 
enterprises and individuals.  The first UCC was established in 1979.  See id. at 9-10; 
see also Nicholas Loubere & Heather Xiaoquan Zhang, Co-operative Financial 
Institutions and Local Development in China, 3 J. COOP. ORG. & MGMT. 32, 34 (2015) 
(explaining that UCCs were “set-up and run by local people, institutions and 
governments” and “worked closely with local governments” when making loans). 
 44 See Allen, Gu & Qian, supra note 34, at 7-8. 




 46 See NICOLAAS GROENEWOLD, YANRUI WU, SAM HAK KAN TANG & XIANG MEI 
FAN, THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET: EFFICIENCY, PREDICTABILITY AND PROFITABILITY 10 
(2004) (explaining that in the early 1980s, joint stock structures were limited to some 
instances of “co-operative shareholding” established by township and village 
enterprises in southern coastal provinces). 
 47 In the early 1980s, there were over 178,000 ge-ti (“个体”) shops and locations 
in Mainland China that together employed over two million people.  Each of these 
entities could technically only hire up to seven people, but by 1983, some employed 
over 100 people.  Xiaohong Chen, Private Enterprises, and the Growth of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, in THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 276, 283-84 (Wang 
Mengkui ed., 2012). 
 48  See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra 
note 23, at 184 (citing Deng Xiaoping, Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhan and Shanghai, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 374 (1993)).  
In 1983, a nationwide “three-nots” policy was also issued in response to large-scale 
business operations emerging across the PRC: “It is not convenient to promote 
these, they are not allowed to be publicized openly, and we should not be in a hurry 
to shut them down.”  See Xiaohong Chen, supra note 47, at 284-85. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
814 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
not be legalized until 1988. 49   Yet capital markets remained 
immature, 50  and SOB lending volume was capped by the State 
Council and largely restricted to SOEs.51 
To fuel large-scale investments and equipment imports, state-
owned “trust and investment companies” (“TICs”), from which the 
first SFCCs would emerge, were established. 52   The first—China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (“CITIC”)—was 
founded with state funds in 1979.53  By 1982, hundreds of TICs—all 
state-controlled—were operational. 54   TICs raised capital from 
institutional sources, such as governments and international 
investors, and used those funds to make loans and investments 
across sectors.55  
The establishment of TICs was a necessary ingredient for the 
formation of the first FCCs.  Another was the gradual proliferation 
of joint-stock ownership structures for private and public sector 
enterprises, accelerated by local-level policy actions between 1984 
and 1986,56 which enabled thousands of joint-stock companies to 
 
 49 It was not until 1988 that the PRC Constitution was amended to permit the 
private sector to exist.  See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC 
REFORM, supra note 23, at 59-60. 
 50  See Grace Xing Hu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Chinese Capital Market: An 
Empirical Overview 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24346, 2018), 
http://web.mit.edu/people/junpan/CCM.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5VX-NZ8W] 
(discussing the initial stage of the PRC’s significant but slow period of transforming 
into a more market-oriented economy after 1976, beginning with the emergence of 
common stocks in the early 1980s). 
 51 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 191-92. 
 52 See Zhaohui Hong & Ying Yan, Trust and Investment Corporations in China 2 
(Fed. Rsrv. Bank Cleveland, Working Paper No. 97-06, 1997), 
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/workin
g-papers/working-papers-archives/1997-working-papers/wp-9706-trust-and-inv
estment-corporations-in-china.aspx [https://perma.cc/A84K-GMZK] (noting that 
“[b]efore TICs were formed, most of the firms in China had only one resource for 
all their financial needs—the state-owned banks”); GREGORY C. CHOW, THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY 297 (2d ed. 1987) (observing that the first TIC was established in part to 
“import advanced technology and equipment”). 
 53 See QIN XIAO, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND CHINESE ENTERPRISE REFORM: THE 
CASE OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 93 (2004). 
 54  See ANDREW COLLIER, SHADOW BANKING AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM IN 
CHINA 77 (2017). 
 55 See id. at 76-77. 
 56  In 1984, the Shanghai Municipal Government established securities 
regulations, facilitating private company stock ownership, and enabling an 
electronics company to issue stock, marking for the first private sector share 
issuance in the PRC’s history.  See KANG YONG, LU SHI & ELIZABETH D. BROWN, 
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emerge.57  Then in 1986, the State Council stimulated the conversion 
of SOEs into joint-stock companies,58 and explicitly encouraged the 
development of horizontally-integrated, multi-sector conglomerates 
through its “Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Further 
Promoting Horizontal Economic Integration” (“1986 Provisions”).59  
With the goal of achieving a “socialist commodity economy,” the 
1986 Provisions supported “horizontal economic union” between 
enterprises through a number of approaches, including multi-sector 
conglomerates.60 
Following the spirit of these provisions, CITIC’s CEO proposed 
to the State Council in 1986 that CITIC be permitted to reorganize as 
a “socialist group company” with a banking subsidiary.61  In 1987, 
the State Council allowed CITIC to transform into a multi-tiered 
conglomerate called “CITIC Group,” 62  launch a wholly-owned 
national commercial bank,63 and reorganize its many divisions into 
 
CHINESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 6 
(2008), https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR618.html 
[https://perma.cc/2LXU-JSAK].  By 1986, other local governments had also issued 
rules to govern the issuance of private company stocks to the public.  See Basile 
Cuigniez, The Chinese Stock Market: Historical Evolution and Current Trends 19 
(2017) (M.S. Dissertation, Universiteit Gent), 
https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/376/724/RUG01-
002376724_2017_0001_AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8LP-TZZN]. 
 57 By 1986, over 6,000 companies across the PRC had issued stock, and over-
the-counter stock markets were operating in several big cities.  Cuigniez, supra note 
56, at 19. 
 58 The State Council’s Regulations on Deepening Enterprise Reform and Enhancing 
the Vitality of Enterprises allowed many SOEs to be converted into joint-stock 
companies.  See Hu, Pan & Wang, supra note 50, at 4; FAN ZHANG, THE INSTITUTIONAL 
EVOLUTION OF CHINA: GOVERNMENT VS. MARKET 100 (2018) (noting that according to 
the regulations, “local governments could pick some large and medium-sized SOEs 
to carry out experiments on changing the SOEs to shareholding companies,” and 
“[b]y the end of 1986, about 6,000 shareholding companies had been set up 
nationwide”). 
 59  Guanyu Jinyibu Tuidong Hengxiang Jingji Lianhe Ruogan Wenti De 
Guiding (关于进一步推动横向经济联合若干问题的规定) [Provisions on Several 
Issues Concerning Further Promoting Horizontal Economic Integration] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 23, 1986, effective Mar. 23, 1986) 1987 LAW 
Y.B. CHINA 1, 267 (China), 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&gid=1510038015 
[https://perma.cc/5GPA-3WHX]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See YONGJIN ZHANG, CHINA’S EMERGING GLOBAL BUSINESSES 139-40 (2003). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. at 140 (reporting that this bank’s establishment required State Council 
approval); Margot Schueller, Financial system reform in China in THE INTERNATIONAL 
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subsidiaries.64  This marked the formation of Mainland China’s first 
FCC, as CITIC Group controlled multiple types of financial 
companies, as well as large subsidiaries operating across a range of 
non-financial sectors.65 
This structure exemplified the 1986 Provisions, as did the State 
Council’s 1987 decision to allow a non-financial conglomerate to 
establish a “finance company of an enterprise group.”66  By year-
end, seven of such internal financial companies had been formed, 
each of which was funded by deposits from its own affiliates and 
conducted intra-group lending.67  Around this time, several new 
joint-stock regional banks were also established,68 some of which 
were controlled by entities conducting substantial levels of non-
financial activities. 69   For example, China Merchants Bank, 
established in 1987, was wholly-owned by China Merchants 
Group—an SOE primarily involved in shipping.70 
 
HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL REFORM 73, 76-77 (Maximilian J.B. Hall ed., 2003) (noting 
that this bank was established in 1987 and wholly-owned by CITIC). 
 64 See QIN XIAO, supra note 53, at 104. 
 65 See id. at 104-05; YOUNGJIN ZHANG, supra note 61, at 140. 
 66 Guanyu Zujian He Fazhan Qiye Jituan De Jidian Yijian (关于组建和发展企
业集团的几点意见 ) [Several Opinions on the Formation and Development of 
Enterprise Groups] (promulgated by State Econ. & Trade Comm’n & State Econ. 
Restructuring Comm’n, Dec. 16, 1987, effective Dec. 16, 1987), art. 16, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=810e5e624a7f2348bdfb
&keyword= 关 于 组 建 和 发 展 企 业 集 团 的 几 点 意 见
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate&Search_IsTitle=0 
[https://perma.cc/KR7P-ETK4]. 
 67 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 74-75 
(1998). 
 68 See id. at 69-70 (listing eight regional banks established during the late 1980s, 
including Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, 
Merchants Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank); Chunhang Liu, Reform 
and Opening Up of the Banking Industry in THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 254, 255 
(Wang Mengkui ed., 2012) (explaining that Shenzhen Development Bank, 
Merchants Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and three other banks 
“set up with ownership by shareholders” were established in the late 1980s).  Some 
regional banks were able to establish significant presences outside their home 
locality.  See LARDY, supra, at 67. 
 69 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 192 (explaining that many of the regional 
banks formed in the late 1980s were owned by “state-affiliated agencies or large 
enterprises, local government bodies or private companies”). 
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In the late 1980s, the State Council allowed new insurance 
companies to emerge to compete with PICC.71  One was a Shenzhen-
based joint-stock regional insurer called Ping An Insurance 
Company, established by a consortium that included China 
Merchants Group. 72   Around the same time, China Merchants 
Group also gained control of a Hong Kong insurance company.73  
Thus China Merchants Group, having expanded into banking and 
insurance, became the PRC’s second SFCC.  Later, in the 2000s, Ping 
An Insurance Company transformed into a privately-controlled 
corporate group called Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of 
China, Ltd. (“Ping An Group”) and became one of the PRC’s largest 
PFCCs, controlling a range of financial and non-financial 
businesses.74 
c. The 1990s:  Economic Shifts, Legal Changes, and an Embrace of the 
“Socialist Market Economy” Set the Stage for Rapid 2000s FCC 
Formation 
By 1990, about half of the PRC’s industrial output was still 
attributable to SOEs. 75   Throughout the subsequent decade, a 
number of legal changes, market structure shifts, and SOE reforms 
were initiated in response to both the PRC’s early 1990s embrace of 
a “socialist market economy” and spats of market turmoil.  
 
 71 See Qixiang Sun, Lingyan Suo & Wei Zheng, China’s Insurance Industry: 
Developments and Prospects in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE: BETWEEN 
LOCAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 597, 601-02 (J. David Cummins & 
Bertrand Venard eds., 2007) (observing that the State Council’s 1985 Interim 
Regulations on the Administration of Insurance Enterprises enabled the establishment 
of new insurance companies). 
 72 Ping An Insurance Becomes Goldman Sachs’ First Principal Investment in China, 
GOLDMAN SACHS, https://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
firm/history/moments/1994-ping-an.html [https://perma.cc/W9F4-THU6]. 
 73 See Changyuan Lin, Financial Conglomerates in China 16-17 (Ctr. for Int’l L. 
Stud., Working Paper No. 2003020011, Oct. 14, 2003), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=446840 
[https://perma.cc/3ULN-HNH6]. 
 74 See History, PING AN, https://www.pingan.cn/en/about/history.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/E8VX-3KZB]; see also infra note 169 and accompanying text 
(examining when Ping An Group gained control of substantial non-financial 
businesses). 
 75 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS 
IN CHINA 75 (2014), 
https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/6932/03iie6932.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AQT3-54PA]. 
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Although only one lasting FCC emerged in the 1990s, the legal and 
policy groundwork necessary for FCC growth throughout the 2000s 
was set during this time, and many financial companies later 
acquired by FCCs were established. 
i. Securities Markets Expand and New Banks Form, while the 
“Socialist Market Economy” Spurs the Company Law and 
Private Sector Growth 
In order to legitimize flourishing informal securities markets, 
two national stock markets—the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges—were formed in 1990. 76   By 1992, the number of 
participating brokerage firms doubled to over eighty.77  During this 
time, the State Council also approved the formation of the PRC’s 
first futures exchange, spurring the formation of many futures 
companies and numerous regional derivatives exchanges.78  Several 
securities and futures companies that emerged during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s would later be controlled by FCCs.79 
As securities markets grew and joint-stock companies 
proliferated, national-level policymakers, including General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin and PBOC Governor Zhu Rongji, endorsed 
the establishment of a “socialist market economy.”80  This economic 
 
 76 See Damian Tobin & Ulrich Volz, The Development and Transformation of the 
Financial System in the People’s Republic of China 16 (ADB Institute, Working Paper 
No. 825, Mar. 2018), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/411136/adbi-wp825.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C92M-8LU5]. 
 77 See CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: THE STOCK 
MARKETS AND THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE REFORM 155 (2003). 
 78 See Donald Lien & Bo Yang, Futures Markets in the People’s Republic of China: 
Development and Prospective, 11 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 25, 29-30 (2004). 
 79  For example, China Merchant Securities Co. Ltd., controlled by China 
Merchants Group, was established in 1991.  Company Profile, CMS, 
http://www.newone.com.cn/ws/html?arg=en/AboutUs&; see also infra notes 86-
88 and accompanying text. 
 80  See KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD & KOEN RUTTEN, FROM ACCELERATED 
ACCUMULATION TO SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY IN CHINA 101-02 (2017) (citing 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan 
Wenti De Jueding (中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 ) 
[Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Decision on Certain Issues 
concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy] (Promulgated by 
Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Nov. 14, 1993, effective Nov. 14, 
1993) [hereinafter 1993 Socialist Market Economy Decision], 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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model was incorporated into the PRC’s constitution in 1993 by the 
National People’s Congress (“NPC”),81 and its key feature was the 
“modern enterprise” (essentially, corporations) system, which 
enabled the conversion of large SOEs into profit-maximizing joint-
stock companies with equity ownership rights allotted to both state 
and non-state entities. 82   The embrace of a “socialist market 
economy” also enabled private firms to play a larger role in the 
economy, and opened the door to SOE privatization.83 
Against this backdrop, in 1992, the PBOC approved the 
establishment of two new national commercial banks wholly owned 
by SOEs, and then, in 1995, enabled the conversion of these banks 
into joint-stock institutions, bringing the total number of national, 
non-SOB commercial banks to four. 84   One of these new banks, 
Huaxia Bank, was initially owned by a state-owned steel 
 
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=4cbd93d7254ee66fbdfb&key
word= 中 共 中 央 关 于 建 立 社 会 主 义 市 场 经 济 体 制 若 干
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate&Search_IsTitle=0 
[https://perma.cc/GY6D-5FAV]. 
 81 The NPC is a nearly 3,000-member legislative body that usually meets for 
about ten days each year.  For more information on the NPC, see SUSAN V. 
LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41007, UNDERSTANDING 
CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 31 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7BH-QFDE].  As legal scholars note, as was the case with this 
PRC Constitution amendment, the NPC translates the policy preferences of senior 
officials into “state will” “through legal procedure.”  See Jianfu Chen, The 
Transformation of Chinese Law—From Formal to Substantial, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 689, 
721 n.173 (citing Liu Zheng (刘政), Wei Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi 
Tigong Geng Youli de Xianfa Baozhang (为建设有中国特色的社会主义提供更有力的宪
法保障) [Further Constitutional Protection for the Construction of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [LEGAL SCI. IN CHINA] 5, 6 (1993)).  
This Constitutional change was adopted during the First Session of the Eighth NPC.  
See id. 
 82 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 102 (citing 1993 Socialist Market 
Economy Decision, supra note 80); see also Wu Jinglian, Ma Guochuan, Xiaofeng Hua 
& Nancy Hearst, The Failure of State-Owned Enterprise Reforms Under Market 
Socialism, in WHITHER CHINA? RESTARTING THE REFORM AGENDA 71 (Wu Jinglian & 
Ma Guochuan eds., 2016) (observing that “institutional innovations in the large 
SOEs” taken in accordance with the 1993 Socialist Market Economy Decision were 
carried out “with a view to establishing a modern enterprise (that is, corporate) 
institution”). 
 83 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 103, 105-06; see also Jianfu Chen, 
supra note 81, at 721 (observing that the embrace of the “socialist market economy 
must first and foremost be seen as a license to practice capitalism in the economic 
sphere”). 
 84 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 66-69.  Besides the large SOBs, CITIC’s bank and 
the Bank of Communications were the PRC’s first two national banks, established 
in 1986 and 1987, respectively.  See id. at 64-66, 250 n.36. 
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conglomerate known as Shougang Group.85  Another one, China 
Everbright Bank, was established by China Everbright Group86—an 
SOE that began as a TIC and operated technology, infrastructure, 
and construction businesses87—which would soon also gain control 
of a securities company,88 marking the formation of the PRC’s third 
SFCC.  Problematic transactions between the two newly-established 
national banks and their intra-group affiliates soon led to 
government-ordered restructurings and Shougang Group’s loss of a 
majority stake in Huaxia Bank, 89  a sign of troubles to come for 
FCCs.90 
Most notably, the PRC’s embrace of a “socialist market 
economy” led to the passage of the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China at the end of 1993. 91   This law eased and 
formalized the process through which joint-stock companies could 
form92—a critical precondition to the growth in PFCCs that began 
roughly a decade later.  The proliferation of joint-stock companies 
was further enabled by 1992 and 1993 State Council actions that 
established the State Council Securities Commission (“SCSC”) and 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”),93 and also 
standardized accounting rules and the process for listing on the 
PRC’s growing stock markets under a regulatory framework led by 
 
 85 See id. at 67-68. Shougang Group would later become an SFCC.  See infra 
Appendix A (listing major FCCs as of 2017). 
 86 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 67. 
 87 See Changyuan Lin, supra note 73, at 14 (listing various business activities of 
China Everbright Group in 1994); WU XIAOQIU, CHINESE SECURITIES COMPANIES: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION, AND 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 29 (2014) (noting that China Everbright Group first emerged 
as a TIC). 
 88 See id. 
 89  See LARDY, supra note 67, at 67-68; see also NEIL C. HUGHES, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE: SMASHING THE IRON RICE BOWL 48 (2015) (observing that 
China Everbright Group retained control of its newly-formed bank). 
 90  By the late 2010s, several large FCCs were engaged in high levels of 
problematic intra-group transactions.  See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
 91 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 105-06 (citing Gongsi Fa (公司
法) [Company Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 
1993; rev’d by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 2004), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-03/21/content_1867695.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5ZY9-3DVJ]). 
 92 See Zhao Youg Qing, The Company Law of China, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
461, 467 (1996) (citing Company Law, supra note 91, art. 8). 
 93 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 4. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
2021] Conglomeration Unbound 821 
these newly-formed entities.94  Although the CSRC’s powers were 
initially quite limited in scope,95 during the late 1990s, it gained a 
range of securities and futures markets regulatory authorities96 and 
absorbed the SCSC.97 
ii. Further Banking System, Insurance Industry, and SOE Reforms 
Enable FCC Formation 
By the mid-1990s, banking assets were flooding into stocks, 
which in turn resulted in stock market bubbles, and bank lending 
volume was insufficient. 98   In response, the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks (“Commercial Bank Law”) 
was passed in 1995, which allowed for non-financial company 
control of banks—a critical precondition to future FCC growth—but 
required that:  (1) loans to a single “borrower” not exceed ten 
percent of a bank’s capital; (2) banks not invest in securities firms or 
TICs; (3) unsecured loans not be extended to a bank’s “related 
persons”; (4) secured loans to “related persons” be extended at or 
above prevailing market rates; and (5) regulators first approve of 
any transaction that will result in a change of “shareholders” 
holding over ten percent (later lowered to five percent or more) of a 
bank’s shares or capital. 99    In 1995, the NPC also passed the 
 
 94 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 194; Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli 
Zanxing Tiaoli (股票发行与交易管理暂行条例 ) [Interim Provisions on the 
Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks] (promulgated by State 
Council, Apr. 22, 1993, effective Apr. 22, 1993) (China), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1334 
[https://perma.cc/Q7JR-P8QY]. 
 95 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 18-19. 
 96  See STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS, 
PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 157-58 (2003) (explaining that in 1997, due to changes 
brought about by the National Financial Work Conference, “[securities market] 
regulatory powers were concentrated in the CSRC and local governments were 
sidelined,” and that, by this time, “the PBOC . . . was forced to hand over its powers 
to the CSRC”); Lien & Bo Yang, supra note 78, at 30 (explaining that the CSRC gained 
oversight authority over the futures market in 1994). 
 97 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 4. 
 98  See Liping Xu & Yu Xin, Thorny Roses: The Motivations and Economic 
Consequences of Holding Equity Stakes in Financial Institutions for China’s Listed 
Nonfinancial Firms, 10 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 105, 109 (2017); HUGHES, supra note 89, at 
48-49. 
 99 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业
银 行 法 ) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
822 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Insurance Law”), 
which allowed non-financial companies to control insurers, but 
included a requirement that regulators approve of any transactions 
resulting in changes to owners of ten percent or more (later lowered 
to five percent) of the shares of a joint-stock insurer.100  Unlike the 
Commercial Bank Law, it did not address related party 
transactions.101 
This omission, as well as the Commercial Bank Law’s narrow 
restrictions on intra-group dealings, meant that the laws did not 
significantly curb the ability of a non-financial conglomerate to 
engage in intra-group transactions conducted on preferential 
 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10, 
1995, effective July 1, 1995), art. 15, 24, 40, 43, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HV-F7WN].  In 
December 2003, the Commercial Bank Law was amended, and regulatory authority 
over banks was transferred to the newly-formed China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (“CBRC”).  See WEI WANG, CHINA’S BANKING LAW AND THE NATIONAL 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN-FUNDED BANKS 140-41 (2013).  As part of the December 2003 
amendments, Article 24 was amended to require that transactions resulting in a 
change of shareholders holding five percent or more of a bank’s shares or capital 
first be approved by regulators—the threshold was originally over ten percent.  
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) 
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (2003), art. 24, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383716.
htm [https://perma.cc/A2GE-4AM9].  Also, many references to the People’s Bank 
of China in the Commercial Bank Law were changed to a “regulatory authority 
under the State Council.”  For example, contrast Article 15 of the 1995 Commercial 
Bank Law with that of the 2003 version.  The CBRC, the “regulatory authority under 
the State Council” mentioned in the 2003 Commercial Bank Law, was established 
pursuant to the Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision, passed in 2003 by the 
NPC, which resulted in a 2003 State Council notice that established the CBRC.  See 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, CHINA BANKING NEWS, 
http://www.chinabankingnews.com/china-banking-regulatory-commission/ 
[https://perma.cc/3HLV-GQPN]; Guowuyuan Guanyu Jigou Shezhi de Tongzhi (国务
院关于机构设置的通知 ) [Notice of the State Council on the Setup of Institutions], 
GUOWUYUAN ( 国 务 院 ) STATE COUNCIL (Mar. 21, 2003), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2003/content_62041.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9L5F-XTCT]. 
 100  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoxian Fa (中华人民共和国保险法 ) 
[Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 
91, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4644.htm 
[https://perma.cc/86FA-5G9S].  The threshold was lowered to five percent in 2009.  
See LOVELLS, AMENDMENTS TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INSURANCE LAW: TIME 
FOR A COMPLETE OVERHAUL OR SIMPLY A CONSOLIDATION? § 7.2 (2009), 
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/publication/amen
dmentstotheprcinsurance-law_pdf [https://perma.cc/UV98-WQ8T]. 
 101 See LOVELLS, supra note 100, § 7.1 (explaining that the Insurance Law did 
not substantially address related party transactions until 2009). 
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terms 102 —in other words, a mixed conglomerate could support 
intra-group growth via transactions with a financial firm affiliate 
priced below prevailing market-wide risk-based prices. 103   FCCs 
would later take advantage of these weak regulatory guardrails to 
engage in high levels of these transactions.104  FCCs would also grow 
by taking advantage of the absence of a clear definition of 
“shareholder,”105 and due to the fact that the Commercial Bank Law 
allowed for certain changes of actual control over a bank to take 
place without regulatory approval. 106   Moreover, while the 
Insurance Law generally prohibited insurance companies from 
controlling non-insurance businesses, exceptions to that rule were 
soon granted—Ping An Insurance Company established a securities 
company in 1995 and acquired a TIC in 1996.107 
 
 102 See Kuan-Chun Chang, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates In China 
In The Post WTO Era—The Challenges Of Risk Concentration And Risk Contagion, 11 U. 
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 30 (2003) (explaining that the Commercial Bank Law 
and other rules “fail[ed] to provide a concrete firewall between banks and their 
affiliates” and did not regulate several “types of transactions between affiliates that 
can adversely affect the condition of banks”); see also Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of 
the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), art. 40, 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HV-
F7WN] (providing a relatively narrow definition of “related persons”). 
 103  Financial markets regulators associate high levels of these types of 
transactions within a mixed conglomerate with an increased risk that the 
conglomerate will lack sufficient financial resources vulnerable to withstand 
macroeconomic or idiosyncratic shocks.  TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, supra note 3, at 20-
23 (explaining the risks of high intra-group exposures within a financial 
conglomerate); id. at 36-37 (explaining why intra-group exposures are particularly 
risky for mixed conglomerates); see also infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 104 For example, Tomorrow Group’s Baoshang Bank engaged in high levels of 
intra-group transactions.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 105  Haier Group, for example, gained control of a bank through separate 
investments made by five of its affiliates.  See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying 
text. 
 106 See IMF, People’s Republic of China: Detailed Assessment Report: Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Country Report No. 12/78, at 40 (Apr. 
2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1278.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T9KQ-H2BT]. 
 107 See Sun, Suo & Zheng, supra note 71, at 605 (explaining that China Ping An 
Insurance (Group) Company Ltd.’s expansions into non-financial business lines 
exemplified one of several exceptions made to the newly-passed Insurance Law); 
History, supra note 74. 
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Despite regulatory shifts, new bank formation still required 
PBOC approval,108 and few new joint-stock banks were established 
in the five years after the Commercial Bank Law’s passage. 109  
Indeed, the four large SOBs still accounted for roughly eighty-five 
percent of banking assets in 1995. 110   Yet by 1996, the PRC had 
entered a banking crisis, and twenty-four percent of SOB lending 
volume was non-performing (meaning that loans were “overdue, 
idle, or simply bad”). 111   The next year, PRC stock markets 
crashed, 112  and the non-performing loan rate across its financial 
sector rose to over twenty-eight percent.113  During the late 1990s, 
many TICs failed, including one of the PRC’s largest,114 prompting 
policymakers to suspend the operations of almost all TICs and 
require that remaining TICs reapply for licenses. 115   Four state-
owned asset management companies that acquired SOB non-
performing loans were also established.116  Although these entities 
 
 108 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业
银 行 法 ) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10, 
1995, effective July 1, 1995), art. 11, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HV-F7WN]. 
 109 See HUGHES, supra note 89, at 58-59 (reporting that “[a]t the end of 1999, 
there were just eleven shareholder banks”). 
 110 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 224. 
 111 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 257 (reporting the nonperforming loan 
ratio by using “the Chinese standard for classifying bad loans”). 
 112 See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 77, at xxvi. 
 113 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 257. 
 114 See COLLIER, supra note 54, at 77-78. 
 115 See JIANBO LOU, AN OVERVIEW OF PRC TRUST LAW AND TRUST BUSINESS 2, 
http://shintakuhogakkai.jp/activity/pdf/vol40_China2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3VG8-AEDC] (observing that TIC operations were suspended 
in by 2000); Touzi Guanchazhe (投资观察者) [Investment Observer], Zhongguo 
Xintuoshi Shang Liuci Zhengdun Dashiji (中国信托史上六次整顿大事记) [Six Major 
Events in the History of China Trust], SOUHU ( 搜狐 ) [SOHU] (May 16, 2016), 
https://m.sohu.com/a/75610386_372392/ [https://perma.cc/NZD3-M5XF] 
(reporting that by 2001 only sixty TICs were authorized to operate in the PRC due 
to the 1999-2000 restructuring of the industry, which resulted in hundreds of TICs 
being closed).  The 1999-2001 restructuring of the TIC industry resulted from policy 
initiatives decided upon at the 1997 National Financial Work Conference convened 
by senior national policymakers.  See Dai Xianglong (戴相龙), Daixianglong Huiyi 
1993 Nian Dao 2000 Nian Jinrong Zhixu Banian Dazhengdun (戴相龙回忆 1993 年到
2000 年金融秩序八年大整顿)  [Dai Xianglong Recalls the Eight-Year Overhaul of the 
Financial Order from 1993 to 2000], JINRONGJIE (金融界) [JRJ.COM] (July 17, 2018), 
http://bank.jrj.com.cn/2018/07/17112124824468.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/7U9W-RF89]. 
 116  See Delin Zhang, Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises, in 
THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 217, 225-26 (Wang Mengkui ed., 2012). 
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would later transform into FCC-like entities,117 no new major FCCs 
besides China Everbright Group formed in the 1990s.  Yet two 
significant late 1990s crisis responses set the stage for FCC growth 
during the 2000s. 
First, in the midst of financial markets turmoil, a new type of 
joint-stock commercial bank was created through the consolidation 
of UCCs. 118   These depository institutions had proliferated 
throughout the 1980s, and accounted for five times as much private 
lending volume as the SOBs in 1996,119 even though UCCs’ financial 
assets equaled just four percent of the SOBs’.120  Yet by 1999, UCCs’ 
balance sheets were seriously distressed—with a non-performing 
loan ratio of thirty-seven percent.121   In response, 2,300 of these 
institutions were soon consolidated into over ninety “city 
commercial banks” 122 —joint-stock commercial banks primarily 
owned by urban non-financial company, individual, and local 
government shareholders. 123   Some of these banks would be 
acquired by PFCCs in the 2000s.124 
The second, late 1990s policy driver of 2000s FCC growth was 
the SOE reform strategy of “grasp the large and let go of the small” 
(“ 抓大放小 ,” or zhuadafangxiao in Chinese), first endorsed by 
national policymakers in 1995.125  At the time, forty percent of SOEs 
 
 117 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 63 (observing that these asset 
management vehicles maintain investments in both non-financial and financial 
entities). 
 118 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 72. 
 119 See id. at 71-72. 
 120 See id. at 224 (reporting that the 1995 total assets of UCCs totaled 303 billion 
yuan, while the total assets of the four major SOBs totaled 8.056 trillion yuan). 
 121 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 259. 
 122 See HUGHES, supra note 89, at 59. 
 123 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 72. 
 124 See infra notes 131-137, 154 and accompanying text. 
 125  ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG (中共中央) [CENT. COMM. OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF CHINA], ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUANYU ZHIDING GUOMIN JINGJI HE 
SHEHUI FAZHAN “JIUWU” JIHUA HE 2020 NIAN YUANJING MUBIAO DE JIANYI (中共中央
关于制定国民经济和社会发展”九五”计划和 2010 年远景目标的建议) [PROPOSAL OF 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON FORMULATING THE 
NINTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
VISION OF 2010] 20 (Sep. 28, 1995), 
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/200709/
P020191029595683696918.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB3M-ZV48].  As Chiu and 
Lewis explain, this policy was “officially implemented after its confirmation at the 
Fifteenth Party Congress in October 1997 and the Ninth National People’s Party 
Congress in March 1998.”  CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 66-67. 
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were losing money, 126  and many had more debts than assets. 127 
Within five years, over 10,000 small and medium SOEs were 
converted into privately-controlled joint-stock companies largely 
owned by management.128  Concurrently, about 1,000 large SOEs 
were restructured, primarily through the consolidation of SOEs into 
bigger, joint-stock SOEs.129  Central state organs encouraged many 
of these large SOEs to form expansive, multi-sector corporate 
groups, the growth of which was supported by preferential credit 
and equity market access policies.130 
d. The 2000s:  Most FCCs are Born 
By 2000, the economic, policy, and legal conditions necessary for 
the growth of FCCs had been established:  struggling city 
commercial banks sought capital injections, large SOEs were 
expanding across sectors in the spirit of zhuadafangxiao and the 1986 
Provisions, and legal changes stemming from the “socialist market 
economy” were driving the growth of equity markets, joint-stock 
companies, and demand for insurance by businesses and 
individuals.  These and other early 2000s developments—including 
policymakers’ commitment to sector-based regulation, the growth 
of e-commerce, policy changes that attracted more private capital 
into the financial system, and a resurgence of TICs—enabled many 
more large FCCs to emerge. 
 
 126 See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra 
note 23, at 157. 
 127 See Zhang, supra note 116, at 225 
 128 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 68-69. 
 129 See id. at 66-67.  In response to high losses at SOEs, in 1998 Premier Zhu 
Rongji announced that the government would work to turn large and medium-
sized SOEs into profit-making entities within three years.  See CHIU & LEWIS, supra 
note 31, at 74; Zhang, supra note 116, at 225-26.  Yet from 2001 to 2005, the PRC’s 
SOEs as a whole experienced losses each year.  See Xin Li & Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, 
SOE Reform in China: Past, Present and Future, 31 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 54, 60 
(2013). 
 130 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 67. 
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i. PFCCs Form and SFCCs Grow as Insurance and Securities 
Markets Restructure, and TICs are Revived 
As the 2000s began, newly-formed city commercial banks 
needed capital.131  In the early 2000s, Haier Group, a fast-growing 
appliance manufacturing conglomerate, 132  gained control of the 
Bank of Qingdao, 133  which had been established through the 
consolidation of twenty-one UCCs in 1996.134  It did so through five 
subsidiaries, each of which acquired ten percent stakes, 135 
illustrating the weakness of Commercial Bank Law restrictions on 
ownership concentration and complexity.  By 2001, the private 
industrial and technology conglomerate Tomorrow Group, which 
emerged thanks to securities market and SOE reforms of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, 136  gained control of Baoshang Bank and Tai’an 
Bank, also taking advantage of a wave of city commercial bank 
restructuring.137 
To improve regulatory oversight over an increasingly complex 
banking system, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
 
 131 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 259. 
 132 See BILL FISCHER, UMBERTO LAGO & FANG LIU, REINVENTING GIANTS: HOW 
CHINESE GLOBAL COMPETITOR HAIER HAS CHANGED THE WAY BIG COMPANIES 
TRANSFORM 47 (2013). 
 133 See JEANNIE JINSHENG YI & SHAWN XIAN YE, THE HAIER WAY: THE MAKING OF 
A CHINESE BUSINESS LEADER AND A GLOBAL BRAND 108 (2003).  Pursuant to the PRC’s 
Commercial Bank Law, the PBOC would have needed to approve this acquisition.  
See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 134  See BANK OF QINGDAO CO., LTD., GLOBAL OFFERING 121 (2015), 
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2015/1120/ltn201511200
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HWR-NF8Y].  
 135 See YI & YE, supra note 133, at 108. 
 136 See Dan Wei (但伟), Mingtianxi Wanzhuan Shangshi Gongsi (明天系玩转上市
公司) [Tomorrow Group’s Fun with Listed Companies], SOUHU (搜狐) [SOHU.COM] (Feb. 
7, 2017), http://roll.sohu.com/20130408/n371904827.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/U7RG-N5ZU]. 
 137  See Su Longfei (苏龙飞), Mingtianxi, Anbangxi, Haihangxi, Fuxingxi . . . 
Minying Jinrong 28 Jutou Mingdan Ji Chigu Quan Jiemi (明天系、安邦系、海航系、复
星系 . . . 民营金融 28 巨头名单及持股图全揭秘) [Tomorrow, Anbang, HNA, Fosun . . . 
The List of 28 Private Financial Giants and Their Shareholding Charts Will Be All 
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(“CBRC”) was established in 2003. 138   It soon implemented new 
restrictions on intra-group transactions that expanded the definition 
of “related party” relative to the Commercial Bank Law, but capped 
these transactions at a high level and still relied upon unclear 
terminology, thereby impeding effectiveness and enabling further 
FCC growth.139  Also, as a reaction to the growing number of non-
financial corporate groups that controlled numerous financial 
companies, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(“CIRC”),140 CBRC, and CSRC issued guidelines in 2004 endorsing 
 
 138  The CBRC was established pursuant to NPC-approved State Council 
actions in 2003.  See China Banking Regulatory Commission, supra note 99.  Its 
establishment was authorized by Article 9 of the Insurance Law.  See Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Baoxian Fa (中华人民共和国保险法) [Insurance Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l 
People’s Congress, June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 9, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4644.htm 
[https://perma.cc/86FA-5G9S].  
 139 A 2004 CBRC rule required that credit extended by a bank to “related 
parties” not exceed fifty percent of net capital.  Shangye Yinhang Yu Neiburen He 
Gudong Guanlian Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa (商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法) 
[The Administrative Measures for the Connected Transactions between the Commercial 
Banks and their Insiders or Shareholders] (promulgated by China Banking Regul. 
Comm’n, Apr. 2, 2004, effective May 1, 2004) art. 32, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3500&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/QZQ5-7K7U].  It also expanded the Commercial Bank Law’s 
definition of “related party” to include legal persons under direct or indirect 
“control” by the same organization controlling a bank.  Compare id., art. 6-8 with 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) 
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (2003), art. 40, 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HV-
F7WN].  See also Mary Ip, Chinese Financial Markets: Regulators and Current Laws in 
CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES FROM WTO MEMBERSHIP 297, 321 (Kam C. 
Chan et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the CBRC’s 2004 regulations “amplified the 
description of ‘connected persons’”).  Yet what constituted “control” remained 
ambiguous, enabling preferential “related party” transactions to continue.  See IMF, 
People’s Republic of China: Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report No. 
11/321, at 41 (Nov. 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11321.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JJ66-Q2CX] (explaining that “no legal requirement [existed] to 
identify ultimately beneficial owners and clients of banks” and suggesting that 
“[r]ules for identifying related parties . . . need to be strengthened”).  Moreover, a 
fifty percent threshold is relatively high, and therefore undermined the rule’s 
effectiveness.  See MARK A. DEWEAVER, ANIMAL SPIRITS WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS: INVESTMENT BOOMS AND BUSTS IN THE WORLD’S EMERGING 
ECONOMIC GIANT 112 (2012).  
 140 The CIRC was established in 1998 by the State Council.  Guowuyuan Guanyu 
Chengli Zhongguo Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weyuanhui de Tongzhi (国务院关于成立中国
保险监督管理委员会的通知) [Notice of the State Council on the Establishment of China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission] (promulgated by State Council, Nov. 11, 2014, 
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increased cross-agency regulatory coordination, but reaffirming a 
commitment to sector-based regulation. 141   Although the State 
Council officially approved CITIC Group and China Everbright 
Group to be classified as financial holding companies in 2002,142 no 
group-wide regulatory regimes were established, 143  enabling 
further FCC growth. 
Against this regulatory backdrop and amidst securities market 
reforms, beginning in 2001, Tomorrow Group gained control of 
several securities companies,144 becoming the PRC’s first PFCC.145  
China Huaneng Group, a state-owned utility company, also 
emerged as a SFCC during this time after gaining control of a 
securities company and its fund management subsidiary,146 one of 
 
effective Nov. 11, 1998), https://law.lawtime.cn/d471199476293.html 
[https://perma.cc/839Z-7DDZ]. 
 141 Zhongguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui, Zhongguo Zhengquan 
Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui, Zhongguo Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui (中国银
行业监督管理委员会、中国证券监督管理委员会、中国保险监督管理委员会 ) 
[China Banking Regul. Comm’n, China Sec. Regul. Comm’n & China Ins. Regul. 
Comm’n], San Da Jinrong Jianguan Jigou Jinrong Jianguan Fengong Hezuo Beiwanglu (
三大金融监管机构金融监管分工合作备忘录 ) [Memorandum of Cooperation on 
Financial Supervision of Three Major Financial Supervisory Agencies] art. 8 (Jun. 2004), 
http://business.sohu.com/2004/06/28/21/article220752183.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VG7C-WZ5T]. 
 142  See Jin Sheng, China’s Financial Holding Companies: Mixed Operation and 
Separate Supervision 5 (Nat’l Univ. of Sing. Ctr. for Banking & Fin. L. Working Paper, 
Feb. 3, 2016), https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2020/07/CBFL-WPS-1601-SJ02_SHENG-Jin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GGT-TEEH]. 
 143 See Tang Shisheng (汤世生), Taiwan Jinkong Moshi Dui Dalu Jinrong de Jiejian 
(台湾金控模式对大陆金融的借鉴) [Learning in Mainland Financial Markets from 
Taiwan Financial Holding Company Model], ZHONGGUO FAZHAN GUANCHA (中国发展
观 察 ) CHINA DEV. WATCH 43 (2011), 
https://doc.mbalib.com/view/9f9156ac61a0dbe2abf87dd94beef4b2.html 
[https://perma.cc/SW8Z-P42R] (reporting that the PBOC proposed draft 
regulations for holding companies in 2000 and 2005, but ultimately abandoned 
those plans). 
 144 See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137. 
 145 Ping An Group did not become a PFCC until after it gained control of 
numerous non-financial companies.  See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 146 See Gongsi Jianjie (公司简介) [Company Introduction], CHANGCHENG JIJIN, (长
城 基 金 ) [GREAT WALL FUND] 
http://www.ccfund.com.cn/main/zjcc/gsjs/index.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/N89R-M2NR] (noting that Great Wall Securities, controlled by 
China Huaneng Group, was founded in 2001); ZHONGGUO CHANGCHENG 
ZHENGQUAN GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI, (中国长城证券股份有限公司) [CHINA GREAT 
WALL SECURITIES CO. LTD.], CHANGCHENG ZHENGQUAN GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI 
SHOUCI GONGKAI FAXING GUPIAO ZHAOGU SHUOMINGSHU (长城证券股份有限公司首
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the first of such firms to emerge in the PRC.147  Overall, the number 
of fund management companies grew to over fifty-eight by 2006.148 
Also in the early 2000s, PBOC regulatory changes allowed TICs 
to reemerge as a powerful force in Chinese financial markets.149  As 
a result, by 2004, TIC assets had rebounded to 278.4 billion yuan, 
and then reportedly rose to 1 trillion and 14 trillion yuan in 2007 and 
2014, respectively. 150   In 2003, a TIC controlled by recently-
restructured Ping An Group—which by then was the PRC’s second-
largest life insurer—received regulatory approval to acquire a 
regional bank.151  China Resources—an SOE with business activities 
spanning construction, consumer products, energy, and healthcare 
that had grown under zhuadafangxiao152—also gained control of a 
TIC in 2006.153  In 2009, it became one of Mainland China’s largest 
SFCCs after regulators allowed it to assume an over seventy-five 
percent ownership stake in a struggling city commercial bank.154 
 
次公开发行股票招股说明书) [CHINA GREAT WALL SECURITIES CO. LTD. INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERING PROSPECTUS] 71-72 (2018), 
http://www.cgws.com/cczq/tzzgx/xxpl/201905/P020190508581655383249.pdf 
(reporting that by 2003, China Huaneng Group and its affiliates controlled over fifty 
percent of Great Wall Securities). 
 147 The PRC’s first fund management companies were established in 1998.  See 
Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian, Meijun Qian & Mengxin Zhao, A Review of China’s 
Financial System and Initiatives for the Future, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 48 (James R. Barth et al. eds., 2009). 
 148 Id. 
 149 See JIANBO LOU, supra note 115, at 13-14. 
 150 Id. at 14. 
 151 See History, supra note 74 (noting that in February 2003, Ping An Insurance 
Company was restructured into a holding company, Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China, Ltd., that went public the following year); Ping An Plans to Buy 
Fujian Bank, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 26, 2003), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/26/content_284939.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9NY7-CH86] (reporting that in November 2003, Ping An 
Group, through its TIC subsidiary, gained control of Fujian Asian Bank in Fujian 
province). 
 152  See Company at a Glance, CHINA RES., 
http://en.crc.com.cn/whoweare/companyataglance/ [https://perma.cc/5HX5-
CXLG]. 
 153 See Gongsi Jianjie (公司简介), [Company Introduction], HUARUN XINTUO (华润
信 托 ) [CR TRUST], https://www.crctrust.com/gsjj/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/A58V-85SA]. 
 154 Zhongguo Yinjianhui Guanyu Huarun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Rugu Zhuhaishi 
Shangye Yinhang Gudong Zige de Pifu (中国银监会关于华润股份有限公司入股珠海市
商业银行股东资格的批复) [Reply of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on CR 
Trust’s Qualifications to Become a Shareholder of Zhuhai Commercial Bank], ZHONGGUO 
YINJIANHUI ( 中 国 银 监 会 ) [CBRC] (Apr. 23, 2009), 
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Another driver of PFCC formation was insurance industry 
growth brought about in part by an increase in private risk-taking 
stemming from the PRC’s embrace of a “socialist market 
economy.” 155   Between 1999 and 2004, total Mainland China 
insurance industry assets grew from 260.4 billion to 1.112 trillion 
yuan, and by 2003, there were twenty-two domestic insurance 
companies, versus thirteen in 2000 and just four in 1991.156  One new 
insurer was Anbang Property and Casualty Insurance Co., Ltd., 
which was founded in 2004 and later reorganized into a PFCC called 
Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. (“Anbang Group”).157  Funde 
Sino Life Insurance Co., Ltd., also launched in the early 2000s,158 
would later become a subsidiary of the PFCC Funde Holding Group 
Co., Ltd. (“Funde Group”),159 established in 2007.160 
In 2006, the State Council’s “Several Opinions on the Reform and 
Development of the Insurance Industry” accelerated insurance 
sector growth by supporting restructuring, acquisitions, and 




 155  The embrace of the “socialist market economy” in 1993 by national 
policymakers resulted in individuals and businesses increasingly assuming 
financial risks, thus fueling insurance demand.  See Sun, Suo & Zheng, supra note 
71, at 602-03. 
 156 See id. at 603, 606. 
 157  See Anbang Insurance Group (China), PUB. OPS. INT’L, 
https://www.publicopinions.net/index.php/directory/the-200-certified-winners
-of-the-sustainable-development-award-2018-2019/1935-anbang-insurance-group-
china.html [https://perma.cc/WG9Q-8HGG] (noting that the CIRC granted 
approval for Anbang Property & Casualty Insurance Co., Ltd. to restructure as a 
holding group and that, in 2012, Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. was founded);  
New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137 (providing a timeline of Anbang Group’s 
financial company acquisitions and its expansion into non-financial business lines, 
particularly hotel management). 
 158  See Company Profile, SINO LIFE INS. CO., https://www.sino-
life.com/ensinolife/ [https://perma.cc/8DRC-9VCH ]. 
 159 See infra Appendix A. 
 160  Jituan Jianjie (集团简介) [Group Introduction], FUDE KONGGU JITUAN (富德控
股 集 团 ) [FUDE HOLDING GRP.], 
http://www.fundegroup.com/web/introduction.aspx [https://perma.cc/PUW9-
PYPJ]. 
 161 New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137; Guowuyuan (国务院) [State 
Council], Guowuyuan Guanyu Baoxianye Gaige Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian(国务院
关于保险业改革发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions of the State Council on the 
Reform and Development of the Insurance Industry] (Jun. 15, 2006), 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-06/26/content_320050.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D2T5-HZXN]. 
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Tomorrow Group were established shortly thereafter. 162   HNA 
Group—an airline company that had acquired SOE assets 163 —
similarly established an insurance company joint venture, 164 
becoming a PFCC.165   
Also in 2006, the CIRC formally allowed insurance companies to 
invest in up to two banks.166  Shortly thereafter, Ping An Group—
still the PRC’s second-largest life insurer167—gained control of two 
Mainland China banks.168  By this time it had morphed into a PFCC 
that controlled a range of significant non-financial subsidiaries with 
business lines spanning e-commerce, hotel management, electronics 
manufacturing, and expressway maintenance.169 
 
 162 See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137. 
 163 See David Barboza & Michael Forsythe, Behind the Rise of China’s HNA: The 
Chairman’s Brother, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/business/hna-group-deals-china.html 
[https://perma.cc/G4HU-BXXR]. 
 164 See Da Shiji (大事记) [Major Events], DINGCHENG RENSHOU (鼎诚人寿) 
[DINGCHENG LIFE], https://www.dingchenglife.com.cn/c/2019-09-
23/485307.html [https://perma.cc/9L9F-F8W7]. 
 165 HNA Group had already acquired a futures company in 2003. See Haihang 
Jituan Caiwu Youxian Gongsi (海航集团财务有限公司) [HNA Group Finance Co., Ltd.], 
QINGKE YANJIU ( 清 科 研 究 ) [PEDATA.COM], 
https://m.pedata.cn/ep/detail_254369410.html [https://perma.cc/Y4ER-7H6E]. 
 166 Guanyu Baoxian Jigou Touzi Shangye Yinhang Guquan de Tongzhi (关于保险
机构投资商业银行股权的通知) [Notice on Insurance Institutions Investing in Equity of 
Commercial Banks] (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
10/16/content_414876.htm [https://perma.cc/625U-SWGT]. 
 167  See PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 3 
(2010), https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2010/0427/ltn201
004271085.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP9U-8U6D]. 
 168 See History, supra note 74. 
 169 Although Ping An Insurance Company of China gained control of financial 
companies throughout the 1990s, it did not become an FCC until after it both 
reorganized as Ping An Group and gained majority equity interests in several 
principal subsidiaries engaged in non-financial businesses across a number of 
sectors between 2007 and 2009.  Compare PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., 
supra note 167, at 144-46 (listing various non-financial companies in which Ping An 
Group, by 2009, controlled over fifty percent of equity interest, including three 
manufacturers, a consulting company, two IT companies, and three hotel 
management businesses) with  PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., ANNUAL 
REPORT 2007, at 121-23 (2008), 
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2008/0326/ltn200803264
57.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W3K-AGM2] (presenting a list of principal subsidiaries 
of Ping An Group as of December 2007, which only includes three non-financial 
companies—two property managers and one expressway management company—
in which Ping An Group controlled over fifty percent of equity interest).  In 2004, 
Ping An became a publicly listed company in which U.K. and U.S. banks held major 
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ii. Mainland China’s First Internet PFCC Forms 
As Mainland China’s private sector grew, so did a new online 
retailer called Alibaba 170  which, in 2004, built out a payments 
processing system called Alipay that allowed it to facilitate online 
payments as the custodian of buyer and seller funds.171  Alipay soon 
morphed into a mobile payments service with tens of millions of 
users, prompting the PBOC to create a new regulatory framework 
for these activities—Alipay received Mainland China’s first 
Payments Business License in May 2011. 172   That same month, 
Tenpay Payment Technology Co., Ltd. (“Tenpay”), a company 
controlled by Tencent Holdings Ltd. (“Tencent”), an online gaming, 
music, and social network company, also received one of these 
licenses. 173   In 2013, Alipay and Alibaba’s financial services 
 
stakes, but for which the largest shareholder was a Shenzhen municipal 
government investment vehicle.  See Christine Chan, HSBC to Strengthen Grip on 
Ping An, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 8, 2004), 
https://www.scmp.com/article/458658/hsbc-strengthen-grip-ping 
[https://perma.cc/7UEQ-2G4K]; see also History, supra note 74.  By 2020, Ping An 
Group’s Healthcare and Technology unit operated China’s largest online healthcare 
platform, known as Ping An Good Doctor.  See Eric Ng, Ping An Good Doctor, China’s 
Largest Health Care Platform, Reports Jump in Users Amid Coronavirus, Smaller than 
Expected Annual Loss, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3050074/ping-good-doctor-chinas-larg
est-health-care-platform-reports-jump-users [https://perma.cc/8M2X-J26P]. 
 170 See DUNCAN CLARK, ALIBABA: THE HOUSE THAT JACK MA BUILT 131 (2016).  
Alibaba was incorporated in 1999, but before then it had already been conducting 
business for several years, and at the time of its incorporation had over 28,000 
customers.  Id. at 102. 
 171 See Julia Wu, A Brief History of Jack Ma’s Ant Financial - the $150B Unicorn, 
HACKERNOON (Aug. 6, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/the-story-of-ant-financial-
4t2aq3zh8 [https://perma.cc/F3KG-2TJE]. 
 172 Gongsi Licheng (公司历程) [Our History and Timeline], MAYI JITUAN (蚂蚁集
团 ) [ANT GRP.], https://www.antfin.com/history.htm [https://perma.cc/JZS6-
33AG].  Notably, in 2011, Alipay was spun off into a company directly controlled 
by Alibaba’s CEO.  See Huang Yuntao & Kevin Soh, Alipay Gets License to Set Up E-
payment System, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
alipay/alipay-gets-licence-to-set-up-e-payment-system-idUSTRE74P26120110526 
[https://perma.cc/KJV2-KB8L]. 
 173 See Guanyu Caifutong (关于财付通) [About Tenpay], CAIFUTONG (财付通) 
TENPAY, https://www.tenpay.com/v3/helpcenter/about/about.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/9MGR-AJAX].  Tenpay Payment Technology Co., Ltd. (财付通
支付科技有限公司) is also known as Tenpay, and it is reportedly over ninety-five 
percent owned by Tencent Computer (深圳市腾讯计算机系统有限公司 or  腾讯计
算机 in Chinese).  Caifutong Zhifu Keji Youxian Gongsi (财付通支付科技有限公司) 
[Tenpay], TIANYANCHA ( 天 眼 查 ) TIANYANCHA, 
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businesses—including a sizable non-bank consumer micro-lending 
service—were restructured into a new company soon rebranded as 
Ant Financial, which later expanded its non-bank credit product 
offerings.174  Ant Financial remained seventy-five percent owned by 
Alibaba management and employees, 175  thus this Article treats 
Alibaba as effectively maintaining control of Ant Financial as 
Alipay’s annual payments processing volume grew to over $1 
trillion USD in 2015.176 
 
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/2313221010.  Since 2005, Tencent has 
controlled Tencent Computer through contractual agreements, even though it lacks 
direct equity ownership in the company.  See TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD., 2005 ANNUAL 
REPORT 80, 83 (2006), http://cdc-tencent-com-
1258344706.image.myqcloud.com/storage/uploads/2019/11/09/d530cf0097fd78
8ce2ff5d0583e6dcb4.pdf [https://perma.cc/37ZG-2F46]; TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD., 
infra note 181, at 261, 263. 
 174 Ant Financial’s formation process began in 2013, and by 2014, in addition 
to Alipay and investment platforms, Ant Financial also operated Ant Credit, a non-
bank lending service.  See Ant Fin. Servs. Grp., Official Launch of Ant Financial 
Services Group Brings New Financial Ecosystem to China, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141016005260/en/Official-Laun
ch-of-Ant-Financial-Services-Group-Brings-New-Financial-Ecosystem-to-China 
[https://perma.cc/9CLX-7JJS].  By Q1 2014, Ant Credit “had loaned RMB190 
billion for more than 700,000 small and micro-businesses.”  IFC, Ant Financial 
Services Group and Goldman Sachs 10,000 Women Launch First Internet-Based Gender-
Finance Program in China to Boost Women Entrepreneurship, INT’L FIN. CORP. (Jan. 27, 
2015), https://ifcext.ifc.org/IFCExt/pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/5DFDA58B
CBFE71B685257DDA00303B14?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/G74W-
Q3HH].  By 2017, Ant Financial operated five non-bank consumer and business 
lending services.  See CITIGROUP, BANK OF THE FUTURE: THE ABCS OF DIGITAL 
DISRUPTION IN FINANCE 39 (2018), 
https://www.citibank.com/commercialbank/insights/assets/docs/2018/The-Ba
nk-of-the-Future/2/ [https://perma.cc/72EM-ZFG8].  Additionally, by 2017, Ant 
Financial also controlled two Chongqing-based non-bank small consumer loan 
companies that in 2017 issued over 200 billion yuan in asset-backed securities.  See 
Yan Qinbo (闫沁波), Mayi Jinfu Jiang Zai Chongqing Sheli Xiaofei Jinrong Gongsi(蚂蚁
金服将在重庆设立消费金融公司) [Ant Financial Sets Up a Consumer Finance Company 
in Chongqing], 21 CAIJING (21 财 经 ) [21 FINANCE] (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2018-02/06/content_80272.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2SBB-5SGD].  For the purposes of this Article, all of the 
consumer and business small loan services provided by Ant Financial are treated 
as one financial company, while Ant Financial’s two Chongqing-based small loan 
businesses are together treated as one financial company. 
 175  See ANT FIN., ANT FINANCIAL (2016), https://www.alibabagroup.com
/en/ir/pdf/160614/12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF4T-QXMH]. 
 176  See ZENNON KAPRON & MICHELLE MEERTENS, SOCIAL NETWORKS, E-
COMMERCE PLATFORMS, AND THE GROWTH OF DIGITAL PAYMENT ECOSYSTEMS IN CHINA: 
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This milestone marked the emergence of Mainland China’s first 
“internet PFCC” (“IFCC”)—a subcategory of PFCC that 
distinctively:  (1) operates a large retail payment system ($1 trillion 
USD processed annually); and (2) earns much of its revenue from 
internet-related activities. 177   In 2015, Ant Financial also gained 
control of a fund management company that it had already 
partnered with to launch one of the world’s largest money market 
mutual funds.178   Unlike Ant Financial, Tencent operates a fund 
management platform but does not control a major retail-oriented 
fund management company,179 although throughout the late 2010s 
both Tencent and Alibaba conducted very high levels of venture 
capital investing. 180   Tencent-controlled non-bank lender Tenpay 
Micro Loan launched in 2014, but Tencent did not become an IFCC 
until 2016 after it both gained control of a bank and its annual 
payments volume grew to over $1 trillion USD.181  
 
 177 As mentioned above, this Article treats $1 trillion USD in annual payment 
processing volume as a threshold for determining whether the financial activities 
of an FCC are “significant.”  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 178 See EO INTELLIGENCE, DECIPHERING THE TRILLION-VALUED UNICORN – ANT 
FINANCIAL CASE STUDY 7-8 (2019), https://img2.iyiou.com/ThinkTank/2019-06-
21/Ant%20Financial%20Case%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VJ8-UZYG] 
(reporting that in 2015, Ant Financial gained control of fifty-one percent of 
Tianhong Asset Management’s total shares).  Tianhong Asset Management 
launched the Yu’e Bao money market fund in 2013 via a partnership with Ant 
Financial.  Id. at 6-7.  By 2014, Yu’e Bao was the world’s fourteenth largest money 
market mutual fund.  See Gwynn Guilford, China’s $122 Billion Boom in Shadow 
Banking is Happening on Phones, QUARTZ (Feb. 10, 2014), 
https://qz.com/175421/chinas-122-billion-boom-in-shadow-banking-is-happenin
g-on-phones/[https://perma.cc/A5AX-24DF]. 
 179 Tencent’s Licaitong is an online marketplace for financial products, through 
which Tencent enables customers to invest in funds established by fund 
management companies with which it partners, but does not control.  See LEON QI, 




 180 See Savannah Dowling, Huge Rounds, Heated Competition: How Tencent & 
Alibaba Are Defining VC in China, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Jan. 21, 2018), 
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/huge-rounds-heated-competition-tencent-
alibaba-defining-vc-china/ [https://perma.cc/9CQ6-DY8G] (reporting that 
Tencent’s and Alibaba’s participation in venture capital funding rounds grew 
dramatically from 2013 to 2017, totaling over 200 and 100 investments, 
respectively). 
 181 Tenpay Micro Loan (深圳市财付通网络金融小额贷款公司 or 财付通小贷 in 
Chinese), which was founded in 2013 and lends to small and medium enterprises, 
is ultimately controlled by Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology Co. Ltd. (深圳市世
纪凯旋科技有限公司), a company that, through contractual agreements rather than 
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iii. 2010s Banking System Policy Decisions Enable Further PFCC 
Growth 
A series of 2010s policy decisions enabled Tencent and other 
privately-owned conglomerates to expand into banking.  First, in 
2010, the State Council issued “Some Opinions on Encouraging and 
Guiding the Sound Development of Private Investment,” calling for 
more private capital in the financial services industry.182  The PBOC 
also once again decided not to implement holding company 
regulations for FCCs, although in 2011 it again proposed 
introducing such regulations for some conglomerates.183  Then in 
2012, the CBRC issued “Suggestions on the Implementation of 
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Invest in the Banking 
Sector,” which affirmed that “private enterprises may invest in 
 
equity ownership, is controlled by Tencent.  See Shenzhenshi Caifutong Wangluo 
Jinrong Xiaoe Daikuan Gongsi (深圳市财付通网络金融小额贷款公司) [Tenpay Micro 
Loan], TIANYANCHA ( 天 眼 查 ) TIANYANCHA, 
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/2325765626 (providing information on 
the nature of Tenpay Micro Loan’s business and the company’s origins, and 
reporting that the firm is over seventy percent owned by Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan 
Technology Co. Ltd.);  TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 261, 263 
(2020), https://cdc-tencent-com-
1258344706.image.myqcloud.com/uploads/2020/04/02/ed18b0a8465d8bb733e33
8a1abe76b73.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2BF-U56L] (reporting that while Tencent 
“does not have legal ownership in equity” of Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology 
Co. Ltd., “under certain contractual agreements . . . [Tencent] and its other legally 
owned subsidiaries control [Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology Co. Ltd.]”).  
Tencent gained control of a bank in 2014.  See infra note 192 and accompanying text.  
The volume of Tencent’s WeChat Pay transactions first exceeded $1 trillion USD in 
2016.  See KAPRON & MEERTENS, supra note 176, at 7.  Tencent launched WeChat Pay 
in 2013 by integrating Tenpay into its WeChat platform, and WeChat Pay payments 
and transfers are routed through Tenpay.  See About Tenpay, supra note 173. 
 182 Guowuyuan (国务院) [State Council], Guli He Yindao Minjian Touzi Jiankang 
Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian (鼓励和引导民间投资健康发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions 
on Encouraging and Guiding the Sound Development of Private Investment], art. 18 
(2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-05/13/content_1605218.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SX6T-BCU7]. 
 183 See DELOITTE, JINRONG HUNYE JINGYING ZHENGSHI MAIRU XINPIANZHANG (金
融混业经营正式迈入新篇章 )  [MIXED FINANCIAL COMPANIES HAVE OFFICIALLY 
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banking financial institutions through establishment, subscription 
for new stock, transfer of equity, and merger and restructuring.”184 
Amidst these policy shifts, HNA Group gained a twenty percent 
stake in Yingkou Coastal Bank in 2010 with approval from the 
CBRC.185   That year, the CBRC also published a notice allowing 
major shareholders to gain ownership interests exceeding twenty 
percent of shares in some at-risk rural and urban commercial banks, 
although it also generally restricted a single company from investing 
in more than two banks. 186   Yet at the same time, the CBRC 
accelerated efforts to merge troubled RCCs into joint-stock rural 
commercial banks187 and thus, in the following years, Tomorrow 
Group expanded investments in two rural commercial banks, while 
Anbang Group acquired a thirty-five percent share of Chengdu 
Rural Commercial Bank.188  Overall, between 2002 and 2013, private 
ownership of joint-stock banks increased from eleven to forty-five 
percent and private ownership of city commercial banks increased 
from nineteen to fifty-six percent.189 
 
 184 Guanyu Guli He Yindao Minjian Ziben Jinru Yinhangye de Shishi Yijian (关于
鼓励和引导民间资本进入银行业的实施意见) [Suggestions on the Implementation of 
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Invest in the Banking Sector], CHINA 
BANKING REGUL. COMM’N (May 26, 2012), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/35AF2AE678A043
9BA5E296C3137A5652.html [https://perma.cc/Q5N4-468W]. 
 185  Zhongguo Yinjianhui (中国银监会 ) [China Banking Regul. Comm’n], 
Zhongguo Yinjianhui Guanyu Choujian Yingkou Yanhai Yinhang de Pifu (中国银监会关
于筹建营口沿海银行的批复) [Reply of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on the 
Establishment of Yingkou Coastal Bank], ZHONGGUO YINJIANHUI (中国银监会) [CHINA 
BANKING & INS. REGUL. COMM’N] (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=272901&itemI
d=4110&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/YSL8-FHW5]. 
 186  Zhongguo Yinjianhui (中国银监会 ) [China Banking Regul. Comm’n], 
Zhongguo Yinjianhui Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Zhongxiao Shangye Yinhang Zhuyao 
Gudong Zige Shenhe de Tongzhi (中国银监会办公厅关于加强中小商业银行主要股东
资格审核的通知 ) [Notice of the General Office of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission on Strengthening the Qualification Review of Major Shareholders of Small and 
Medium-sized Commercial Banks], ZHONGGUO YINJIANHUI (中国银监会 ) [CHINA 
BANKING & INS. REGUL. COMM’N], 
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/govermentDetail.html?docId=278643
&itemId=863&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/327A-UPUS]. 
 187  See MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42380, CHINA’S BANKING 
SYSTEM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42380.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQ29-KMHU]. 
 188 See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137. 
 189 See Qingmin Yan (阎庆民), Yinjianhui Zhuxi Yanqingmin Tan Minying 
Yinhang Shidian Gongzuo (银监会副主席阎庆民谈民营银行试点工作) [Qingmin 
Yan, Vice Chairman of the CBRC, Talks Sbout the Pilot Work of Private Banks], 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
838 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
Yet until 2014, no Mainland China-based banks had been 
established entirely with private capital in the PRC.190  That year, the 
CBRC approved the establishment of five pilot privately-owned 
banks.191  The first of the pilot banks, WeBank, was established in 
2014 and is controlled by Tencent. 192   Two other pilot banks 
established in 2015 were also backed by PFCCs:  1) MYbank, 
controlled by Ant Financial; and 2) Shanghai Huarui Bank, 
controlled by JuneYao Group, an FCC that also controls a range of 
non-financial business including a namesake airline and several 
consumer goods retailers.193  The CBRC soon formalized the process 
by which privately-owned banks are formed by issuing related 
 




 190  Before 2014, Mainland China only had one bank founded by private 
capital—Minsheng Bank.  See Xinhua, China Regulator Approves Operation of Private 
Webank, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 13, 2014), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-12/13/content_19080267.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9E5F-3ZGC].  However, Minsheng Bank was not entirely 
founded by private capital.  See About CMBC, CHINA MINSHENG BANK (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://en.cmbc.com.cn/CMBCToday/AboutCMBC/IntroductiontoCMBC/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/62VR-D8MN] (noting that Minsheng Bank was the “first 
national joint-stock commercial bank initiated and founded mainly from non-
public enterprises”). 
 191 See Jamil Anderlini, China Opens Door to Private Banks, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/7096239e-a8e0-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de 
[https://perma.cc/WSH2-AT2M]. 
 192 See Yang Ge, Online Banks Tied to Tencent, Alibaba Bulk Up 1 Yuan at a Time 
on Microloans, CAIXIN (Jun. 7. 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-06-
07/online-banks-tied-to-tencent-alibaba-bulk-up-1-yuan-at-a-time-on-microloans-
101099195.html [https://perma.cc/WSH2-AT2M] (reporting that WeBank is 30 
percent owned by Tencent).  A mid-2017 New Fortune article reported that Tencent 
controlled WeBank; see infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Jiang Xueqing, Micro Firms Handed a Boost, Thanks to New Breed of Private 
Banks, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 22, 2019), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/22/WS5c46805aa3106c65c34e5cb6.htm
l [https://perma.cc/4HC9-2T8T] (reporting that MYBank is thirty percent owned 
by Ant Financial); Huarui Bank, JUNEYAO, http://www.en.juneyao.com/hrbank
/index.jhtml [https://perma.cc/HXP6-5X66] (reporting that Shanghai Huirui Bank 
formally started operation in May 2015).  A mid-2017 New Fortune article reported 
that Ant Financial controlled MYbank while JuneYao Group controlled Shanghai 
Huirui Bank as well as a TIC.  See infra note 197 and accompanying text.  For 
information on JuneYao Group’s non-financial business lines, see Appendix A, and 
Group Introduction, JUNEYAO, http://www.en.juneyao.com/
GroupIntroduction.jhtml [https://perma.cc/V58X-E52S]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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licensing procedures and regulatory requirements in 2015.194   By 
2017, the CBRC approved the establishment of seventeen privately-
owned banks including Jiangsu Suning Bank, backed by consumer 
goods retailer Suning.com Co., Ltd. (“Suning Commerce Group”),195 
marking the formation of another PFCC.196  
 
 194  CBRC, Guidance on Promoting the Development of Private-owned Banks, 
GOV.CN (June 22, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-
06/22/content_5042920.htm [https://perma.cc/5WU6-PMDR]. 
 195  See Li Dongmei, Chinese Retailer Suning Launches Private Internet Bank, 
CHINA MONEY NETWORK (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.chinamoneynetwork.com/2017/06/19/chinese-retailer-suning-
launches-private-internet-bank [https://perma.cc/DM9J-WADB]; Suning Tesco, 
Suning, https://www.suningholdings.com/cms/suningdqtxtdata/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R76A-5RV3].  Given the PBOC’s classification of Suning 
Commerce Group as a “de-facto financial holding company,” as well as thresholds 
used in foreign regulatory regimes to determine that a non-financial firm controls 
a bank, this Article treats Jiangsu Suning Bank as being controlled by Suning 
Commerce Group.  See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169; infra notes 315-
320, 345-349 and accompanying text (explaining how twenty-five and twenty 
percent ownership stakes held by a non-financial company in a bank are used by 
U.S. and EU financial regulators, respectively, to determine whether a heightened 
regulatory regime is appropriate).  Suning.com Co., Ltd. is also called Suning 
Commerce Group (苏宁云商集团股份有限公司).  See Suning Tesco, supra. 
 196  By 2017, Suning Commerce Group also controlled Suning Financial 
Services, which offers non-bank consumer and business loans.  See MANCY SUN, 
PIYUSH MUBAYI, TIAN LU & STANLEY TIAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, THE RISE OF CHINA 
FINTECH 66 (2017), https://hybg.cebnet.com.cn/upload/gaoshengfintech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JDY-SN4V].  In 2017, Suning Financial Services reportedly 
offered $24.3 billion USD loans.  See Zhou Pengfeng (周鹏峰), Minying Jinkong 
Yangben Zhi Suning Jinrong: Sanzudingli You Youhuo You Tiaozhan (民营金控样本之
苏宁金融：三足鼎立 有诱惑有挑战) [Suning Finance, a Specimen of Private Finance: A 
Three-Legged Stand with Temptations and Challenges], 21 JINGJIWANG (21 经济网 ) 
[21JINGJI.COM] (Sep. 1, 2018), http://www.21jingji.com/2018/9-
1/wMMDEzODBfMTQ0NzIwMQ.html [https://perma.cc/64GA-3MWP].  For the 
purposes of this Article, Suning Financial Services and its various financial 
affiliates, including numerous regional non-bank lending subsidiaries, are 
collectively treated as one “company that, through one or more non-bank lending 
businesses, conducts a high level of financial intermediation,” one of the nine types 
of financial companies considered in this Article’s categorization of FCCs.  See supra 
note 5 and accompanying text (providing the methodology used in this Article to 
classify FCCs); Shanghai Suning Jinrong Fuwu Jituan Youxian Gongsi (上海苏宁金融
服务集团有限公司) [Shanghai Suning Financial Services Group Co., Ltd.], TIANYANCHA 
( 天 眼 查 ) TIANYANCHA, https://www.tianyancha.com/company/3403000763 
(reporting that Shanghai Suning Financial Services Group, also known as Suning 
Financial Services, controls numerous provincial non-bank small business lending 
subsidiaries, as well as various other financial companies that do not correspond to 
the nine types of financial companies considered in this Article’s categorization of 
FCCs). 
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE, STRUCTURE, AND REGULATION OF FCCS IN 
MAINLAND CHINA 
FCCs play a critical role in Mainland China’s financial system 
across various industry verticals, including banking, payments, 
insurance, and fund management.  This Part presents estimates of 
the extent to which financial companies controlled by FCCs 
participate in key segments of Mainland China’s financial markets.  
It also examines causes of and policy issues related to FCC 
organizational complexity that compound the difficulty of 
identifying, assessing, and regulating the financial market risks 
posed by Mainland China’s FCCs.   
a. Mainland China’s FCCs Are Significant Across Financial Industry 
Verticals 
Appendix A provides a list of large FCCs used to estimate the 
scope of financial services activities conducted by Mainland China’s 
FCC-controlled firms.  These FCCs were identified using data from 
several prominent Chinese financial news and data aggregation 
services—including New Fortune, Wind, and TianYanCha—as well 
as an analytical framework provided in the PBOC’s 2018 Financial 
Stability Report.197  Importantly, given the prevalence of complex 
 
 197 Appendix A is primarily sourced from mid-2017 New Fortune publications 
that list financial companies controlled by the PRC’s largest state-owned and 
privately-owned conglomerates, ranked by financial assets.  Su Longfei (苏龙飞), 
Zhongguo Minying Jinrong Quanli Bang TOP100: Mayun Jingran Zhi Pai Diwu, Naxie 
Ren Bi Ta Geng (中国民营金融权力榜 TOP100：马云竟然只排第五，哪些人比他更
有权力?) [Top 100 of China’s Private Financial Power List: Jack Ma Is Only Fifth, Who Is 
More Powerful than Him?], XIN CAIFU (新财富 ) [NEW FORTUNE] (July 11, 2017), 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/A_y9igKA7A8Rnt0WQYScag 
[https://perma.cc/N3K9-TBFH]; Su Longfei (苏龙飞), Yang Qi Jinrong Quanli Bang: 
ZhaoShangju, Huarun, Guojia Dianwang, Yancao Zonggongsi……Jiemi 23 Da Shiye 
YnagYnagYnagYnagYangYnag Qi Jinrong Quan Buju (央企金融权力榜：招商局、华
润、国家电网、烟草总公司……揭秘 23 大实业央企金融全布局!) [List of Financial 
Powers of Central-Government-Owned Enterprises: China Merchants, China Resources, 
State Grid, Tobacco Corporation . . . Unveiled the Full Layout of 23 Major Industrial 
Central-Government-Owned Enterprises!], XIN CAIFU (新财富) [NEW FORTUNE] (July 
13, 2017) [collectively hereinafter New Fortune 2017 Reports], 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4_Ay3Hc2vOhuwk1d06Y7zg 
[https://perma.cc/9H2D-GJKS].  Besides Tencent, all conglomerates listed in the 
New Fortune 2017 Reports that are also included in Appendix A are those that 
conform with this Article’s definition of an FCC because, as of 2016-17: (1) each 
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conglomerate controlled two or more of the nine types of financial companies 
considered in this Article’s approach to identifying FCCs; (2) financial companies 
controlled by each conglomerate collectively accounted for over $10 billion USD 
(about 70 billion yuan) in financial assets; and (3) each conglomerate operated large 
non-financial business lines.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  Capital 
leasing companies listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports, however, are excluded 
from estimates of FCC-controlled financial companies set forth in Appendix A, as 
these are not one of the nine types of financial companies considered in this article’s 
approach to identifying FCCs.  Also, even though the New Fortune 2017 Reports 
indicate that Tencent’s 2017 financial assets were below the $10 billion USD 
threshold, this article still considers it an FCC because of the scale of its payment 
system.  See id.  For an overview of the sources used to determine if a conglomerate 
listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports operated large non-financial business lines 
in 2016-17, see infra note 407.  Notably, given the close relationship between Alibaba 
and Ant Financial, this Article treats Alibaba as an FCC rather than Ant Financial, 
the entity listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports.  See supra notes 174-176 and 
accompanying text.  Appendix A also includes four FCCs not listed in the New 
Fortune 2017 Reports:  CITIC Group, China Everbright Group, Shougang Group, 
and Suning Commerce Group.  The PBOC has categorized CITIC Group, China 
Everbright Group, and Suning Commerce Group as “de-facto financial holding 
companies.”  See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 168-69.  This Article treats 
Suning Commerce Group as controlling two financial companies that are types 
considered in this article’s approach to identifying FCCs.  See supra notes 195-196 
and accompanying text (listing financial companies controlled by Suning 
Commerce Group).  This article treats CITIC Group as controlling seven of these 
financial companies: CITIC Bank (which together with AiBank and CITIC Bank’s 
subsidiaries, including China CITIC Bank International, is treated as a single 
financial company), CITIC Trust, CITIC Securities (which together with its financial 
company subsidiaries, besides CITIC Futures, is treated as one financial company), 
CITIC Futures, CITIC-Prudential Fund Management Co., Ltd., CITIC Finance Co., 
Ltd. (an internal financial company), and CITIC-Prudential Life Insurance Co., Ltd.  
See CITIC LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 175, 336-39 (2018), 
https://www.citic.com/ar2017/download%20center/en/e00267.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BYZ-2UMY] (reporting CITIC Group as the parent company 
of CITIC Ltd., which at the time held fifty percent or more shares in each of CITIC 
Bank, CITIC-Prudential Life Insurance Co., Ltd., CITIC Trust, and CITIC Finance 
Co., Ltd.); Group Structure, CITIC INT’L FIN. HOLDINGS LTD. (Dec. 15, 2017), 
http://www.citicifh.com/eng/structure/index.htm [https://perma.cc/5ED3-
XPXZ] (reporting that CITIC Bank, through a subsidiary, as of December 2017 
controlled seventy-five percent of China CITIC Bank International); Gongsi Jianjie (
公司简介) [Company Profile], ZHONGXIN BAOCHENG (中信保诚) CITIC-PRUDENTIAL 
FUND MGT. CO., LTD., https://www.citicprufunds.com.cn/pc/companyInfo 
[https://perma.cc/73DA-Y6A7] (explaining that CITIC-Prudential Fund 
Management Co., Ltd, founded in 2005, is a joint-venture of CITIC Trust and 
Prudential Group Co, Ltd.); CITIC SEC., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 54, 106 (2018), 
http://www.citics.com/newsite/en/FinancialInformation/FinancialReport/2018
04/P020180420605294602805.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5NQ-STJH] (reporting that 
in 2017 CITIC Securities controlled CITIC Futures as well as other financial 
companies, and that 16.5 percent of CITIC Securities shares were ultimately 
controlled by CITIC Group, by far the largest shareholder).  Given the close 
relationship between CITIC Group and CITIC Securities, this article treats CITIC 
Securities as being controlled by CITIC Group.  See id. (detailing numerous 
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significant CITIC Securities related party transactions with CITIC Group); Nisha 
Gopalan, How CLSA Had the Life Squeezed out of It, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-09/clsa-losing-identity-
threatens-citic-s-global-ambitions [https://perma.cc/X7FH-X4J3] (referring to 
CITIC Securities as a unit of CITIC Group); Zhonggong Zhongxin Jituan 
Weiyuanhui (中共中信集团委员会) [CCP CITIC Group Committee], Zhonggong 
Zhongxin Jituan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai Qingkuang de Tongbao (中共中
信集团委员会关于巡视整改情况的通报) CCP CITIC Group Committee Announcement 
on Inspection and Rectification, Zhonggong Zhongyang Jilü Jiancha Weiyuanhui (中
共中央纪律检查委员会 ) [Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China] (Apr. 27, 2016), 
www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/zyxszt/2015dsl_zyxs/agls_2015dsl_zyxs/201605/t2016
0501_78340.html [https://perma.cc/2P44-SAXV] (indicating that CITIC Securities 
acts as a subsidiary of CITIC Group).  This article treats China Everbright Group as 
controlling seven financial companies that are types considered in this article’s 
approach to identifying FCCs.  Zhongguo Guangda Jituan Gufengongsi (中国光大集团
股 份 公 司 ) [China Everbright Group], TIANYANCHA ( 天 眼 查 ), 
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/210456243 (reporting that China 
Everbright Group owns fifty percent or more shares of each of Everbright Sun Life 
Insurance Co., Everbright Xinglong Trust Co., Ltd., China Everbright International 
Trust & Investment Corporation, and Everbright Financial Holding Asset 
Management Co., Ltd.—which either directly or through subsidiaries controls 
several fund companies and is, for purposes of this Article, treated as a single 
financial company); CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 65, 67-68 (2018), 
http://www.cebbank.com/site/gdywwz/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Re
ports/H_Share81/66410664/2018042722274447511.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M5Y-
YKJ4] (reporting that in 2017 China Everbright Group and its state owner Central 
Huijin Investment Ltd. together controlled over fifty percent of China Everbright 
Bank’s shares); EVERBRIGHT SEC. CO., LTD., ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANNUAL RESULTS FOR 
THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017, at 106 (2018), 
http://www.ebscn.com/upload/20180327/20180327083850883.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DL3V-3R8L] (reporting that as of December 2017, China 
Everbright Group was the controlling shareholder of Everbright Securities 
Company Limited, which is, together with its subsidiaries, treated as a single 
financial company in this article, with the exception of Everbright Futures Co., Ltd., 
which this Article treats as a separate financial company).  This Article also treats 
Shougang Group as a FCC, even though it is not explicitly mentioned by the PBOC.  
See Shougang Jituan Youxian Gongsi (首钢集团有限公司) [Shougang Group Limited 
Company], TIANYANCHA ( 天 眼 查 ) [TIANYANCHA], 
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/672482 (reporting that Shougang Group 
controls one internal financial company and a fund company that controls other 
financial companies but for purposes of this article is treated as a single financial 
company); infra note 200 (explaining that in mid-2017 Shougang Group controlled 
over 20 percent of Huaxia Bank, a large bank).  This Article’s counts of financial 
companies controlled by Suning Commerce Group and the two large IFCCs include 
payments and non-bank lending companies that are not included in tallies 
presented in the New Fortune 2017 Reports.  See supra notes 5, 174, 181 and 
accompanying text (explaining the circumstances under which these types of 
financial companies are included in this Article’s counts of financial companies 
controlled by an FCC as well as how many of these types of companies are 
controlled by the IFCCs).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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FCC organizational structures that rely on cross-shareholding and 
ownership pyramids,198 as well as the lack of public information on 
ownership relationships between opaquely organized FCCs and 
non-listed banks and insurers, it can be difficult to determine 
whether a particular financial firm is controlled by an FCC.  This 
Article largely relies on mid-2017 New Fortune investigative reports 
to make these determinations, which were critical to producing 
Figure 1 and Table 1 below.199   
i. Banking:  FCC-Controlled Banks Account for One-Quarter of 
Banking Assets Held Outside the Large SOBs 
According to the estimate presented in Figure 1,200 by mid-2017, 
FCC-controlled banks accounted for about thirteen percent of 
Mainland China’s commercial banking assets, while banks 
 
 198 For an explanation of these ownership structures that enable an FCC to 
control a financial company even though it does not directly own the majority of 
shares, see infra notes 225-228 and accompanying text. 
 199 See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 200 Appendix B lists all banks included in this analysis, and was primarily 
developed by cross-referencing Appendix A’s list of FCCs with New Fortune’s lists 
of banks controlled by Mainland China’s largest conglomerates in 2016-17, using 
each conglomerate’s respective ownership share in the bank(s) it controlled.  See 
New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197 and accompanying text.  For the four 
FCCs identified in this Article but not listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports, the 
following sources are used to determine each FCC’s ownership stake in its 
respective bank affiliate: CITIC LTD., supra note 197 and accompanying text; HUA 
XIA BANK CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 64 (2018), 
http://www.hxb.com.cn/en/images/abouthuaxiabank/investorrelationship/inf
ormationdisclosureannualreport/2018/07/13/81C01D5A8B7C45D21CA6DF1FC
D7B2D6C.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT7J-2F3Q] (reporting that in mid-2017, 
Shougang Group controlled 20.28 percent of Huaxia Bank); CHINA EVERBRIGHT 
BANK, supra note 197 and accompanying text.  Suning Commerce Group is excluded 
from Appendix B because it did not establish a bank until mid-2017.  For each of 
the banks listed in Appendix B, Wind data was used to determine Q2 2017 banking 
assets, except in three instances where data limitations necessitated that 2016 Wind 
data be used, and one instance where 2015 data, as reported by New Fortune, was 
used.  See Wind Financial Terminal, WIND, https://www.wind.com.cn/en/wft.html 
[https://perma.cc/GA68-RLD5]; infra note 408 and accompanying text.  SOB and 
total commercial bank assets data used to produce Figure 1 was obtained from the 
CBRC website.  Yinhangye Jianguan Tongjizhibiao Yuedu Qingkuangbiao (2017 Nian) (
银行业监管统计指标月度情况表 (2017 年)) [Monthly Statistics Fact Sheet], ZHONGGUO 
YINHANG BAOXIAN JIANDUGUANLI WEIYUANHUI (中国银行保险监督管理委员会 ) 
[CHINA BANKING & INS. REGUL. COMM’N] (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=146945&itemI
d=954&generaltype=0 [https://perma.cc/J53C-YPVH].  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
844 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
“influenced” by FCCs—meaning that an FCC held twenty percent 
or more of shares, but there is no clear indication that as of mid-2017 
it controlled the bank—accounted for almost six percent of 
commercial banking assets. 
 
Figure 1:  FCC-Controlled and FCC-Influenced Banks Account 
for Almost 20 Percent of Mainland China Commercial Banking 
Assets by 2017 
 
 
Of the twenty-two banks controlled by FCCs in early 2017, the 
largest were China Merchants Bank, CITIC Bank, China Everbright 
Bank, and Ping An Bank.201  Overall, in mid-2017, FCC-controlled 
banks accounted for at least twenty-four percent of Mainland China 
commercial banking assets not controlled by large SOBs,202 totaling 
23 trillion yuan (approximately $3.4 trillion USD).203   
ii. Payments:  IFCCs Operate Major Retail Payments Systems 
According to a J.P. Morgan analysis, fifty-four percent of 
Mainland China’s 2018 e-commerce spending by value took place 
via digital wallet mobile payments services.204  Moreover, a 2018 
study reported that digital wallet mobile payments services 
accounted for forty percent of Mainland China’s retail in-person 
 
 201 See infra Appendix B.  This table excludes a bank controlled by Suning 
Commerce Group. 
 202 See supra Figure 1 (grouping the Mainland China banking assets by FCC-
controlled banks’, FCC-influenced banks, large state-owned banks and “other 
banks”). 
 203 See infra Appendix B.  For conversion rate, see Exchange Rates, supra note 
18. 
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spending. 205   Across e-commerce and in-person spending, over 
ninety percent of Q4 2018 mobile payments were executed via 
services provided by the PRC’s two IFCCs, Tencent and Alibaba.206  
Taken together, these findings suggest that payments companies 
controlled by the PRC’s two IFCCs accounted for forty to fifty 
percent of Mainland China’s retail payments in 2018.207 
iii. Insurance, Fund Management, and TICs:  FCCs Have Sizable 
Market Shares 
By 2017, several FCCs played a very large role in the PRC’s 
insurance industry.  Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, data compiled by 
S&P Global Ratings and New Fortune together suggest that in early 
2017, FCC-controlled life insurance companies accounted for over 
one-third of life insurance policies written in Mainland China.208 
  
 
 205 SUKRITI BANSAL, PHILIP BRUNO, OLIVIER DENECKER, MADHAV GOPARAJU & 
MARC NIEDERKORN, GLOBAL PAYMENTS 2018: A DYNAMIC INDUSTRY CONTINUES TO 





 206 JOSHUA YOUNGER, ALEX YAO, KATHERINE LEI & ARTHUR LUK, J.P. MORGAN, A 
CASE STUDY IN ALTERNATIVE PAYMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE 7 
(2019). 
 207 This figure is estimated using data reported by other sources.  See supra 
notes 204-206 and accompanying text. 
 208 To produce Table 1, each of the PRC’s twenty-five largest life insurance 
companies and their respective market share, as reported by S&P Global Ratings, 
was cross-referenced against insurers that, according to the New Fortune 2017 
Reports, were controlled by FCCs listed in Appendix A.  See infra Appendix A; New 
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FCC that Controls the 
Insurers (est. mid-2017 
ownership stake) 
Market Share of Q1 
2017 Life Insurance 
Policies Written 
Ping An Life Insurance 平安人寿 Ping An Group (99.5%) 13.2% 
Anbang Life Insurance 安邦人寿 Anbang Group (100%) 9.0% 
Huaxia Life Insurance 华夏人寿 Tomorrow Group (93%) 5.3% 
Funde Sino Life Co. Ltd. 富德生命 Funde Group (81%) 3.9% 
Tianan Life Insurance 天安人寿 Tomorrow Group (40%) 2.6% 
Evergrande Life Insurance 恒大人寿 Evergrande Group (50%) 1.0% 
Qianhai Life Insurance 前海人寿 Baoneng Group (100%) 1.0% 
Estimated total market share of FCC-controlled life insurers 36.0% 
 
The PRC’s large FCCs also play a major role in fund 
management.  Most significantly, Ant Financial’s money market 
fund is one of the largest in the world, with over one trillion yuan in 
assets under management in 2018.209  The fund assets of other FCCs 
listed in Appendix A are also substantial, and totaled over one 
trillion yuan at year-end 2016.210  Moreover, both IFCCs also serve 
as important channels through which retail investors invest in bank-
administered wealth management products 211  that are similar to 
MMFs.  Serving as funding vehicles to various financial institutions, 
these wealth management products collectively accounted for 22.2 
trillion yuan in assets under management by 2019.212 
By year-end 2016, the total assets of TICs controlled by FCCs 
listed in Appendix A likely equaled about seven trillion yuan,213 and 
Mainland China’s TIC assets reportedly totaled 23 trillion yuan in 
 
 209 See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 9. 
 210 The total asset value of FCC-controlled funds was calculated by summing 
the 2016 fund assets reported by New Fortune for funds it reported as controlled 
by FCCs listed in Appendix A.  See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197; see 
infra Appendix A. 
 211 See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 11-12. 
 212 See id.; Ehlers, Kong & Zhu, supra note 17. 
 213 The total asset value of FCC-controlled TICs was calculated by summing 
the 2016 TIC assets reported by New Fortune for TICs it reported as controlled by 
FCCs listed in Appendix A.  See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197; see infra 
Appendix A. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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mid-2017.214  Thus, overall, TICs controlled by Mainland China’s 
FCCs likely accounted for about 30 percent of total TIC assets in 
early 2017.  These TICs largely serve either as funding vehicles 
through which assets of wealthy individuals or businesses are used 
to finance high-risk projects, or as a conduit through which banks 
and other financial firms can invest in asset classes that they would 
otherwise not be able to purchase due to regulatory reasons.215 
b. Understanding FCC Organizational Complexity and Related 
Regulatory Challenges 
The PBOC’s 2018 Financial Stability Report flagged the rapid 
growth of non-financial conglomerates controlling two or more 
types of financial firms as a potential risk to the Chinese economy, 
warning that these groups’ complex structures can enable excessive 
financial leverage, impede supervision, and enable corporate 
groups to circumvent regulations on improper intra-group 
transactions.216  This Section identifies drivers and characteristics of 
FCC organizational complexity, explores how the PBOC and market 
observers believe FCC structures contribute to regulatory 
challenges, and examines the potential impact of recent regulatory 
shifts aimed at addressing some of these issues. 
i. Cross-Shareholding & Pyramids:  Characteristics of Many FCC 
Structures 
During the early 2000s, as sweeping legal and policy changes 
and economic turmoil helped drive many FCCs to form, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) found that PRC regulators were understaffed and ill-
 
 214  BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., CHINA TRUST INDUSTRY REPORT 2 (2018), 
http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-China-Trust-Report-Feb-2018_ENG_tcm
52-188092.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XS5-SZGQ].  
 215  PING AN TRUST CO. & MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE COMING 
TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA’S TRUST INDUSTRY—CHINA TRUST INDUSTRY REPORT 2013, 
at 4 (2013), http://www.mckinseychina.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/mckinsey-china-the-coming-transformation-of-chinas-
trust-industry.pdf?5c8e08 [https://perma.cc/FGV3-ASZJ]. 
 216 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-70. 
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equipped to conduct proper industry oversight. 217   Accordingly, 
some of the large FCCs that emerged in the 2000s were established 
through opaque webs of shell companies and non-publicly-listed 
financial institutions.218  Indeed, up until regulations were tightened 
in 2018,219 rules aimed at restricting a single entity from controlling 
more than one bank and one insurer were systematically 
circumvented through regulatory arbitrage whereby complex FCC 
structures were used to exert control over numerous financial 
institutions.220  This problem was exacerbated by unclear definitions 
 
 217  See OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC POLICY 
CHALLENGES 50 (2002). 
 218  See Michael Forsythe, Behind China’s Anbang: Empty Offices and Obscure 
Names, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/asia/china-anbang-insurance.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/Y2BP-7SL5] (reporting on Anbang Group’s complex web of 
business units); David Barboza, Behind a Chinese Powerhouse, a Web of Family 
Financial Ties, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/dealbook/hna-debt-deal-hain
an-airlines.html [https://perma.cc/UW3Q-7F4N] (reporting on the conglomerate 
structure of HNA Group). 
 219  In 2018 and 2019, the CBRC, CIRC, and CSRC tightened supervisory 
loopholes that enabled corporate groups to control numerous financial companies.  
Shangyeyinhang Guquan Guanli Zanxing Banfa (商业银行股权管理暂行办法 ) 
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Equities of Commercial Banks] 
(promulgated by China Banking Regul. Comm’n, Jan. 5, 2018, effective Jan. 5, 2018),  
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/govermentDetail.html?docId=265032
&itemId=861&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/UE7B-MXWS]; Baoxiangongsi 
Guquan Guanlibanfa (保险公司股权管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of 
Equities of Insurance Companies] (promulgated by China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, Apr. 10, 2018, effective Apr. 10, 2018), 
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=372940&itemI
d=928&generaltype=0 [https://perma.cc/R74E-TKWH]; Zhengquangongsi 
Guquan Guanliguiding (证券公司股权管理规定) [Provisions on the Administration 
of Equities of Securities Companies] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, July 5, 2019, effective July 5, 2019),  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201907/P020190705633045079946.p
df [https://perma.cc/6K9K-LLPA]. 
 220 See Tian Jing (田静), Jituan Nei Jinrongjigou Jianguan Mianlin de Tiaozhan Yu 
Duice (集团内金融机构监管面临的挑战与对策) [Challenges and Countermeasures 
Faced by Group Financial Institutions], 98 BIJIAO (比较) [COMP. STUD.] 228, 228 (2018), 
http://bijiao.caixin.com/2019-01-16/101370632.html [https://perma.cc/6DUP-
3GP7]; PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170; see also Peng Qinqin & Liu Xiao, 
Party’s Over for China’s Financial Holding Companies, CAIXIN (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-11-20/partys-over-for-chinas-financial-
holding-companies-101173771.html [https://perma.cc/TX7B-5DTT] (observing 
that rules restricting a single company and its affiliates from collectively controlling 
more than one bank were “widely circumvented” throughout the 2010s). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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of critical legal terms such as “shareholder,” enabling FCCs to 
circumvent regulatory barriers to bank and insurer acquisitions.221 
By December 2017, the PRC was “materially non-compliant” 
with international regulatory best practices related to monitoring 
the transfer of significant bank ownership stakes, as Mainland China 
regulators had, according to the IMF, “no systematic process for 
regularly receiving/collecting information on names and holdings 
of all significant shareholders or those that exert controlling 
influence [over banks].”222  Indeed, during this time, the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of some large FCCs were unknown 
entities.223  This outcome was enabled by highly-complex webs of 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings 224 —organizational 
approaches through which an FCC’s ultimate controlling 
shareholder is able to control a financial firm despite only directly 
owning a minority of its voting rights. 
Through pyramid structures, a controlling minority shareholder 
of a holding company can exert control over a financial firm in 
which that holding company maintains a controlling stake. 225  
Complex FCCs generally utilize multi-tiered pyramid structures,226 
thereby compounding the gap between an FCC parent company’s 
share of cash flow rights and the extent of its control over a financial 
firm.  Cross-shareholding, on the other hand, occurs when 
companies own stakes in each other, which in other words means 
 
 221  See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.  For example, Haier 
established five different companies to gain control over a bank.  See supra note 135 
and accompanying text. 
 222 IMF, People’s Republic of China: Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed 
Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 




 223 For example, in 2017, HNA Group’s largest shareholder was essentially an 
unknown person.  See Who Owns HNA, China’s Most Aggressive Dealmaker?, FIN. 
TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8acfe40e-410b-11e7-9d56-
25f963e998b2 [https://perma.cc/JSC8-WLYA]. 
 224 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-70; Tian Jing, supra note 
220, at 228. 
 225 See Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating 
Control from Cash Flow Rights 1, 5-7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
6591, 1999), https://www.nber.org/papers/w6951 [https://perma.cc/WCY9-
VVXF]. 
 226 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-170; Tian Jing, supra note 
220, at 228. 
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that each company indirectly owns some of its own shares.227  An 
FCC can use cross-shareholding to allocate voting shares in such a 
way that greatly reduces the number of shares it must own to control 
an affiliated financial firm.228 
According to the PBOC, Mainland China’s FCCs have exerted 
control over financial companies by using a mix of cross-
shareholding and pyramid structures. 229   Indeed, by 2018, the 
ownership structures of some FCCs were highly complex and 
involved dozens of corporate levels. 230   Opaque and complex 
structures of FCCs have exacerbated financial risks and impeded 
effective supervision, for reasons explained below. 
ii. FCC Complexity Impedes Effective Capital Regulation 
Capital acts as the “first line of defense against losses” for 
financial institutions, 231  and regulatory requirements related to 
capital levels aim to ensure that an institution’s capital is high 
enough to absorb significant losses.232   Higher capital levels also 
reduce the likelihood that linkages between multiple financial firms 
will result in one entity’s failure triggering failures of others.233  In 
late 2018, the PBOC warned that complex ownership structures 
within Mainland China’s FCCs create the risk that banks and 
 
 227 See Bebchuck, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 225, at 7-8. 
 228 See GUIDO FERRARINI, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL LAW REFORM 
AND THE CONTESTABILITY OF CORPORATE CONTROL 11 (2000), 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1931676.p
df [https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM] (explaining that “cross-[share]holdings allow 
[a] company involved to place into friendly hands a number of its own shares,  
thereby reducing the investment required to the controllers to keep control of the 
relevant company”). 
 229 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169 (observing that some “de-facto 
financial holding companies . . . invest in financial institutions through 
multilayered shareholding and cross-holdings”). 
 230 Id. 
 231 Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 763, 764 (2010). 
 232 See Why Do Banks Need to Hold Capital?, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (May 3, 
2019), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/
hold_capital.en.html [https://perma.cc/28HT-LEDU]. 
 233 See Testimony Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs U.S. 
Senate, 114th Cong. (Jun. 7, 2016) (written statement of Hal S. Scott, Director, Comm. 




2021] Conglomeration Unbound 851 
insurance companies will be undercapitalized.234   Similarly, 2019 
research by economists at Chongqing University of Technology 
determined that effective capital regulation for PRC mixed 
conglomerates is impeded by “the prominent phenomenon of multi-
level shareholding and cross-shareholding.”235 
Consistent with these observations, international banking 
regulators and central banks agree that complex ownership 
structures can enable financial groups to obfuscate their capital 
adequacy. 236   Indeed, complex cross-shareholding webs between 
Anbang Group affiliates enabled the FCC to misrepresent to 
regulators that it quintupled its capital within just a few months as 
it dramatically expanded its ownership of banks and launched an 
investment fund. 237   A related problem is that the complex 
ownership structures of Mainland China’s FCCs can enable 
widespread multiple leveraging,238  meaning that funds raised by 
one entity within a corporate group are used as capital to support 
risk-taking in separate but affiliated business units.239  
These issues are compounded by a lack of adequate regulatory 
coordination.  As FCCs formed in the 2000s, contact between 
relevant regulators was limited to periodic meetings conducted 
pursuant to guidance that did not address multiple leveraging.240  
 
 234  PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169 (observing that “layered 
shareholding and cross-holdings” are “driv[ing] up the overall leverage ratio” at 
some financial institutions). 
 235 Chenyuan Zhao & Qiumin Yu, A Summary of Risks in China’s Financial 
Holding Companies, 10 MOD. ECON. 1385, 1390 (2019), 
https://www.scirp.org/pdf/ME_2019051515361999.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5U6N-5FDR]. 
 236 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION 
OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 28-29 (2012), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint29.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM]. 
 237 See Ding Feng & Jia Huajie, In Depth: What’s Driving Insurer Anbang’s Big 
Bang?, CAIXIN (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2015-02-04/whats-
driving-insurer-anbangs-big-bang-101012703.html [https://perma.cc/7MHP-
7BAD]. 
 238 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 162 (observing that “increased 
leverage” has emerged within holding companies that own financial institutions 
“due to investment with non-proprietary funds”); Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 
1389-90. 
 239  See HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 213-14 (2010). 
 240 See Deng Zhongfeng & Cing Yangbin, Analysis on Double Leverage Risk of 
Financial Holding Conglomerates, 257 N. ECON. & TRADE 80, 82 (2006) (observing that, 
during this time, the only agreement between the CBRC, CIRC, and CSRC to 
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The PBOC found that “regulatory gaps” brought about by “sectoral 
regulation” enabled FCCs to “make repeated capital injection[s] in 
the disguise of a shell company.”241 
Also, as the financial activities of almost all FCCs were not 
subject to consolidated supervision at a holding company level, 
there was no group-wide or mid-tier holding company constraints 
on leverage.242  In late 2018 the PBOC also observed that some FCCs 
had invested in financial institutions with borrowed funds, thereby 
increasing leverage.243  Multiple leveraging was exacerbated during 
the 2010s by the wide-spread practice of FCCs conducting offshore 
debt issuances backed by a domestic affiliate’s cash flow,244 and until 
2018 CIRC regulatory action, this debt could be omitted from 
leverage calculations.245 
Additionally, non-bank micro-lending companies controlled by 
IFCCs could make loans with funds raised through the recycling of 
asset-backed security cash flows and the issuance of other forms of 
debt instruments, leading to high leverage, and these entities have 
also collaborated with banks to make jointly-issued loans, causing 
concerns from regulators and market observers over capital 
adequacy and risk contagion.246  For example, Alibaba affiliate Ant 
 
facilitate coordinated supervision of financial conglomerates limited coordination 
to periodic joint meetings, and that no formal regulations existed to facilitate such 
coordination); Zhang Yuzhe, Wu Hongyuran & Teng Jing Xuan, China to Roll Out 
Financial Holding Company Regulations Later This Year, CAIXIN (Jun. 3, 2018), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-06-03/china-to-roll-out-financial-holding-co
mpany-regulations-later-this-year-101261859.html [https://perma.cc/T58L-
Z4HP] (reporting that between 1999 and 2018, there was a “lack of consensus 
between government agencies on who should regulate financial holding companies 
and how they should do so”). 
 241 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169. 
 242 See Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1389-90. 
 243 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169. 
 244 See Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1390; see also Julie Zhu, Buying Overseas, 




 245 See Yang Qiaoling & Han Wei, China Clamps Down on Insurers’ Overseas 
Financing, CAIXIN (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-02-
13/china-clamps-down-on-insurers-overseas-financing-101211049.html 
[https://perma.cc/V9SK-JEAX]. 
 246 See HUANG QIFAN (黄奇帆), JIEGOUXING GAIGE: ZHONGGUO JINGJI DE WENTI 
YU DUICE (结构性改革：中国经济的问题与对策) [STRUCTURAL REFORM: PROBLEMS 
AND SOLUTIONS OF CHINESE ECONOMY]  91 (2020); Zhou Jueshuo (周矍铄), Daxing 
Hulianwang Qiye Jinru Jinrong Lingyu de Qianzai Fengxian Yu Jianguan (大型互联网企
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Financial’s leverage ratio is reportedly well over sixty times assets 
as a result of the lending activity of Chongqing-based non-bank 
online consumer lending affiliates,247 which were lightly-regulated 
at the provincial level but made loans worth over 300 billion yuan 
with just 3 billion yuan in capital.248  Notably, the PBOC in 2017 
constrained ABS issuance by these entities, and in November 2020, 
along with other agencies, issued draft “Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Online Petty Loan Business (Draft for Soliciting 
Opinions),” which, among other things, would require that:  (i) the 
balance of proceeds raised by a non-bank micro-loan company 
operating an online non-bank micro-loan business through issuing 
bonds, ABS products, or other forms of standardized debt assets not 
exceed four times its net assets; and (ii) for a single jointly-issued 
loan, the capital contribution made by a non-bank  micro-loan 
company operating an online non-bank micro-loan business not fall 
below thirty percent.249 
 
业进入金融领域的潜在风险与监管) [The Potential Risk and Regulation of Large Internet 
Enterprises Entering the Financial Sector], CAIXIN (Nov. 1, 2020), 
http://opinion.caixin.com/2020-11-01/101621303.html [https://perma.cc/HY26-
N7TC]; Wu Hongyuran, Hu Yue & Han Wei, In Depth: Cheers and Fears in $283 
Billion Bank-Tech Lending Tie-Up, CAIXIN (Oct. 27, 2019), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-10-27/in-depth-cheers-and-fears-in-283-billi
on-bank-tech-lending-tie-up-101475874.html [https://perma.cc/C5BM-ZA8D]. 
 247 See Liu Caiping, Zhang Yuzhe, Yue Yue, Wei Yiyang & Han Wei, Why Ant 
Group’s IPO May Stay on Ice for a While, NIKKEI ASIA (Nov. 10, 2020), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/Why-Ant-Group-s-IPO-may-stay-on-ic
e-for-a-while [https://perma.cc/68KB-4SK7]. 
 248 See id.; HUANG QIFAN, supra note 246, at 91. 
 249  See China Cracks Down on Online Micro-Lending Firms with New Rules, 
REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-regulations-
loans/china-cracks-down-on-online-micro-lending-firms-with-new-rules-idUSKB
N1DV4OU [https://perma.cc/9GEJ-7RXE]; Wangluo Xiaoe Daikuan Yewu Guanli 
Zanxing Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (网络小额贷款业务管理暂行办法(征求意见稿)) 
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Petty Loan Business (Draft for 
Soliciting Opinions], ZHONGGUO YINBAOJIANHUI (中国银保监会) [CHINA BANKING & 
INS. REGUL. COMM’N] (Nov. 2, 2020), 
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=938821&itemI
d=951 [https://perma.cc/ZS5E-HUC5]; see also Aries Poon & Rebecca Isjwara, 
China’s Leverage Caps on Microlenders Bring Ant’s Regulatory Risk to Forefront, S&P 
GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Sep. 16, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-h
eadlines/china-s-leverage-caps-on-microlenders-bring-ant-s-regulatory-risk-to-for
efront-60376685 [https://perma.cc/7QEJ-532H].  The November 2020 measures, 
once finalized, may only have a limited impact on the leverage of Ant Financial’s 
non-bank online consumer lending affiliates, which have largely already shifted to 
a partnership model whereby most lending is underwritten by partner financial 
institutions.  Id. 
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iii. Potentially Problematic Intra-Group Transactions and FCC 
Interconnectivity 
According to the PBOC, by 2018, certain banks and insurers 
controlled by FCCs had morphed into “cash machines” for the de-
facto controlling persons, the ultimate beneficiaries, or affiliated 
non-financial enterprises, yet through complex structures that took 
advantage of a sector-based regulatory approach, these activities 
were hidden from regulators. 250   For example, according to one 
account, Tomorrow Group appropriated about 150 billion yuan 
from Baoshang Bank between 2005 and 2017.251 
Generally, banking regulators across the world prohibit intra-
group transactions not conducted at prevailing market rates and 
limit various forms of intra-group transactions, which can reflect 
insufficiently diverse exposures, and may stem from pressure by 
management to support intra-firm growth, a potential source of 
inadequate risk management.252  Furthermore, although intra-group 
transactions are not inherently problematic,253 high levels of intra-
group funding may reduce reliance on external financing, which can 
serve as a source of private risk-monitoring.254  Notably, throughout 
the 2005 to 2015 boom period for FCCs, PRC regulators had in place 
regulations aimed at ensuring that intra-group transactions between 
insurers, banks, and securities firms would be conducted at market 
 
 250 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170. 
 251 See Zhou Xuedong (周学东), Zhongxiao Yinhang Jinrong Fengxian Zhuyao 
Yuanyu Gongsi Zhili Shiling—Cong Jieguan Baoshang Yinhang Kan Zhongxiao Yinhang 
Gongsi Zhili de Guanjian (中小银行金融风险主要源于公司治理失灵——从接管包商
银行看中小银行公司治理的关键) [Financial Risk of Small and Medium-sized Banks 
Stems from the Failure of Corporate Governance – An Analysis of the Crucial Determinants 
of Corporate Governance of Small and Medium-sized Banks based on the Case of Baoshang 
Bank] 15 ZHONGGUO JINRONG (中国金融) [CHI. FIN.] 19 (2020). 
 252 See SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 121; see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
 253  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTRA-GROUP TRANSACTIONS 
AND EXPOSURES PRINCIPLES ¶ 2 (1999), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs62.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9JU-JXX6] (observing that some intra-group transactions “can 
facilitate . . . synergies”); see also id. ¶ 7 (reporting that most regulatory regimes 
require that intra-group transactions take place at “arm’s length,” meaning at 
prevailing market rates). 
 254  See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in an International 
Perspective: a Survey of Corporate Control Mechanisms among Large Firms in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany (1994), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/econ41.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6B-M8HV]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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rates and reported to regulators.255  Yet these rules were regularly 
circumvented by certain FCCs during the 2010s through regulatory 
arbitrage, as FCCs’ complex structures impeded regulators’ ability 
to categorize affiliated transactions.256  Moreover, there were legal 
loopholes that enabled intra-group transactions between insurers 
and intra-group affiliates until 2019.257 
Opaque and complex FCC structures can not only mask 
interconnectivity within corporate groups, but also impede 
understanding of connectivity between FCCs and other financial 
institutions.  Indeed, information necessary to understand financial 
relations between various FCC affiliates and external firms may not 
only be poorly understood by regulators, but also by personnel 
working within the FCC. 258   Moreover, some FCCs are 
internationally active—through leveraged transactions conducted 
via a fund and several other affiliated business entities, HNA Group 
was able to acquire a ten percent stake in the global financial group 
 
 255 Zhongguo Baojianhui (中国保监会) [China Ins. Regul. Comm’n], Baoxian 
Gongsi Guanlian Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (保险公司关联交易管理暂行办法) 
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Affiliated Transactions of Insurance 
Companies] (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://bxjg.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab5225/info52464.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XBL4-ERXY]; Shangye Yinhang Yu Neiburen He Gudong Guanlian 
Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa (商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法) [The Administrative 
Measures for the Connected Transactions between the Commercial Banks and their Insiders 
or Shareholders] (promulgated by China Banking Regul. Comm’n, Apr. 2, 2004, 
effective May 1, 2004) art. 32, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3500&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/QZQ5-7K7U]; ASIA-PACIFIC OFF. OF THE CFA INST. CENTRE FOR 
FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS: CAUTIONARY TALES FOR 
INVESTORS IN ASIA (2009) 14, https://www.cfainstitute.org/-
/media/documents/article/position-paper/related-party-transactions-cautionary
-tales-for-investors-in-asia.ashx [https://perma.cc/PRS2-X7GA] (the CSRC 
“banned listed companies from providing loan guarantees to their parents and 
required the latter to settle their loans to subsidiaries starting in 2006”). 
 256 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170-71; see also Xuan Lei, China 
Regulator Bars 5 Insurers from Transactions with Shareholders, Affiliates, S&P GLOB. 
MKT. INTEL. (Oct. 11, 2017) 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/ol4
dj_ilwt9q8ahtm3naqa2 [https://perma.cc/D3NB-W3Y5]. 
 257 See Wu Yujian & Denise Jia, China Revises Rules on Insurers’ Related-Party 
Transactions, CAIXIN (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-09-
10/china-revises-rules-on-insurers-related-party-transactions-101460546.html 
[https://perma.cc/RNZ7-TLXB] (explaining that, through 2019, “rules did not 
clarify [an] insurance company’s management responsibilities on related 
transactions by subsidiaries, making those in control of the insurer able to use the 
subsidiaries to bypass regulations to get access to the insurer’s premium income”). 
 258 See Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 232; Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1390. 
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Deutsche Bank in 2017.259  Moreover, HNA Group’s structure at the 
time was so complex that its largest shareholder remained a 
mystery,260 causing analysts to fear that the unclear magnitude of 
HNA Group’s size and operations created the risk that any material 
financial distress at the conglomerate could be transmitted across 
borders.261  One prominent scholar has also raised concerns that the 
interconnectivity between and within IFCCs may drive risk 
contagion and systemic risk.262 
iv. Cross-Subsidization and Unfair Competitions Concerns 
The PBOC has also raised concerns that certain intra-group 
transactions enable cross-subsidization that both contributes to 
market risk and could bring about “unfair competition”—a non-
financial institution may transfer assets through loans and 
guarantees made by its financial affiliates within the same FCC, 
constituting cross-subsidization (meaning that profits from one type 
of business activity are used to support other business activities).263  
PRC officials fear such intra-group cross-subsidization can enhance 
the competitive advantages of FCCs and affiliates, which has caused 
them and other observers to raise market fairness concerns.264  Other 
commentators note that certain SFCCs enjoy unfair advantages in 
 
 259  See Olaf Storbeck., Deutsche Bank’s Biggest Shareholder Pulls Back from 
German Lender, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/52f159ea-
4cb8-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62.  By March 2019, HNA Group, through its affiliates, 
only controlled five percent of Deutsche Bank’s voting rights, yet had nearly zero 
economic interest in Deutsche Bank’s stock.  Id. 
 260 See Who Owns HNA, China’s Most Aggressive Dealmaker?, supra note 223. 
 261 See, e.g., Anjani Trivedi & Julie Steinberg, How China’s Acquisitive HNA 
Group Fell From Favor, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-chinas-acquisitive-hna-group-fell-from-
favor-1511118961 [https://perma.cc/MNU9-CZV4].  
 262 See Zhou Jueshuo, supra note 246.  Zhou Jueshuo is rumored to be a former 
PBOC governor.  See Eliza Gkritsi, The Unsigned Op-Eds that Foreshadowed Ant Group 
IPO Suspension, TECHNODE (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://technode.com/2020/11/09/china-voices-the-unsigned-op-eds-that-foresh
adowed-ant-group-ipo-suspension/[https://perma.cc/CNE6-N92W]. 
 263 See Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 233-35; see also PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, 
supra note 5, at 103, 170; Cross-Subsidization, OECD (Aug. 13, 2013), 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4968 [https://perma.cc/Z5GQ-
ZUDR]. 
 264 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 103; infra notes 266-268 and 
accompanying text; Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 233-35. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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the form of state support inconsistent with the principle of 
competitive neutrality.265 
The PBOC currently appears most concerned that the interaction 
between financial and non-financial activities within IFCCs will 
hinder risk monitoring and what it sees as fair competition. 266  
Indeed, in December 2020, PBOC Deputy Governor Pan Gongsheng 
stated that a major focus of the PBOC’s late 2020 supervisory 
interviews of Alibaba affiliate Ant Group (previously named Ant 
Financial) was eliminating “unfair competition.”267  Relatedly, the 
PRC’s antitrust regulator (the State Administration for Market 
Regulation) has expressed concern about “unfair competition” by 
so-called “platform economy” conglomerates—in November 2020, 
it proposed “Guidelines on Antitrust in the Field of Platform 
Economy (Draft for Soliciting Opinions),” which, if implemented, 
would limit horizontal integration and intra-group transactions at 
multi-sector conglomerates controlling both financial companies 
and sizable consumer-oriented business lines (such as the IFCCs and 
Suning Commerce Group).268 
 
 265  See Zhang Chunlin, ‘Competitive Neutrality’ for SOEs Can Help China At 
Home and Abroad, CAIXIN (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-10-
16/competitive-neutrality-for-state-firms-can-help-china-at-home-and-abroad-101
335637.html [https://perma.cc/3E8D-WXZP]; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & 
DEV., COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY: MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS 9 (2012), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-
and-services/competitive-neutrality_9789264178953-en#page1 
[https://perma.cc/86VS-CKEX] (explaining that “competitive neutrality occurs 
where no entity operating in an economic market is subject to undue competitive 
advantages or disadvantages”). 
 266 See Guo Shuqing, Party Sec’y & Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of 
China & CBIRC Chairman, Speech at the Singapore FinTech Festival (Dec. 8, 2020), 
https://www.bis.org/review/r201222f.pdf [https://perma.cc/E45J-CLZW]. 
 267 Xinhua (新华), Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fuhangzhang Pan Gongsheng 
jiu Jinrong Guanli Bumen Yuetan Mayi Jituan youguan Qingkuang da Jizhe Wen 
( 中国人民银行副行长潘功胜就金融管理部门约谈蚂蚁集团有关情况答记者问) [Pan 
Gongsheng, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Answered Reporters’ 
Questions about the Interview with the Financial Management Department about Ant 
Group], XINHUA [新华] XINHUA (Dec. 27, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-
12/27/c_1126912928.htm [https://perma.cc/2XTJ-G4JM]. 
 268  See  Guanyu Pingtai Jingji Lingyu de Fanlongduan Zhinan (Zhengqiu 
Yijian Gao) (关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南(征求意见稿)) [Guidelines on Antitrust 
in the Field of Platform Economy (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)] (promulgated by 
St. Admin. for Mkt. Regul., Nov. 10, 2020), 
http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202011/t20201109_323234.html 
[https://perma.cc/3NE8-F9VA]; see also Soon Chen Kang & Xiuxi Zhu, Alibaba in 
Crosshairs of Growing Antitrust Scrutiny in China, S&P MKT. INTEL. (Nov. 24, 2020), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-h
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v. Recent Regulatory Responses to FCCs 
These developments along with the PBOC’s proposed non-bank 
lending rules discussed above are components of accelerating efforts 
since 2018 by PRC regulators to constrain the operations of and 
increase supervision over certain FCCs—particularly the IFCCs.  
That year, a modest pilot regulatory program for FCCs was 
introduced, which brought about heightened group-wide risk 
management standards for the financial operations of three FCCs (as 
well as two other holding groups).269   Yet shortly thereafter, the 
PBOC reported it continued facing the challenge of “regulatory 
blind spots,” seeking regulatory authority to engage in “holistic, on-
going and look-through supervision” of certain mixed 
conglomerates.270  On September 11, 2020, its request culminated in 
the State Council’s issuance of the “Decision of the State Council on 
Implementing Access Administration of Financial Holding 




 269  In 2018, five corporate groups—China Merchants Group, Shanghai 
International Group, Beijing Financial Holdings Group, Ant Financial, and Suning 
Commerce Group—were placed in a pilot regulatory program that entailed more 
stringent capital requirements and heightened risk management standards for the 
financial operations of each of these five corporate groups.  See Stella Yifan Xie & 
Chao Deng, China to Tighten Rules on Five Financial Giants, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-tighten-rules-on-five-financial-giants-15
41246489 [https://perma.cc/9FUK-WVYM] (citing state-run media outlet Xinhua 
News Agency). Two of these are large FCCs identified in this Article’s analysis, 
while one—Ant Financial—is controlled by Alibaba, another FCC.  See infra 
Appendix A.  PRC regulators are able to apply group-level supervision principles 
to the FCC Ping An Group because it is headed by a regulated financial services 
business, an insurer.  See IMF, People’s Republic of China: Financial Sector Assessment 
Program: Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Insurance Core Principles, Country 
Report No. 17/402, at 92-94 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17402.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/RMH3-G62P].  All other FCCs identified in this Article, besides 
Anbang Group, are headed by a non-financial entity.  See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text; see infra Appendix A.  As the IMF observed in 2017, “[w]here 
there is a non-financial parent entity [controlling a bank or banking sub-group], the 
CBRC . . . supervises banks or banking sub-groups within the wider group,” but 
“[a]t present there is no holding company regime in law or regulation” that enables 
group-wide supervision.  IMF, supra note 222, at 114. 
 270 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170-72. 
 271 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Shishi Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Zhunru Guanli de 
Jueding (国务院关于实施金融控股公司准入管理的决定 ) [Decision of the State 
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PBOC to promulgate rules requiring non-financial enterprises and 
persons controlling two or more types of certain financial 
institutions to apply to establish a separately capitalized financial 
holding company subject to PBOC supervision and regulation.272  
The PBOC’s regulations, “Interim Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Financial Holding Companies” (“FHC 
Measures”), mirrored a July 2019 PBOC proposed rule and were 
implemented in November 2020, requiring “de-facto financial 
holding companies”—entities that meet criteria set forth in the 
rules—to apply to the PBOC for approval for formal formation and 
formal licensing as a PBOC-regulated financial holding company 
within twelve months.273 
Under the FHC Measures, however, only a conglomerate with a 
high proportion of financial assets (eighty-five percent or more of 
the group’s total assets) could be reorganized from the top-down as 
a “financial holding group” subject to group-wide regulation and 
 
Council on Implementing Access Administration of Financial Holding Companies] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Sep. 13, 2020, effective Nov. 1, 2020), 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-09/13/content_5543127.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U5SR-N46R]. 
 272  Id.  The types of financial institutions for which a financial holding 
company would have to be formed include: commercial banks (excluding rural 
banks), financial leasing companies, TICs, asset managers, securities companies, 
public funds, futures companies, and insurers.  Id.  A financial holding company 
will need to be established if a domestic non-financial enterprise, a natural person, 
or an authorized legal person de-facto controls at least two types of these financial 
institutions and: (1) if it de-facto controls at least one commercial bank, either total 
assets of all financial institutions exceed or equal 500 billion yuan, total assets of all 
financial institutions other than commercial banks exceed or equal 100 billion yuan, 
or assets under management exceed or equal 500 billion yuan; (2) if it does not 
control any commercial banks, either total assets of all financial institutions exceed 
or equal 100 billion yuan or assets under management exceed or equal 500 billion 
yuan; or (3) if total financial assets do not meet the standards stated in either (1) and 
(2), but the PBOC deems that a financial holding company should be established.  
Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Shixing Banfa (金融控股公司监督管理试行
办法 ) [Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Financial 
Holding Companies] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, Sep. 13, 2020, 
effective Nov. 1, 2020), art. 6 [hereinafter PBOC FHC Measures], 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/tiaofasi/144941/144957/4093006/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/379P-BBNA]. 
 273  Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Shixing Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian 
Gao) (金融控股公司监督管理试行办法 (征求意见稿)) [Interim Measures for the 
Supervision and Administration of Financial Holding Companies (Draft for 
Soliciting Opinions)] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, Jul. 26, 2019), 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-07/26/content_5415624.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q6BZ-42UH] (China); PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 
13. 
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supervision.274  This threshold is hardly met by most Chinese FCCs.  
For FCCs that do not meet the threshold, financial affiliates 
controlled by the FCC will likely reorganize into a separately 
capitalized, PBOC-regulated financial holding company controlled 
by a domestic non-financial entity.275  However, it remains to be seen 
if certain FCC structures could preclude the need for such 
reorganization.276  Regardless, most FCCs will likely not be subject 
to robust group-wide regulation under the new rules,277 although 
those that ultimately create PBOC-regulated financial holding 
companies pursuant to the regulations will be subject to new 
holding company-level capital regulations, 278  qualitative and 
quantitative risk management standards, 279  cross-shareholdings 
restrictions, 280  “penetration supervision” of controlling 
shareholders and the actual controller, 281  and anti-monopoly 
regulations.282 
It remains unclear whether an FCC controlling a “de-facto 
financial holding company” that requires PBOC licensing under the 
new rules would, as a whole, be protected by the PRC’s national 
financial safety net.  Were that to be the case, it could weaken market 
discipline, resulting in moral hazard and excessive risk-taking by 
affiliated financial institutions.283  Moreover, the 2019 extension of 
 
 274 PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 6. 
 275 See China’s New Rules on Financial Holding Firms to Curb Systemic Risks, FITCH 




 276 See id. (noting that “[i]mplementation will be key to the effectiveness of 
these new regulations”).  Indeed, it seems possible that certain ownership 
structures could enable FCCs to control two or more financial companies but not 
reorganize those entities within a financial holding company pursuant to the new 
rule. 
 277 However, although it appears that financial holding companies organized 
pursuant to the rule will not be subject to any clear supervisory benchmarks, the 
establishment of these entities would likely enable regulators to more closely 
scrutinize intra-group transactions.  See id. 
 278 PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 7. 
 279 Id. art. 24-35. 
 280 Id. art. 18. 
 281 Id. art. 40, 41. 
 282 Id. art. 11, 35, 47. 
 283 See TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, supra note 3, at 17 n.9 (suggesting that the real or 
apparent extension of a safety net over non-financial affiliates of a mixed 
conglomerate is an undesirable policy outcome); see also GARY H. STERN & RON J. 
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the national financial safety net to protect 99.98 percent of the 
corporate creditors of Tomorrow Group’s Baoshang Bank as well as 
likely on average over ninety percent of its other creditors’ claims—
including large inter-bank creditors—illustrates that the financial 
operations of certain FCCs may already be viewed by PRC 
regulators as too-big-to-fail.284 
In short, the Access Administration Decision and FHC Measures 
are likely to enhance PBOC oversight authority over the financial 
operations of most FCCs and modestly limit intra-group transaction 
volume, but will not directly restrict the ability of FCCs to form 
through non-financial entities gaining control of multiple large 
financial companies.285  Indeed, the new rules arguably legitimize 
the structure of certain FCCs, 286  even though the two IFCCs—
particularly Alibaba—continue to be subject to fierce regulatory 
scrutiny.287  In fact, as recent events suggest, FCCs may ultimately 
enjoy a generous extension of the PRC’s national financial safety net. 
 
FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 2 (2004) (explaining that 
the expansion of the expectation of government protection over creditors results in 
excessive risk taking and moral hazard). 
 284 See Liu Jiefei, Regulators Move to Restructure Troubled Baoshang Bank, CAIXIN 
(Jun. 17, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-06-17/regulators-move-to-
restructure-troubled-baoshang-bank-101427929.html [https://perma.cc/7KPC-
6FD2]. 
 285 PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 36 (setting forth restrictions on 
related party transactions for financial holding companies and their holding 
institutions); supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text. 
 286 In September 2020, the PBOC noted the economic benefits of certain FCCs 
to the Chinese economy, observing that some 
non-financial enterprises [that] have held several different types of 
financial institutions through investment . . . have improved resource 
allocation, reduced cost as well as enriched and improved their financial 
services through this business model, which was conducive to meeting the 
demands of various enterprises and consumers and to boosting the 
capacity of the financial sector for serving the real economy. 
See PBC Officials Answer Press Questions on Trial Measures on Regulation of Financial 
Holding Companies, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA (Sep. 18, 2020), 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4048269/4098744/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z2J8-4VF4]. 
 287 In addition to the restrictions on horizontal integration that the November 
2020 SAMR regulations would bring about, a mid-January 2021 draft PBOC rule 
would effectively mandate anti-trust investigations into and forced divestures by 
the two IFCCs because of the market concentration enjoyed by their financial 
affiliates.  See Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu 《Feiyinhang Zhifu Jigou Tiaoli 
(Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) 》Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于
《非银行支付机构条例（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知 ) [Notice of the 
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IV. HOW FCCS DISTINGUISH MAINLAND CHINA FROM OTHER 
MAJOR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
This Part explores how the structure and regulation of Mainland 
China’s FCCs distinguishes its financial markets from those of the 
EU, Japan, and the United States.  First, Chinese SFCCs conduct a 
much broader range of significant financial and non-financial 
business activities relative to European, Japanese, or U.S. 
government-owned entities that offer financial services.  Second, 
EU, Japanese, and U.S. regulatory frameworks either prohibit the 
structures of most of the PRC’s largest FCCs or subject non-financial 
parent companies and affiliates within somewhat similarly 
structured entities to higher levels of regulation, while few 
comparable groups exist in these jurisdictions.  Third, although 
cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures do exist within Japan’s 
and the EU’s financial sectors, only in Mainland China are some 
large mixed conglomerates characterized by both structural 
features, as well as high levels of intra-group transactions. 
a. Mainland China’s SFCCs, Unlike State-Owned Groups in Other 
Major Markets, Engage in a Wide Range of Financial and Non-
Financial Activities 
Mainland China’s largest SFCCs conduct a wide range of sizable 
financial activities but, generally, most of their revenue comes from 
non-financial business lines.288   This model does not exist in the 
United States, where few government-owned companies directly 
 
People’s Bank of China on Public Consultation on the “Regulations on Non-bank 
Payment Institutions (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)”] (promulgated by People’s 
Bank of China, Jan. 20, 2021), 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rmyh/105208/4166553/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/M63G-UL4D]; see also Timmy Shen, China’s New Monopoly Rules 
Put Fintech Giants in the Crosshairs, CAIXIN (Jan. 22, 2021), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-01-22/chinas-new-monopoly-rules-put-fint
ech-giants-in-the-crosshairs-101653928.html [https://perma.cc/2CH4-ANKM]. 
 288 For example, financial services revenue at CITIC Ltd., the major corporate 
unit of CITIC Group, made up less than forty percent of 2018 revenue.  See CITIC 
LTD., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 9 (2019) [hereinafter CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT], 
https://www.citic.com/uploadfile/2019/0418/20190418044301701.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5XJ-FAVB].  Many SFCCs listed in Appendix A—such as 
China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinochem Group—are likewise not 
primarily focused on financial activities. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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provide business- or consumer-facing financial services and those 
that do are often guided by precise financial markets policy 
objectives and do not operate substantive non-financial business 
lines.  It is also a stark contrast from the Eurozone and Japan, where 
besides two post office groups that control relatively large financial 
companies, state-owned institutions that provide a sizable amount 
of business- or consumer-facing financial services either directly or 
through affiliates are largely not active in non-financial sectors and 
predominantly focus on a limited number of financial sector 
business lines. 
 One of the few large U.S. federal government-owned financial 
companies is the Government National Mortgage Association 
(“Ginnie Mae”), 289  which guarantees principal and interest 
payments for securities comprised of U.S. government-guaranteed 
mortgages.290  In addition to narrowly-focused, federal government-
owned financial services entities, the U.S. is also home to some small 
government-owned entities that directly provide retail financial 
services, including a North Dakota state government-owned 
bank,291 as well as some U.S. state government-owned non-profit 
 
 289 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored enterprises that 
securitize mortgages, are not considered to be “government-owned,” as both firms 
are under federal government conservatorship, meaning that the powers of 
common stockholders have been transferred to a U.S. government agency, but the 
majority of equity rights have not.  See N. ERIC WEISS & DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R44525, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7-8 (May. 31, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44525.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZG-3Z25].  For a 
list of other U.S. federal government corporations, see KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., RL30365, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW (2011), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30365.pdf [https://perma.cc/X66F-BHGG]. 
 290 Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned U.S. Government corporation.  It securitizes 
mortgages insured or guaranteed by the U.S. Federal Housing Administration 
(which guarantees mortgages to first-time and low-income homebuyers), as well as 
several other U.S. government programs.  See Our Model & Platform, GINNIE MAE, 
https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/who_we_are/Pages/our_business_mod
el.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6MN-FBBA]. 
 291  BANK OF N. DAKOTA, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2018), 
https://bnd.nd.gov/annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/7DE7-C3NY] (explaining 
that the Bank of North Dakota is “the only state-owned bank in the country”).  The 
bank’s “primary service is to North Dakota’s financial institutions and state 
agencies” and it only “deal[s] directly with North Dakota residents . . . to fill a need 
that is underserved and for which the private sector has requested [their] 
involvement.”  See Eric Hardmeyer, Why Public Banking Works in North Dakota, N.Y. 
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insurance corporations. 292   Yet, unlike Mainland China’s SFCCs, 
these state-owned institutions all almost exclusively conduct 
financial activities, and are not structured as large multi-layer 
corporate groups. 
In Japan, there are several directly government-owned banks,293 
which unlike Mainland China’s SFCCs, are designed to focus on 
lending to economic sectors deemed by the government to be 
underserved.294  Only one of these entities—Shoko Chukin Bank—
provides a range of retail-facing financial services and conducts 
some non-financial business activities.295  Yet the scope of its non-
financial activities is quite small and its lending activities equaled 
less than two percent of Japan’s outstanding commercial bank loans 
in 2017.296 Conversely, Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance 
maintain sizable retail financial services market shares in Japan and 
are majority-owned by government-controlled Japan Post 
Holdings—which also controls non-financial businesses such as a 
postal service—but the government’s ownership stake in Japan Post 
Holdings must fall to around one-third in the coming years under a 
privatization plan, and the stakes of Japan Post Holdings in Japan 
Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance are likewise each set to fall to 
fifty percent or lower.297  
 
 292  See, e.g., Who We Are, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., 
https://www.citizensfla.com/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/NC9J-445H]. 
 293  IMF, Japan Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report No. 
17/244, at 51 (Jul. 12, 2017), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/31/Japan-Financial-
System-Stability-Assessment-45151 [https://perma.cc/VX7F-VPAL].  
 294 See Lev Ratnovski & Aditya Narain, Public Financial Institutions in Developed 
Countries—Organization and Oversight  7-8 (IMF, Working Paper No. 07/227, 2007),  
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07227.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BB93-K6QC]. 
 295  See New Appearance of Shoko Chukin Bank, SHOKO CHUKIN BANK, 
https://www.shokochukin.co.jp/english/about/company/reborn/; SHOKO 
CHUKIN BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 60 (2018), 
https://www.shokochukin.co.jp/english/about/company/report/2018/pdf/ar1
8_all.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMQ5-YR6Q]. 
 296  See id.; Shoko Chukin Bank’s Q1 2017 loan balance (9.357 trillion yen) 
equaled just 1.7 percent of Japan’s 2017 outstanding commercial bank loan balance, 
which the Federal Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis reports was about 539 trillion yen.  See id.; 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, ECONOMIC DATA, USE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
ASSETS: OUTSTANDING LOANS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS FOR JAPAN (June 26, 2018), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JPNFCSODCXDC [https://perma.cc/WQ7U-
SSV7]. 
 297  See IMF, supra note 293, at 9 n.5, 50-1; Hisao Kodachi, Insurance scandal 
delays Japan Post privatization by 5 years, NIKKEI ASIA (Feb. 13, 2020), 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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In the Eurozone, roughly eight percent of banking assets were 
held by large public sector institutions in 2015.298  Approximately 
sixty percent of these assets belonged to Germany’s regional 
government-owned banks (generally known as Landesbanken), such 
as LBBW, the Eurozone’s largest government-owned financial 
firm. 299   Like Mainland China’s SFCCs, Landesbanken can be 
structured as holding companies300 and may control non-financial 
firms.301  Yet as opposed to FCCs, for which non-financial business 
lines are significant, Landesbanken earn over ninety-eight percent of 
their operating income from financial activities. 302   On the other 
hand, unlike the Landesbanken and the Eurozone’s other sizable 
state-owned financial firms,  France’s La Banque Postale—the 
Eurozone’s second largest state-owned financial firm, accounting 
for ten percent of Eurozone 2015 public sector banking assets303—is 
controlled by a state-owned group that earns the majority of its 
revenue from non-financial business activities. 304  Yet as Table 2 
illustrates, that parent group, La Poste, controls a narrower range of 
 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Insurance-scandal-delays-Japan-Post-privatizati
on-by-5-years [https://perma.cc/K7RR-PXBZ]; Taro Fuse & Taiga Uranaka, Japan 
Post Insurer Plans $2.9 Billion Buyback From Parent, BLOOMBERG  (Dec. 16, 2020) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-16/japan-post-insurer-
plans-2-9-billion-buyback-to-cut-owner-stake [https://perma.cc/3HPV-8X2E]. 
 298 See Nicolas Véron, The Governance and Ownership of Significant Euro-area 
Banks, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUTION, May 2017, at 1, 5, https://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/PC-15-2017-290517.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ7E-
HJTE].  
 299  See id. at 13-15 (reporting data used to calculate German public sector 
regional and local government-owned banks’ share of EU banking assets). 
 300 See IMF, Germany: Financial Sector Assessment Program, Country Report No. 
16/189, at 56 (June 2016), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16189.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WM5B-UQJG]. 
 301  For example, BayernLB controls “one of the largest catering firms in 
Munich.”  Group Subsidiaries, BAYERNLB (JAN. 1, 2021), 
https://www.bayernlb.com/internet/en/blb/resp/about_us/konzern_4/toechte
r_3/toechter_2.jsp [https://perma.cc/SR5E-YQNQ]. 
 302 Data from 2017 shows that Germany’s largest Landesbanken generated over 
73 percent of operating income from interest, and about 25 percent from 
commissions and financial transactions.  DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, MONTHLY REPORT 
29, 36 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/760004/6d8b3367ff98c77e715eac6c
7c12bfc7/mL/2018-09-ertragslage-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5EV-BPXY]. 
 303 See Véron, supra note 298, at 13-15. 
 304  LE GROUPE LA POSTE, 2020 UNIVERSAL REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 8, 12 (2021), 
https://le-groupe-laposte.cdn.prismic.io/le-groupe-laposte/8438b095-1a9a-477a-
8a25-9699ee41876a_GLP2020_UDR_EN_mars_2021.pdf. 
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non-financial affiliates than large Chinese SFCCs. Table 2 contrasts 
business lines of the Eurozone’s two largest state-owned financial 
groups with those of large Chinese SFCCs, as well as large state-
owned entities in the United States and Japan that provide financial 
services. 
 
TABLE 2:  FINANCIAL & NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESS LINES OF 
LARGE GOVERNMENT-OWNED GROUPS ENGAGED IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES IN THE EU, JAPAN, THE PRC, AND THE UNITED STATES  
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 305  Id.; La Banque Postale and its Subsidiaries, LA BANQUE POSTALE, 
https://www.labanquepostale.com/en/about-us/presentation.subsidiaries.html 
[https://perma.cc/WH8E-86FH]. 
 306  The Subsidiaries of LBBW, LBBW, 
https://www.lbbw.de/group/landesbank-baden-wuerttemberg/subsidiaries/
subsidiaries_7wong3s3u_e.html [https://perma.cc/YU2S-9E99] (last visited Mar. 
13, 2021). 
 307 New Appearance of Shoko Chukin Bank, supra note 295, at 60. 
 308 Our Model & Platform, supra note 290. 
 309  Structure, CHINA MERCHANTS GRP., http://
www.cmhk.com/en/ac/orst/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/XWJ6-SULB]. 
 310  About CNPC, CPNC, http://www.cnpc.com.cn
/en/aboutcnpc/aboutcnpc_index.shtml [https://perma.cc/DR3D-674B]. 
 311 See CITIC LTD., supra note 197, at 11, 23, 29, 37, 48-52, 336-38; CHINA CITIC 
BANK, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 57-59 (2018), 
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2018/0427/ltn201804272
486.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ4A-P693].  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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b. Could Mainland China’s FCCs Exist Under the EU’s, Japan’s, or the 
United States’ Regulatory Frameworks? 
Another distinctive characteristic of Mainland China’s financial 
system relative to the world’s three other largest is that its FCCs can 
control relatively large banks and insurers, and can do so without 
being subject to significant group-wide supervision or regulation.312  
As mentioned above, even an FCC regulated under the FHC 
 
 312 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164-70.  
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Measures, as a whole, largely will not be subject to group-wide 
regulation and supervision.  The analysis below examines why 
organizations structured similarly to Mainland China’s largest 
FCCs—many of which by 2017 controlled both a bank and an 
insurer,313 and could exhibit high levels of intra-group transactions, 
as explained above—largely do not exist in the EU, Japan, or the 
United States. 
i. Most FCC Structures Could Not Exist Under the United States’ 
Regulatory Model 
The United States is one of a small number of countries in the 
world where commercial firm ownership of banks is generally 
prohibited, albeit with notable exceptions.314  According to the U.S. 
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), ownership of twenty-five 
percent or more of a bank’s voting securities constitutes control of a 
bank,315 and regulators can also utilize subjective tests to determine 
that owning as little as five percent of voting shares constitutes 
“control.” 316   Once federal regulators determine that an entity 
“controls” a bank, that entity is considered a “bank holding 
company” (“BHC”) 317  and is subject to a number of holding 
company-level regulations, including that the BHC serve as a source 
of strength to its subsidiary bank,318 adherence to strict caps on intra-
 
 313  For a list of the ten largest FCCs as of 2017, see supra note 25 and 
accompanying text.  By early 2017, each of these FCCs controlled either: (i) a bank; 
(ii) one or more insurers; or (iii) a bank and one or more insurers.  Seven of the ten 
largest FCCs controlled a bank and one or more insurers, and only seven FCCs 
listed in Appendix A do not control either a bank or insurer.  See supra note 197 and 
accompanying text. 
 314 See JAMES R. BARTH, TONG LI, APANARD ANGKINAND, YUAN-HSIN CHIANG & 




 315 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (2019). 
 316 12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (2019). 
 317 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2019). 
 318 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2019). 
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group transactions involving the bank, 319  and compliance with 
group-wide capital requirements.320 
By 2016-17, fifteen of the PRC’s largest FCCs maintained an 
ownership stake in a bank greater than twenty-five percent.321  Thus, 
these FCCs would be regulated as BHCs at the holding company 
level under a U.S.-style regulatory model.322  Yet importantly, the 
BHC Act also generally restricts BHCs from controlling non-
financial companies.323  Were a regulatory environment similar to 
that of the U.S.’s enacted across Mainland China, the structures of 
these fifteen FCCs would be effectively prohibited. 
Surely, some U.S. states have permitted the chartering of non-
financial company-owned banks, known as “industrial loan 
companies” (“ILCs”). 324   Yet state laws still require that these 
institutions obtain federal deposit insurance, 325  a process that 
necessitates an application to and approval by the U.S. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),326 which has approved no 
such applications for non-financial company-owned ILCs since 
2004, around the time that Wal-Mart’s efforts to establish an ILC 
were fiercely resisted.327  By 2017, only six non-financial company-
 
 319 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2019) (the aggregate value of intra-group transactions of 
the bank and its subsidiaries to one affiliate generally may not exceed ten percent, 
and to all affiliates, generally may not exceed twenty percent). 
 320 12 CFR § 225, app. A. 
 321 See infra Appendix B. 
 322 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2019) (defining bank holding company). 
 323 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2019).  Some relatively minor exemptions do exist for 
foreign banks, merchant banking investments, and investments in companies that 
conduct activities closely related to the business of banking.  See DIV. OF SUPERVISION 
AND REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
SUPERVISION MANUAL §§ 3040, 3907, 3020 (2020). 
 324 All six non-financial company-owned ILCs are headquartered either in 
Utah or Nevada.  See JAMES R. BARTH & YANFEI SUN, A NEW LOOK AT THE 
PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE US 
BANKING SYSTEM 51 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197316 
[https://perma.cc/H88X-NT7Z]. 
 325  See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1544-45 (citing, as an example, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 7-8-3(4)(b) (2006)). 
 326 In 2006, the FDIC implemented a moratorium on approving commercially 
owned ILC applications.  See id. at 1549-50 (citing FDIC, Moratorium on Certain 
Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71 FED. REG. 43,482, 43,483 
(Aug. 1, 2006)). 
 327  Numerous U.S. government officials opposed Wal-Mart’s early 2000s 
effort to establish an ILC.  See Wilmarth, supra note 325, at 1542.  The last non-
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owned ILCs remained in the U.S.,328 five of which each had total 
assets between $20 million and $1.4 billion USD, while one had 
approximately $9 billion USD in assets.329  Some of these ILCs are 
controlled by primarily non-financial U.S. corporate groups that also 
control other types of financial firms,330 but overall, these groups 
each conduct a level of financial intermediation below the 
thresholds used in this article’s FCC definition.331 
U.S. companies may concurrently control sizable non-financial 
businesses and large non-bank financial firms, such as insurers.332  
For example, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. controls freight rail 
transportation and energy businesses as well as large insurance 
companies, and some companies it controls are active in derivatives 
markets.333  Yet Berkshire Hathaway operates as a holding company 
 
financial company-owned ILC approved for federal deposit insurance by the FDIC 
was Target Bank, which subsequently closed.  See BARTH, LI, ANGKINAND, CHIANG 
& LI, supra note 314, at 24; DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46489, INDUSTRIAL 
LOAN COMPANIES (ILCS): BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46489.pdf.  In December 2020, the FDIC eased 
regulations regarding ILC applications for deposit insurance, and in May 2020, it 
granted conditional approval of applications for two ILCs each controlled by a 
financial business, rather than a commercial business.  See id. at 11-12 (reporting 
that Nelnet and Square, for which the FDIC approved ILC applications in March 
2020, are primarily financial companies). 
 328 See BARTH & SUN, supra note 324, at 51. 
 329 See id.  BMW Bank of North America, ultimately controlled by Germany’s 
BMW AG, had over $9 billion USD in total assets.  See id. 
 330 For example, Harley-Davidson Inc. is the ultimate parent company of the 
ILC Eaglemark Savings Bank, as well as a Nevada-based insurance company, 
Harley-Davidson Insurance Services, Inc.  See id.; About Us, HARLEY-DAVIDSON 
(2020), https://www.insurance.harley-davidson.com/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/F5YY-PLDG]. 
 331 See supra notes 5, 329 and accompanying text. 
 332 Broadly, this business structure is not prohibited by federal or state laws.  
See generally Lanny A. Schwartz, Hilary S. Seo, Nancy Lee, Allen Mayer & Elena 
Belov, So, Now You Own a Broker-Dealer!: Regulatory Considerations for 
Integrating a Brokerage Firm into a Corporate Group (DavisPolk & Oliver Wyman, 
2017), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-09-20_so_now_you_own_broker_dealer.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CAK2-QC7Z]; BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44046, 
INSURANCE REGULATION: BACKGROUND, OVERVIEW, AND LEGISLATION IN THE 114TH 
CONGRESS (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44046.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UHE9-HR77]. 
 333 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at K-1, K-85 (2019), 
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2018ar/2018ar.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RA3B-L6RQ]; see also Ryan Tracy, Regulators Weigh Whether 
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with “essentially no centralized or integrated business functions,” 
and is largely not involved in the day-to-day operations of firms it 
controls334—it does not meet this Article’s definition of an FCC.  
Most other large U.S. insurers exist within corporate groups that 
primarily operate within the financial sector335 and, accordingly, are 
not structured like an FCC. 
This is perhaps in part because, unlike many of the PRC’s FCCs, 
which integrate the activities of financial and non-financial 
businesses, 336  U.S. corporate groups that control insurers face 
stringent regulation of group-wide activities.  Material intra-group 
transactions by an insurer are subject to regulatory review, and such 
transactions must be conducted at “fair and reasonable” terms.337  
The U.S. state insurance regulators also have the power to examine 
risks posed to an insurer by its “ultimate controlling party,” and can 
examine the books and records of that entity and other intra-group 
affiliates.338  State regulators must be notified of changes in major 
insurer shareholders and can actively scrutinize intra-group activity 
to ensure that it does not threaten insurer-level capital adequacy.339 
Notably, applying a U.S.-style regulatory regime to Mainland 
China’s FCCs would result in the two IFCCs being subject to BHC 
 
 334 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., supra note 333, at K-1. 
 335 For a list of the largest insurers in the United States by market share, see 
Facts + Statistics: Insurance Company Rankings, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-insurance-company-rankings 
[https://perma.cc/XM5K-GA4F]. 
 336  Mainland China’s conglomerate structures often foster internal capital 
markets.  See KON SIK KIM, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN EAST ASIA 18-19 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 391/2018, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141179 
[https://perma.cc/R24E-LM4T].  Some large FCCs use funds raised from 
consumers for insurance products to fuel international expansion into non-financial 
sectors.  James T. Addy, In China, Insurers Sell Risky Products to Fund Risky 




 337  NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM 
REGULATORY ACT (MODEL #440-4) §5 (2015) [hereinafter Model U.S. State Insurance 
Holding Company Act], https://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-440.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HME-QCBZ]. 
 338 Id. §6.  All fifty U.S. states have passed this model legislation.  See WEBEL, 
supra note 332, at 19-20. 
 339 Id. §5; see also Ctr. for Ins. Pol’y & Research, Group Supervision, NAT’L ASS’N 
INS. COMM’RS (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_group_supervision.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3Q9P-RR6C]. 
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Act group-wide regulation,340 as Tencent and Alibaba (through Ant 
Group) each control over twenty-five percent of a commercial 
bank’s shares.341  Although WeChat Pay and Alipay are enormous 
PBOC-regulated services, and the PBOC serves as custodian for user 
funds for these payment systems, 342  neither of the ultimate 
controlling groups were subject to group-wide supervision through 
much of the 2010s.343  Conversely, in the United States, debit and 
credit card networks—the dominant channel for non-cash retail 
payments—are controlled by BHCs.344 
ii. Applying EU Rules Would Subject Some Large FCCs to Strict 
Group-wide Regulation, and Similarly Structured EU Groups 
are Rare  
Unlike the United States, the EU generally permits corporate 
groups to concurrently control banks and sizable non-financial 
companies.  However, an EU-based corporate group that conducts 
substantial non-financial activities while also controlling two or 
more types of financial firms can be subject to enhanced group-wide 
regulatory requirements through “supplementary supervision” as a 
“mixed financial holding company” if the following conditions set 
forth in EU Directive 2002/87/EC (as amended) are met345: 
 
 340 See infra Appendix B and accompanying text; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841. 
 341 See infra Appendix B; supra notes 175, 193 and accompanying text. 
 342 See Chen Jia & He Wei, PBOC Reins in Funds of Payment Platforms, CHINA 
DAILY (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/15/WS5c3d169fa3106c65c34e4671.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/NTQ9-C9WN]. 
 343 See supra notes 269-287 and accompanying text. 
 344  See STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT 
CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND 
INNOVATION 215-17 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
08/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities--Nonbank-Financial
s-Fintech-and-Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKR3-C5NQ].  Seventy-four 
percent of non-cash 2017 U.S. consumer transactions were reportedly conducted by 
credit and debit cards.  Id. at 221. 
 345 A corporate group that meets the EU definition of “mixed financial holding 
company” is “subject to supplementary supervision at the level of the . . . 
conglomerate.”  See Council Directive 2002/87, art. 5(2), 2003 O.J. (L 35) [hereinafter 
Supplementary Supervision Directive], 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02002L0087
-20140101&qid=1578025064160&from=EN [https://perma.cc/8H27-GXBR]; see 
also Michael Gruson, Consolidated and Supplementary Supervision of Financial Groups 
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(1) An otherwise non-regulated EU entity (“Group X”) either 
exercises a “dominant influence” over, or directly or indirectly owns 
twenty percent or more of the voting rights or capital of, at least one 
banking or investment services firm, and at least one insurance 
sector company;346 
(2) The balance sheet total of financial sector entities 
substantially invested in or controlled by Group X [the “Financial 
Balance Sheet”] equals over forty percent of Group X’s group-wide 
balance sheet;347 and 
(3) Either: A) Group X’s insurance company assets and its 
combined banking and investment services firm assets each, as a 
share of the Financial Balance Sheet, exceed ten percent, while both 
Group X’s insurance sector solvency requirements and Group X’s 
combined banking and investment services sector solvency 
requirements each equal over ten percent of Group X’s total 
financial sector solvency requirements,348 or B) the smaller of Group 
 
in the European Union 42-43 (Inst. for L. & Fin., Working Paper Series No. 19), 
https://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/ILF_WP_0
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CJ8-TJ7P] (explaining that “the term mixed financial 
holding company [covers] . . . conglomerates headed by a non-regulated entity 
holding company”). 
 346 A “mixed financial holding company” is a “group”—defined to include 
“undertakings which consist[] of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries and the 
entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation”—
that is not headed by a “regulated entity” (including banks, insurers, and funds), 
but which meets the Supplementary Supervision Directive’s definition of a 
“financial conglomerate,” one criteria of which is that at least one entity within the 
group “is within the insurance sector and at least one is within the banking or 
investment services sector.”  Supplementary Supervision Directive, supra note 345, 
arts. 2(12), (14)-(15).  “Subsidiaries” are defined as either: (i) “any undertaking over 
which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, a parent undertaking effectively 
exercises a dominant influence”; (ii) “all subsidiaries of such subsidiary 
undertakings”; or (iii) an entity that is a “subsidiary undertaking,” as defined in 
Article 1 of Council Directive 83/349/EEC—including a company for which 
another entity “has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights.”  Id. 
art. 2(10) (citing Council Directive 83/349 of the Council of the European 
Communities, Seventh Council, Jun. 13, 1983 (as amended, Jan. 7, 2013), art. 1, 2003 
O.J. (L 193), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01983L0349
-20130701&from=EN [https://perma.cc/WWV6-DFXJ]).  “Participation” is 
defined to include “direct or indirect ownership of 20% or more of the voting rights 
or capital of an undertaking.”  Supplementary Supervision Directive, supra note 
345, art. 2(11). 
 347 Id. art. 2(14)(b)(i) (citing art. 3(1)). 
 348 Id. art. 2(14)(b)(iii) (citing art. 3(2)). 
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X’s combined banking and investment services company assets or 
its insurance sector assets exceeds six billion euros.349 
“Supplementary supervision” brings about a range of reporting 
obligations and expanded supervisory authorities over a 
conglomerate, including group-wide capital requirements, 350  risk 
concentration reporting, 351  restrictions on intra-group 
transactions,352 and risk management standards.353  Entities that do 
not meet criteria set forth above but earn a large amount of income 
from financial activities can still be designated as “mixed financial 
holding companies” by national regulators, subject to the same 
“supplementary supervision” regime.354  Additionally, in the EU, 
“financial holding companies”—defined to mean a corporate group, 
the subsidiaries of which are “exclusively or mainly” financial 
companies, at least one of which is a credit institution or investment 
firm, “and which is not a mixed financial holding company”355—are 
subject to consolidated group-wide regulation, and notably, the 
term “mainly” can be understood to mean that over 50 percent of a 
group’s revenues are associated with financial firm subsidiaries.356 
Notably, in 2016, less than one percent of Eurozone banking 
assets were held by financial holding companies or mixed financial 
holding companies that were both:  (i) ultimately controlled by a 
non-financial entity or particular family; and (ii) deemed by 
 
 349 Id. art. 2(14)(b)(iii) (citing art. 3(3)). 
 350 Id. art. 6 
 351 Id. art. 7.  
 352 Id. art. 8. 
 353 Id. art. 9. 
 354  Id. art. 3(5) (noting that regulators may “in exceptional cases and by 
common agreement” use income structure, off-balance sheet activities, or total 
assets under management thresholds to replace the art. 3(2) balance sheet threshold 
used to determine if an organization’s financial activities are significant under art. 
2(14)(b)(iii) and therefore whether it meets the definition of “financial 
conglomerate,” a term that, under art. 2(15), includes “mixed financial holding 
companies”). 
 355 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council 
of the EU of 26 June 2013, art. 4(1)-(3), 4(20), 2003 O.J. (L 176), 
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/501983
/3b700c1c-f136-405d-a4b3-b22ea0a062af/CELEX_32013R0575R(02)_EN_TXT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RVW6-N4B2].  The term “mainly” can refer to when “50% of 
the equity, consolidated assets, revenues, personnel or another indicator deemed 
relevant by [a regulator] are associated with subsidiaries that are institutions or 
financial institutions.”  What is Meant with ‘Mainly’ in the Definition of ‘Financial 
Holding Company’?, EBA (Nov. 21, 2014), https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-
qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2014_796 [https://perma.cc/JS9R-9YTX]. 
 356 See Gruson, supra note 345, at 2-5. 
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regulators to be “significant”—generally defined as groups or 
institutions with over thirty billion euros in assets.357  By late 2019, 
just five mixed financial holding companies, as defined above, were 
directly or indirectly supervised by the European Central Bank.358  
Additionally, several non-financial companies controlled one or 
more “less significant” financial institutions.359 
Considering the above-mentioned criteria, were an EU 
regulatory regime implemented in Mainland China, larger FCCs for 
which financial sector assets make up a sizable share of the group-
wide balance sheet, such as CITIC Group360 and Tomorrow Group 
(as it existed in 2017361), would likely be subject to “supplementary 
supervision.”  Other large FCCs, as structured in 2017, could also 
 
 357 By 2016, approximately eighty percent (22,118 billion euros) of Eurozone 
banking assets (27,699 billion euros) were held by “significant institutions” (“SIs”), 
of which only four—VW Financial Services, Investar/Argenta Bank, RCI Banque, 
and Precision Capital/BIL—were over fifty percent owned by a non-financial 
business or a particular family, accounting for 121 billion, 39 billion, 37 billion, and 
33 billion euros in total assets, respectively.  Véron, supra note 298, at 2, 13-15 (listing 
total Eurozone banking assets and listing assets of and major shareholders in the 
Eurozone’s largest SIs).  SIs generally include all Eurozone financial groups or 
institutions with total financial assets exceeding thirty billion euros, although some 
smaller institutions can also be classified as SIs.  Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of 
the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 (SSM Framework Regulation), art. 50-
52, 2014 O.J. (L 141), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0468&from=EN 
[https://perma.cc/7BN4-TJ8N]. 
 358  See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, LIST OF SUPERVISED ENTITIES (Sep. 2019), 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.listofsupervised
entities201910.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4W5-FFRW]. 
 359 Examples of banks controlled by manufacturing or telecommunications 
groups include Airbus Bank GmbH; Mercedes-Benz Bank AG; Mercedes-Benz 
Bank GmbH; Siemens Bank GmbH; and MOBILIS banque.  See id. at 27, 34, 43, 69, 
79. 
 360 In 2018, CITIC Ltd.’s total financial services company assets (7.1 trillion 
Hong Kong Dollars) equaled well over forty percent of its total, group-wide assets 
(7.7 trillion Hong Kong Dollars).  CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 288, at 2.  
Additionally, the total assets of both an insurer fifty percent controlled by CITIC 
Ltd. and CITIC Bank each exceeded over six billion euros.  Id. at 10, 18.  For 2017 
currency conversion rates, see Exchange Rates, supra note 18, and accompanying 
text. 
 361 At year-end 2016, the assets of banks and insurance companies controlled 
by Tomorrow Group totaled 1.3 trillion and 796 billion yuan (approximately 104 
billion euros), respectively, while Tomorrow Group’s total financial sector 
company assets equaled over three trillion yuan.  See New Fortune 2017 Reports, 
supra note 197.  For 2017 currency conversion rates, see Exchange Rates, supra note 
18 and accompanying text.  A 2017 report describing the conglomerate’s businesses 
suggests that well over forty percent of Tomorrow Group’s assets were likely 
financial sector companies at the time.  See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 
137. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
876 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
seemingly be classified as a “financial holding company” under the 
EU’s regulatory approach, and would thus be subject to group-wide 
supervision.   
It is doubtful that the business mix and structure of the PRC’s 
two IFCCs would be permitted in the EU.  As of 2019, only nine 
internet companies had been granted financial licenses by national 
regulators in the Eurozone, and each of these licenses was quite 
limited in scope. 362   Moreover, the European Central Bank is 
reportedly considering an even stricter regulatory regime for 
internet companies that offer financial services.363 
iii. Under the Japanese Model, Some FCCs Could Operate, but the 
Largest Would Likely be Prohibited 
Japan’s approach towards the regulation of companies 
structured similarly to Mainland China’s FCCs is also more 
accommodating relative to the U.S.’s.  Corporate groups that control 
various sizable financial and non-financial companies are subject to 
differing degrees of regulation by the Financial Supervision 
Authority (“FSA”)—Japan’s banking, insurance, and securities 
market regulator—depending on the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the relationship between a corporate group and the 
financial companies it controls. 
In Japan, if one company owns over fifty percent of shareholder 
voting rights of another company, then the latter company is 
considered a subsidiary of the former.364  A holding company is 
defined as “a company for which the ratio of the total acquisition 
value (or other value if it is so listed in the latest balance sheet) of 
the shares of subsidiary companies to the total assets of said 
company exceeds fifty percent.” 365   Companies that meet this 
 
 362 See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 8, at 7. 
 363 See Martin Arnold, EU Regulators Monitor Big Tech’s Financial Services Foray, 
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/27f965da-e5bf-11e8-8a85-
04b8afea6ea3 [https://perma.cc/4HWH-6YJB]. 
 364  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 2(8), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (unofficial English translation). 
 365 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair 
Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947), art. 9(4)(i), 
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/policy_enforcement/cartels_bidriggings/anti_cartel_f
iles/The_Antimonopoly_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DKM-M7XD] (unofficial 
English translation). 
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definition of a holding company and have at least one bank or 
insurance company subsidiary are defined as “bank holding 
companies” (“Japanese BHCs”) and “insurance holding companies” 
(“Japanese IHCs”), respectively,366 and their business is restricted to 
managing subsidiaries under their control.367 
Certain FCCs—as defined in this Article—can exist under 
Japan’s regulatory model.  An example of such a company is 
Rakuten, Inc., which engages in a variety of e-commerce and 
internet services businesses, and also controls large financial 
companies.368  Yet although one of its subsidiaries controls a bank 
and insurance companies, 369  Rakuten, Inc. is not regulated as a 
Japanese BHC or IHC because it does not meet the Japanese legal 
definition of a holding company.370  Nevertheless, in 2017, almost 
forty percent of Rakuten, Inc.’s total sales reportedly came from 
financial sector activities.371  Large non-financial conglomerates can 
also directly control a Japanese BHC or IHC—for example, Sony 
Corporation owns over sixty-five percent of Sony Financial 
Holdings, which controls a bank and insurance companies.372 
 
 366  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 2(13), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
art. 2(16), https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 367  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-21, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
art. 271-21, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 368  See RAKUTEN, ANNUAL SECURITIES REPORT (“YUKASHOKEN-HOKOKUSHO”): 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017 AND 2018, at 6-7 (2019). 
 369 Announcement of Agreement Regarding Group Reorganization, RAKUTEN (Feb. 
12, 2019), https://global.rakuten.com/corp/news/press/2019/0212_01.html 
[https://perma.cc/DHB8-5KFS]. 
 370 For Japan’s legal definition of a holding company, see supra notes 364-365, 
and accompanying text.  The total acquisition value of the shares of Rakuten’s 
subsidiaries is worth less than half of its total company assets.  See RAKUTEN, supra 
note 368, at 104, 255 (reporting Rakuten, Inc.’s total assets and its capital 
investments into its subsidiaries).  
 371  See Minami Funakoshi & Sam Nussey, Rakuten Seeks to Boost Financial 




 372  Sony Financial Group Structure, SONY FIN. HOLDINGS (Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://www.sonyfh.co.jp/en/company/structure.html 
[https://perma.cc/9R3Q-XMNE]. 
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Japanese non-financial business entities that control financial 
companies are nevertheless subject to FSA regulations.  In Japan, a 
“major shareholder” of a bank or insurer is generally defined to 
include a legal person who controls twenty percent or more of 
voting shares of a bank, insurer, BHC, or IHC.373  Becoming a “major 
shareholder” with the intent to remain one for over a year requires 
regulatory approval,374 and relative to Mainland China, in recent 
years, Japan more strictly monitored transfers of bank shares. 375  
Additionally, a “major shareholder” can be required to provide 
regulators with:  (i) access to materials that can be used to evaluate 
the state of a bank’s or insurer’s business;376 and (ii) the ability to 
perform on-site inspections of the “major shareholder.”377  The FSA 
can also order the “major shareholder” to take measures to ensure 
the “sound and appropriate management of the business of” a bank 
 
 373  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), arts. 2(9)-(10), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 2(13)-(14), https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 374  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-9(1)-(2), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 271-10(1)-(2), https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 375 Compare IMF, Japan: Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed Assessment 
of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Country Report 
No. 17/282, at 56-58 (2017) (observing that Japan is “less than compliant” but not 
“materially non-compliant” with international standards agreed upon by central 
banks related to monitoring the transfer of ownership of shares in banks) with IMF, 
supra note 222 and accompanying text (explaining that in 2017, the PRC was 
“materially non-compliant” with these standards). 
 376  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-11, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 271-12, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 377  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-12, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 271-13, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
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or insurer,378 or require the “major shareholder” to divest.379  Most 
of Mainland China’s FCCs would be subject to these rules under a 
Japanese-style regulatory regime.380 
Moreover, Japan’s Antimonopoly Act prohibits the 
establishment of a “company which constitutes an excessive 
concentration of economic power,” thus limiting the scope of any 
conglomerate’s business activities. 381   Japan’s Fair Trade 
Commission (“JFTC”) sets definitions for such companies, one of 
which is a company that controls directly, or through a subsidiary 
or a “virtual subsidiary,”382 both:  i) a financial company with over 
fifteen trillion yen in total assets; and ii) a non-financial business 
with total assets exceeding over 300 billion yen.383  It seems that by 
2017-18 CITIC Group met this definition,384 and several other large 
 
 378  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-14, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 271-15, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 379  Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-15, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNX-
QNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995), 
arts. 271-16, https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation). 
 380 At least twenty-one FCCs own over twenty percent of a bank while at least 
seventeen FCCs own over twenty percent of an insurer.  See New Fortune 2017 
Reports, supra note 197; see infra Appendix B. 
 381  FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES CONCERNING COMPANIES WHICH 




 382 The guidelines generally define a subsidiary as a “company in Japan in 
which greater than [fifty] percent of its total voting right . . . given to all the stock 
holders (or all the individual members) is owned by another company.”  Id. § 
1(1)(b).  A “virtual subsidiary” is defined as a “company in Japan in which greater 
than twenty-five percent and fifty percent or less of its total voting right is owned 
by the company (including those owned by its subsidiaries . . .) and in which its 
voting rights are the largest among all the holders.”  Id. § 1(1)(c). 
 383 Id. § 2(3) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 2 definition of a group that constitutes 
an “excessive concentration of economic power”). 
 384 In 2018, total assets of CITIC Ltd.’s financial services, resources and energy, 
manufacturing, engineering contracting, and real estate businesses were 7.1 trillion, 
132 billion, 135 billion, 55 billion, and 155 billion Hong Kong Dollars, respectively. 
CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 288, at 2.  In 2018, 1 Hong Kong dollar 
equaled about 14.1 yen.  See Exchange Rates, supra note 18. 
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FCCs did as well. 385   Accordingly, these FCCs would likely be 
subject to regulatory scrutiny and could have been prohibited from 
forming under a Japan-style regulatory regime. 
Another definition used by JFTC is a company group with total 
assets exceeding 15 trillion yen that controls five or more companies, 
each of which has revenue exceeding 600 billion yen and operates in 
a different business area.386  Business areas are narrowly determined 
using the Japan Standard Industrial Classification system 387 —
examples include “building materials,” “iron and steel products,” 
and “banks.”388  Under a third definition, the 15 trillion yen total 
assets threshold is removed and replaced with conditions that:  (i) 
each of five companies controlled by a conglomerate maintains a 10 
percent or higher “sales share” in its respective field of business, or 
just three, depending on if one company “possesses a substantial 
position over a principal field of business with extremely vast scale”; 
and (ii) fields of business in which the company engages are 
“interrelated.”389  Financial services such as banking, credit cards, 
insurance, and securities business are considered interrelated. 390  
Thus, if Japan’s regulatory model were applied in Mainland China, 
Alibaba could potentially be considered a company with “excessive 
 
 385  In 2017, three other primarily non-financial FCCs (China Everbright 
Group, China Merchants Group, and Evergrande Group) controlled a bank with 
over 900 million yuan in assets via an over twenty-five percent ownership stake, 
and thus likely met this definition.  See supra note 382 and accompanying text 
(explaining the JFTC’s “virtual subsidiary” threshold); see infra Appendix B; 
Exchange Rates, supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing a 16.595 yen to 
yuan 2017 conversion rate). 
 386 FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(2) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 1 
definition of a group that constitutes an “excessive concentration of economic 
power”). 
 387 Id., § 2(2)(d) (explaining that, with regards to the JFTC’s Type 1 definition, 
“‘[p]rinciple fields of business’ shall be types of industries which are included in 
the 3-digit classifications of the Japan Standard Industrial Classification and in 
which shipment volume exceeds 600 billion”). 
 388  See Industrial Classification used in the 2016 Economic Census for Business 
Activity, STAT. BUREAU OF JAPAN, https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/e-
census/2016/industry.html [https://perma.cc/DD48-NM63]. 
 389 FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(4) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 3 
definition of a “company that causes an excessive concentration of economic 
power”).  See also Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A of Financial Institutions 
in Japan: Big Bang Financial Deregulation and the New Environment for Corporate 
Combinations of Financial Institutions, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 965, 1003-1006 (1998) 
(explaining that “interrelatedness refers to a situation in which there are trade 
relations among different fields of business, and goods or services from different 
fields of business are complementary to or substitutes for one another”). 
 390 FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(3), list 2. 
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concentration of economic power” according to this third 
definition.391 
c. Some Large FCCs are Uniquely Characterized by Complex Cross-
Shareholding and Pyramid Structures in Which Intra-Group 
Transactions are Prevalent 
As Part III explained, some of Mainland China’s FCCs grew to 
be characterized by the widespread, combined usage of pyramid 
structures and cross-shareholdings within mixed conglomerates 
that engage in high levels of intra-group transactions.  Historically, 
pyramid structures were prevalent in South and East Asia—
particularly Mainland China—as well as some European countries, 
but are now quite rare in much of the EU, Japan, and the United 
States.392  In the United States and Europe, instances of intra-group 
cross-shareholdings are not common, and cross-shareholdings are 
on the decline in Japan as well, despite being prevalent in the past.393 
 
 391 In 2018, Alipay accounted for twenty-four percent of third-party internet 
payments and Ant Financial accounted for over twenty-five percent of MMF assets.  
See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 7, 9.  Data shows that Alibaba also 
accounts for over half of internet retail sales.  See Alibaba, JD.com Lead in China, but a 
Few Others Are Making Dents, Too, EMARKETER (Jun. 2, 2019), 
https://www.emarketer.com/content/alibaba-jd-com-lead-in-china-but-a-few-ot
hers-are-making-dents-too [https://perma.cc/2K8U-6VE9].  A close “trade 
relationship” between these financial businesses and Alibaba’s e-commerce 
business may, under the Japanese regulatory approach, arguably exist.  See FAIR 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(4)(d)(i) (categorizing “trade relationships” as a 
way in which fields of business can be “interrelated”). 
 392 See Bubchuck, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 225, at 7; INSTITUTIONAL 
S’HOLDER SERVS., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 27 (2007), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/final_report_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FE3T-7JEW] (finding that some European companies use 
pyramid structures); Jason W. Howell, The Dual Class Stock Structure in the United 
States: A New Dataset and an Examination of Firms Who Leave the Structure 29 
(May, 2010) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Georgia), 
https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/howell_jason_w_201005_phd.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CJN4-32BH] (observing that pyramid structures are rare in the 
U.S. but common in other countries); Kim, supra note 336, at 13 (finding that the 
“pyramidal ownership structure . . . is relatively rare in the Japanese economy”). 
 393 See Howell, supra note 392, at 29; INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 
392, at 48; Tatsuhisa Shirakabe, Corporate Japan Sheds More Cross-Shareholdings, 
NIKKEI ASIA (Sep. 5, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-
trends/Corporate-Japan-sheds-more-cross-shareholdings 
[https://perma.cc/HWW8-KYGJ]. 
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Indeed, between 1996 and 2011, in response to a range of policy 
reforms that facilitated more diversified ownership structures, 
overall shareholdings by Japanese banks and insurers in other 
companies dropped precipitously from over thirty-five percent to 
about seven percent of publicly-traded equity shares.394  Overall, 
cross-shareholdings equaled just ten percent of Japan’s 2018 stock 
market capitalization, versus thirty-four percent in 1990. 395  
Certainly, some regional banks in Japan still maintain significant 
cross-shareholding levels.396   Yet overall, cross-shareholdings are 
continuing to decline in Japan, reportedly due to recently 
implemented revisions to its corporate governance code, as well as 
enhancements to securities regulations, which require that each 
publicly-listed company disclose its sixty largest investments in 
other companies and state whether any are cross-shareholdings.397  
These rules aim to help ensure that ownership relationships are 
better understood not only for publicly-traded large banks, but also 
at most of Japan’s regional banks, of which approximately three-
quarters are publicly-listed.398 
Thus, despite the modest persistence of cross-shareholdings in 
Japan, Japanese mixed conglomerates are not structured in a way 
that resembles those of Mainland China’s more complex FCCs, 
which exhibit both cross-shareholding and pyramid structures, as 
well as relatively high levels of preferential transactions between 
financial and non-financial affiliates.  Indeed, by 2008, survey data 
showed that significant transactions between related parties—
 
 394 See Hideaki Miyajima & Takaaki Hoda, Ownership Structure and Corporate 
Governance: Has an Increase in Institutional Investors’ Ownership Improved Business 
Performance? 11 POL’Y RES. INST., MIN. OF FIN., JAPAN, PUB. POL’Y REV. 361, 367 (2015), 
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr029/ppr029a.p
df [https://perma.cc/8RTJ-ZJ3T]. 
 395 See Shirakabe, supra note 393. 
 396 See Leo Lewis, Japan’s Cross-Shareholding Still a Tough Habit to Break, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4a89c3a0-cadc-11e7-aa33-
c63fdc9b8c6c [https://perma.cc./5MNE-YUJQ]. 
 397  See Satoshi Uchida, Governance Demands Chip Away at Japanese Cross-
Shareholdings, NIKKEI ASIA (Jul. 8, 2019), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Governance-demands-chip-
away-at-Japanese-cross-shareholdings [https://perma.cc/AW56-K379]. 
 398 Seventy-nine regional banks are publicly listed in Japan.  See Regional Banks 
in Trouble, JAPAN TIMES (May 11, 2019), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/05/11/editorials/regional-banks-
trouble/ [https://perma.cc/7GFQ-5WMQ].  In total, Japan has 102 regional banks.  
List of Licensed (registered) Financial Institutions, FSA, 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/regulated/licensed/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/67HX-X3EE] (reporting data from April 2019 and January 2020). 
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including intra-group transactions, a source of risk for cross-
shareholding structures399—occurred at less than four percent of 
Japan’s listed companies.400 Moreover, transactions between banks 
and a “related person” not conducted according to prevailing 
market terms are generally prohibited in Japan, and the term 
“related person” is defined to include:  (i) a bank’s subsidiary or 
affiliate; (ii) a bank’s major shareholder(s) as well as subsidiaries or 
affiliates of the major shareholder(s); and (iii) any entity holding 
over fifty percent of voting rights in the bank and its subsidiaries or 
affiliates. 401   Conversely, some research finds that by 2015, over 
ninety percent of listed firms in Mainland China engaged in related 
party transactions.402 
EU mixed conglomerates also are not characterized by both 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings, as well as high levels 
of affiliated transactions.  Certainly, in some EU countries such as 
Spain, pyramid structures are not rare,403 and can be used to control 
financial companies. 404   Yet the low, twenty percent investment 
threshold set by the EU’s Directive 2002/87/EC for determining 
whether or not a non-financial conglomerate controls a financial 
institution takes into account whether “dominant influence” exists 
and both indirect and direct ownership. 405   Thus, from the 
perspective of whether supplemental supervision is applicable, it 
appears that there is little difference between using pyramid 
structures to acquire a bank, insurer, or investment company in the 
EU versus more direct approaches.  Moreover, although EU 
 
 399 See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text. 
 400  See OECD, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
RIGHTS 31 (2012). 
 401 See TATSUO TEZUKA, TAKU ISHIZU, MASAO MORISHITA, SUSUMU TANIZAWA, 
JAPAN in BANKING REGULATION IN 27 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 77 (Craig Wasserman 
ed., 2009), 
https://www.jurists.co.jp/sites/default/files/tractate_pdf/en/200905_tezuka_is
hizu_morishita_tanizawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CK-YSXP]. For definitions of 
the terms “subsidiary” and “major shareholder,” see supra notes 364, 373 and 
accompanying text. 
 402 See Kim, supra note 336, at 19 n.62. 
 403  See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 392, at 27 (finding 
meaningful prevalence of pyramid ownership structures in Belgium, France, Spain, 
Luxembourg, and Italy). 
 404 See Valentín Azofra & Marcos Santamaría, Ownership, Control, and Pyramids 
in Spanish Commercial Banks, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 1464 (2011), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426610004218 
[https://perma.cc/J6CK-YSXP]. 
 405 See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text. 
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financial conglomerates can be quite complex (with hundreds of 
business units), once a corporate group is subject to supplemental 
supervision pursuant to Directive 2002/87/EC, regulators pay 
particularly close attention to risks such as multiple leveraging and 
intra-group conflicts-of-interest.406 
V. CONCLUSION 
The large role that FCCs play across Mainland China’s financial 
system is globally unparalleled, and presents its regulators with a 
multifaceted challenge.  The complex ownership structures that 
have emerged within FCCs are difficult to understand, and can 
create opaque interconnectivity not only within corporate groups 
but between them.  As a result, it may be very difficult to know 
whether a particular FCC in Mainland China is adequately 
capitalized, and what impacts its failure would have on the 
economy.   
FCCs emerged in Mainland China not only due to Leninist 
influences and the embrace of cross-sector integration that gave rise 
to the first SFCCs, but also thanks to unclear definitions in 
regulations and laws, insufficiently rigorous supervision, regulatory 
arbitrage precipitated by gaping legal loopholes, and frequent case-
by-case exceptions throughout the 2000s that enabled FCCs to grow 
through investments in banks and insurers.  Simple, time-tested 
approaches to financial markets regulation, such as ensuring the 
regular and accurate disclosure of meaningful intra-group 
transactions and bank and insurer shareholders, as well as 
implementing sound supervisory frameworks to prevent multiple 
leveraging, would go quite far in mitigating potential economic risks 
posed by Mainland China’s FCCs.  While some recent efforts by 
regulators may align with these objectives, it seems that late 2020 
PBOC regulations have legitimized certain FCC structures, 
suggesting that FCCs may remain a unique phenomenon of the 
Chinese financial system for years to come. 
Indeed, as this Article’s application of the EU’s, Japan’s, and the 
United States’ respective regulatory frameworks to Mainland 
 
 406 See Valentina Peleckiene, Kęstutis Peleckis & Gitana Dudzevičiūtė, New 
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China’s FCCs makes clear, the complexity, size, and cross-sector 
structures of some of these groups remain far outside the bounds of 
international norms, and even simple approaches to adequately 
supervising FCCs may not be easy to implement.  This analysis also 
illustrates important trade-offs as new regulatory approaches for 
FCCs are considered.  More broadly, this Article should serve as a 
wake-up call to regulators and market participants to be concerned 
about risks caused by Mainland China’s FCCs, and will help those 
seeking to better understand how the structures and activities of 
these entities could change as new regulations are promulgated. 
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VI. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: THIRTY-FOUR FCCS (2017)407 
FCC name Selected major non-financial business line(s) 
Est. number of financial 
companies controlled  
Tomorrow Group energy; media; technology; tourism; real estate 22 
Ping An Group 
e-commerce; healthcare; infrastructure; real estate; 
technology 
9 
HNA Group aviation; tourism; real estate 8 
CITIC Group 
aviation; construction; communications; energy; 
infrastructure; manufacturing; power generation; metals 
and minerals production; real estate; transportation 
7 
China Everbright Group 
energy; healthcare; pharmaceuticals; property 
management; real estate; tourism 
7 
Alibaba 
communications; e-commerce; logistics; information 
technology 
6 
China Merchants Group 
construction; consumer products; energy; healthcare; 
logistics; infrastructure; manufacturing; real estate 
6 
State Grid Corp. of China power transmission 6 
Anbang Group real estate; tourism 5 
Aviation Industry Corp. 
of China 
aviation; manufacturing; military 5 
China Huaneng Group power generation; technology; transportation 5 
China Minmetals 





energy; information technology; real estate; tourism 4 
Funde Group energy; entertainment; logistics; real estate 4 
China National 
Petroleum Corporation 
energy; oil/gas production 4 
Wanxiang Group energy; manufacturing 4 
Baoneng Group logistics; manufacturing; real estate; tourism 3 
China Baowu Steel 
Group 
energy; steel production 3 
China Oil & Foodstuffs 
Corp. 
agricultural products; foodstuffs production; real estate 3 
China Resources 
construction; consumer products; oil/gas production; 
power generation; real estate; pharmaceuticals 
3 
Huaxin Huitong Group logistics; information technology; real estate; tourism 3 
Tencent 




 407 For the methodology used to develop this list of FCCs and determine the 
number of financial companies controlled by each FCC, see supra notes 5, 197 and 
accompanying text.  This article only considers nine types of financial companies.  
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  Information on non-financial business 
lines was compiled using company websites and the following financial data and 
information sources: Bloomberg; Reuters; TianYanCha; Wind. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5
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China National Offshore 
Oil Corp. 
energy; power generation; oil/gas production 2 
China Railway Group infrastructure; real estate; manufacturing; transportation 2 
China Zhongwang 
Group 
manufacturing; metals and minerals production 2 
Evergrande Group 
construction; consumer products; foodstuffs production; 
healthcare; manufacturing; real estate; tourism 
2 
Haier Group consumer products; manufacturing  2 
Hongda Group 








aviation; construction; consumer products; 




construction; logistics; metals and minerals production; 
real estate; steel production 
2 
Sinochem Group 
agricultural products; chemicals and metals production; 
energy 
2 
State Power Investment 
Corp. 
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APPENDIX B: TWENTY-ONE FCCS WITH A SIGNIFICANT 
MAINLAND CHINA BANK INVESTMENT (2016-17)408  
 
FCC name 
Name of bank controlled (“C”) or 
influenced (“I”) by FCC as of 2016 
Q2 2017 Banking 
Assets (yuan) 
FCC's estimated % 
of bank shares 
China Merchants 
Group 
China Merchants Bank (C) 6,199,690,000,000 29.97% 
CITIC Group CITIC Bank (C) 5,651,216,000,000 65.97% 
Funde Holding 
Group 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (I) 5,915,395,000,000 20.68% 
China Everbright 
Group  
China Everbright Bank (C) 4,033,546,000,000 29.00% 
Ping An Group Ping An Bank (C) 3,092,142,000,000 57.94% 
Shougang Group Huaxia Bank (I) 2,423,098,000,000 20.28% 
State Grid Corp. of 
China 
China Guangfa Bank (I) 1,992,227,000,000 20.00% 
Tomorrow Group 
Baoshang Bank (C) 546,615,738,304  37.56% 
Harbin Bank (C) 546,927,086,000  25.93% 
Guangdong Huaxing Bank (C) 122,867,736,462 27.02% 
Bank of Weifang (C) 103,627,719,616* 38.86% 
Tai'an Bank (C) 60,421,695,162  45.91% 
Shenyang Rural Commercial Bank (C) 39,814,000,000** 30.00% 
Evergrande Group Shengjing Bank (C) 938,711,110,000  27.24% 
Anbang Group Chengdu Rural Commerical Bank (C) 671,305,946,542 35.00% 
China National 
Petroleum Corp. 
Bank of Kunlun (C) 301,192,438,996 77.10% 
Haier Group Bank of Qingdao (C) 281,976,231,000 19.06% 
China Oil & 
Foodstuffs Corp. 
Longjiang Bank (I) 245,573,282,900 20.00% 
China Resources China Resources Bank (C) 142,236,495,724 75.33% 
China Zhongwang 
Group 
Bank of Liaoyang (C) 126,343,524,103 31.46% 
Nanshan Group Yantai Bank (C) 74,305,251,158 34.86% 
China Minmetals Mianyang City Commercial Bank (C) 71,126,740,368 20.00% 
Alibaba MYbank (C) 61,522,357,612* 30.00% 
Tencent WeBank (C) 51,995,491,724* 30.00% 
HNA Group Yingkou Coastal Bank (C) 50,744,737,928 24.80% 
JuneYao Group Shanghai Huarui Bank (C) 30,983,499,686  30.00% 
 
 
 408 For more information on how this Appendix was developed, see supra 
notes 197, 200 and accompanying text.  A “*” designates that due to mid-year data 
availability issues, year-end 2016 data, as reported by Wind, was used rather than 
Q2 2017 banking asset data.  A “**” designates that due to data availability issues, 
2015 data on banking assets, as reported by New Fortune, was used. 
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